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Abstract
Type theories with canonical objects like Martin Lo¨f ’s Type Theory or Luo’s
UTT have increasingly gained popularity in the last decades due to their usage
in proof assistants, formal semantics of natural language and formalization
of mathematics. The main purpose of this work is to explore a new way
of introducing coercive subtyping in such type theories which facilitates the
representation of some practical notions of subtyping.
Introducing subtyping in dependent type theories is not straightforward
when the preservation of properties like canonicity and subject reduction is also
desired. Previous research already showed how such properties are affected
by the usual notion of subsumptive subtyping and offered an alternative in
the form of coercive subtyping introduced by enriching the system with a
set of coercive subtyping judgements. Here I introduce a new way of adding
coercive subtyping to type theory, specifically by annotating certain functions
in assumptions, arguing that this is more handy to represent practical cases.
This system is also closer to the programming model of proof assistants like
Coq where coercions are annotated as such at the assumption level.
Assumptions in Type Theory are represented as either contexts, which
are sequences of membership entries for variables that bear abstraction and
substitution or signatures, which are sequences of memberships entries for
constants for which abstraction and substitution are not available. I shall use
signatures as an environment for subtyping assumptions. I will prove that
the system thus obtained is well behaved, in that it is only abbreviational to
the original system, by considering its relation with the previous version of
coercive subtyping which was already proved to be well behaved.
To demonstrate the ability of the system to argue about practical situa-
tions, I will present three case studies. The first one studies the relationship
between a subsumptive subtyping system and coercive subtyping. The second
case study discusses how Russell-style universe inclusions, as found in Homo-
topy Type Theory, can be understood as coercions in a system with Tarski
style hierarchy. And the last discussion is the need to treat injectivity as an
assumption as well in order to capture faithfully some notions of subtyping
which are based on or generalize inclusion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Considering the increasing popularity of type theories with canonical objects
due to usage in proof assistants like Coq [Coq10], Agda [Agd08], Plastic [CL01]
and Lego [Pol94], in formalization of mathematics projects like Homotopy
Type Theory [Uni13] and in formal semantics of natural language under the
paradigm of common nouns as type initiated by Ranta [Ran94] and further
developed by Luo [Luo12a], I find it important to formulate the concept of
subtyping in a way which does not break the useful properties of such type
theories and at the same time reflects the use of subtyping in practice. So the
main focus of this thesis is to introduce the notion of subtyping in such a way
and analyze some practical situations and how it can be used to argue about
them. In the rest of this chapter I informally introduce some concepts and
present the overview together with the contributions of this thesis.
1.1 Dependent Type Theory
Type Theory is a formal language developed around the concept of terms
being of a certain, defined, uniquely determined type. In contrast to Set
Theory, where a ∈ A is a proposition that can be negated as a 6∈ A, in
Type Theory the fact that a term has a type, denoted by a:A, is a derivable
judgement and its negation does not make sense as the term a can only exist
as a term of a certain type. In addition, it is its own deduction system, a
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type A and a term of it a:A are introduced or computed via preestablished
rules. Church’s Simply Typed λ - Calculus [Chu32, Chu40] and Martin Lo¨f’s
Intuitionistic Type Theory [ML73, ML84] are examples of such languages. The
latter uses the propositions themselves as types and a proposition P being
true amounts to the ability of constructing a proof for it p:P . This setting was
initially employed for foundation of constructive mathematics but it recently
also gained relevance as a programming language.
We can consider the type of natural numbers Nat and the type of pairs
Nat×P . The terms of this type have as their first component a natural number
and as their second component a proof of the proposition P . Similarly we can
consider the type of functions A −→ B. Further, given an integer n:Nat we
can intuitively consider n ∗ Nat which is the type of multiples of n. This
can be seen as the type of natural numbers m, such that there exists another
natural number q such that m = n ∗ q. Formally, this can also be seen as
a pair formed by m in the first component and in the second component a
proof that there exists another natural number q such that m = n ∗ q. Let us
rephrase this by saying that the second component is a proof that n divides m.
This time the type of the second component depends on the first component,
let us call this type, which is a proposition, P (n). The type of such pairs
is called a dependent pairs type which is denoted by Σ(Nat , λm:Nat .P (m))
or Σm:NatP (m). Similarly if we want to consider a program that takes a
natural number n and gives back a vector of length n, we denote the type of
this program by Π(Nat , λn:Nat .V ect(n)) or Πn:NatV ect(n) and refer to it as
dependent function type.
What these examples have in common is the idea of types that depend
on terms. A language with dependent types is more powerful than a sim-
ply typed language. Some dependent type systems in which types depend
on terms are Martin-Lo¨f’s Intuitionistic Type Theory [ML84], Coquand and
Mohring’s Calculus of Inductive Constructions [CP90, PM93] and Luo’s Ex-
tended Calculus of Constructions [Luo90] and Unifying Theory of Dependent
Types(UTT) [Luo92, Luo94].
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When working with dependent type theories one specifies the way well
formed terms are built by introduction rules. Such a type theory can be spec-
ified in a meta-theory which we call a logical framework. A logical framework
is a metalanguage for formalization of deductive systems like natural deduc-
tion, categorical logic, axiomatic methods or sequent calculus([Pfe02]). We
will call the deductive systems under formalization object theories. The bene-
fit of using a logical framework is that it is itself a type theory so it is computer
understandable and it can embed multiple object theories in the same type
theory.
An example of logical frameworks is Edinburgh Logical Framework from
([HHP93]) which is obtained by adding type dependency to the simply typed
λ-calculus. It was used to represent natural deduction based on the corre-
spondence judgements-as-types. Here by judgements we mean judgements of
the object theory in the style of natural deduction. The types of the logical
framework itself will be called kinds for distinction. Another logical framework
is Martin-Lo¨f’s logical framework introduced for Martin Lo¨f’s intensional type
theory [NPS90] and which is also based on λ-calculus. Martin-Lo¨f’s logical
framework is untyped. A typed version of it was developed by Luo [Luo94]
and UTT [Luo92, Luo94] is a theory specified in this logical framework.
Types in such type theories are introduced by type constructors whose
introduction rules determine their canonical objects. Some of these systems
exhibit some important properties like canonicity (every closed object of a type
reduces to a canonical object of that type), subject reduction (if a term M
reduces to another term N then, if M :A is derivable then N :A is derivable as
well), strong normalization (starting from a well-typed term, every rewriting
sequence terminates) and Church-Rosser (if a term M reduces to two terms
P and Q then there exists a term N such that both P and Q reduce to N).
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1.2 Signatures and Contexts
Judgements of a type theory are typically of the form Γ ` J , where Γ is called
context and represents the assumptions part of the judgements. This is a
sequence of membership entries like x1:A1, ..., xn:An. {xi}i={1..n} are usually
treated as variables, they can be substituted or abstracted over.
Signatures were first introduced in [HHP93], and are used to keep track
of constants as opposed to variables. They are also sequences of membership
entries like a1:A1, ..., an:An but these entries don’t support substitution or
abstraction. When signatures are used, the judgements are of the form Γ `Σ J ,
where Γ is a context and Σ is a signature. Signatures have been used in [CL15]
to represent situations in natural language under the paradigm of common
nouns as types initiated by Ranta [Ran94] and further developed by Luo and
colleagues [Luo12a, CL14, LL14].
To understand the difference better let us consider again the example with
multiples of an integer. If n:Nat is part of a context, say for the judgement
Γ, n:Nat , p:P (n) `Σ J we can substitute n with any concrete natural number,
say 2 and obtain Γ, p:P (2) ` [2/n]J1. This cannot happen if we consider
it to be part of a signature like `Σ,n:Nat ,p:P (n) J because n is not a variable
here. Similarly, if we had the context Γ, n:Nat `Σ p:P (n) we could abstract
over it and obtain the judgement Γ `Σ [n:Nat ]p:Π(Nat , λn:Nat .P (n)). This
again is not possible if n:Nat is an entry in the signature. More details on
how substitution and abstraction work follow in Subsection 2.1.1 of the next
chapter.
1.3 Subtyping
Subtyping is a very important and widely used concept in Computer Science
as well as in mathematics, Natural Language and other domains. The most
intuitive and extensively used form of subtyping is subsumption, which states
1here we assume that n might occur in J and [2/n] means that we substitute any occur-
rence of it with 2
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that, if A is a subtype of B all terms of type A are also terms of type B. The
intuition for this kind of subtyping is given by the very expressive notion of
subset. In programming languages employing type assignment systems (well
typing discipline), like ML, which is based on Curry’s system, the problem
of typeability is, for a given term M , to find a context (basis) Γ and a type
A such that Γ ` M :A. Here, because of concepts like principal types (eg.
[vB92]), it is crucial to understand the type hierarchy as a partial order and a
term as belonging to multiple types.
If A is a subtype of A′, we write A ≤ A′. A very useful consequence of the
subsumptive subtyping concept is that we can use an object of A wherever
an object of A′ is expected, a property like the Liskov substitution princi-
ple [LW94] from object oriented programming. This property is also referred
to as subtyping polymorphism. Polymorphism can be achieved through sub-
typing but there is also a form of ad hock polymorphism, when there is no
subsumptive relation, for example + can be applied to any pair of terms
belonging to subtypes of real numbers, R but also to a pair of terms of type
String([Rey80]), the type of strings or a pair of terms, for example, of type Z8,
the type of integers modulo 8([JG94], none of these types having a subsumptive
relation with R. To represent this kind of polymorphism, Reynolds [Rey80]
was first to consider the notion of coercion between objects of different unre-
lated (from subtyping point of view) types in programming languages. Other
developments of coercion semantics of subtyping for programming languages
include work by Mitchell [Mit84] and Breazu-Tannen et al [BCGS91].
When talking about dependent type theories, subtyping as understood in
programming languages simply does not fit. On the one hand the problem
of finding a type for an object doesn’t make sense as objects can only be
introduced as having a type. Further, allowing a term to have multiple types
breaks some of the useful properties of such a type theory that I mentioned
earlier, for example a term of a type can reduce to a term of a different type2.
For this, Luo [Luo96, Luo99] introduced the notion of coercion in dependent
2more details about this follow in the next chapter in section 2.3
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type theory to denote the use of explicitly distinguished conversions to map an
object of T into objects of its supertypes. The kind of subtyping he proposed
keeps the advantage of being able to use an object of a type A wherever an
object of its supertypes is expected but without the burden of an object having
multiple types. If A is a subtype of B, we call the application of a function that
expects an object of type B to an object of type A coercive application. In
order to keep the system consistent, when enhancing it with rules for coercive
application, we want such applications to be nothing more than abbreviations
of the normal well typed application. The formalization of this correctness was
studied later in [SL02, LL01, Luo05] and only finalized in [LSX13, Xue13b].
This formalization is for a system which introduces subtyping through a set
of subtyping judgements. More precisely, the authors consider a base type
theory specified in Luo’s logical framework [Luo94] and they enrich it with a
set C formed of judgements of the form Γ ` A <c B, where c is the coercion
between A and B in context Γ, together with a rule that makes all judgements
in C derivable.
Introducing subtyping through a set of judgements works well in theory,
but it does not represent closely practical situations in which subtyping entries
are part of assumption, for example the programming model of Coq [Coq10]
which is a proof assistant that supports coercive subtyping. The way one
can specify a subtyping assumption in Coq is simply by annotating a prede-
fined mapping as coercion. This thesis introduces a system which allows the
possibility to add coercive subtyping entries to assumptions which apply to a
judgement rather than through a set which applies to the whole system. Pre-
vious work in this direction was started by Luo [LP13] but even though that
seemed like a powerful system that setting is quite tedious to work with. I
argue that the system I introduce here achieves a balance in that it is capable
to represent practical situations, it is close to the programming model of proof
assistants and at the same time it is reasonably easy to formalize and work
with.
Subtyping in dependent type theories has also been studied by Betarte and
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Tasistro [BT98] for Martin-Lo¨f’s logical framework analyzing subkinding be-
tween kinds (called types), Barthe and Frade[BF99] on constructor subtyping
and Aspinall and Compagnoni [AC01] on a form of subsumptive subtyping in
assumptions for Edinburgh Logical Framework [HHP93] among others. The
latter inspires one of the practical situation that I will formally represent in
the system I introduce here. I will also consider constructor subtyping when
discussing certain properties that subtyping benefits from in practice.
1.4 Overview of the Thesis and Contributions
The second chapter introduces the setting used in later chapters of this thesis
in formal details. It will give technical details about dependent type theories,
logical frameworks used to specify type theories and their inductive types,
signatures and subtyping.
A main objective of this thesis is to introduce a system which achieves
a good balance between being powerful enough to represent some practical
situations and to have a reasonably easy meta-theory. I argue that the system
I introduce in chapter three achieves this objective. This system is an extension
of an original dependent type theory with the ability to annotate conversions as
coercions at assumption level. Essentially, this system is a system with coercive
subtyping entries in signatures. This chapter also discusses the relation of this
new system to a system introduced by Luo et al. [LSX13, Xue13b] which also
uses the notion of coercive subtyping.
One of the practical situations that I claim this system is capable to repre-
sent is subsumptive subtyping. The first part of chapter four considers such a
form, more precisely, a system which introduces subtyping through contexts,
and shows how it can be represented in the system with coercive subtyping
entries in signatures. Later in the chapter, more forms of subtyping are con-
sidered. First I consider Russell style universes with their cumulativity and
argue that a system with Tarski style universes and coercive subtyping entries
in signatures can represent it. Further, when subsumptive subtyping, often
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perceived as inclusion is considered, an important thing to consider is injectiv-
ity and to what extent coercive subtyping can exhibit such a property. This
is a discussion I carry out at the end of chapter four by means of constructor
subtyping with Leibniz equality.
The fifth chapter concludes the discussion from the previous chapters and
presents certain points raised during the research work for this thesis and
left open for future work. In particular, an important topic is extension by
definition in type theories.
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Chapter 2
Type Theory, Subtyping and
Signatures
In this chapter I will give the formal context needed to understand the work
done in this thesis. I will reiterate the sections of the previous chapter with
emphasis on the technical details. In particular, I present the notion of logical
framework with emphasise on Luo’s Logical Framework (LF [Luo94]), and I
give examples on how logical frameworks can be used to specify type theories.
I also present universes, Russell and Tarski style and give examples of how
they can be used. I revisit the notion of signatures in a more technical light
and finish with a discussion about subsumptive and coercive subtyping and
some of the multiple forms they appeared in related work.
2.1 Dependent Type Theory
2.1.1 Logical Framework
A logical framework is a metalanguage for formalization of object theories
which are deductive system [Pfe02]. Such logical frameworks are Edinburgh
Logical Framework([HHP93]), where dependently typed λ-calculus was used to
represent natural deduction based on the correspondence judgements-as-types,
the untyped Martin-Lo¨f’s logical framework used for Martin-Lo¨f’s intensional
type theory [NPS90] based on the correspondence propositions-as-types and
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the logical framework which we shall denote by LF developed by Luo [Luo94]
and used to specify UTT [Luo92, Luo94].
In what follows I will present LF in more detail. This is also presented in
Chapter 9 of [Luo94].
Kinds. As mentioned earlier, the types of the logical framework itself will
be called kinds for distinction. The kind of types will be called Type. Note
that this kind is Set in Martin-Lo¨f’s logical framework [NPS90]. Other kinds
of LF are of the form El(A), where A:Type, and (x:K)K ′. El(A) is the kind
of elements of A. I will often write A for El(A) where there is no confusion.
(x:K)K ′ is the dependent product kind, analogous to Π(A,B) which, if de-
fined, is the dependent product type. If x does not occur free in K ′ I will
simply write (K)K ′ instead of (x:K)K ′.
Judgements. Judgements of LF are of the form
1. ` Γ which states that Γ is a valid context. Γ is of the form x1:K1, ..., xn:Kn.
Contexts are used to keep track of such variable which can be abstracted
and substituted. Note that LF does not originally use signatures so all
the assumption entries represent variables.
2. Γ ` K kind which states that the kind K is valid under the assumptions
in Γ.
3. Γ ` k:K which states that the term k has kind K under the assumptions
in Γ.
4. Γ ` k = k′:K which states that the terms k and k′ of kind K are defi-
nitionally equal under the assumptions in Γ. The notion of definitional
equality follows in this section.
Inference Rules. A judgement can be derivable, that is it can be inferred
using inference rules from derivable premises. Inference rules are of the form
J1...Jn
J
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with {Ji}i∈{1..n} the premises of the rules and J the conclusion of the rule. An
instance of a rule is a rule in which {Ji}i∈{1..n} and J are concrete judgements.
In what follows, I will use the notation ≡ to denote the syntactic equality.
Abstraction. In the signatures discussion from Section 1.2 of the previous
chapter I also used the notation [x:K]k to denote abstraction. What this really
means is that, if we have the judgement Γ, x:K ` k:K ′, we can abstract over
the variable x to obtain the judgement Γ ` [x:K]k:(x:K)K ′. Note that [x:K]k
corresponds to the untyped functional operation (x)k from Martin-Lo¨f’s logical
framework.
Substitution. When discussing about signatures, in Section 1.2 of the previ-
ous chapter, I briefly introduced the notation [k/x]J to denote the substitution
of the free variable x with k in the judgement J . We have seen that, in our
case, J can be Γ, K kind, k:K or k = k′:K. If J ≡ k′:K, then [k/x]J ≡
[k/x]k′:[k/x]K. Of course if x does not occur free in k′, then [k/x]k′ ≡ k′. If
J ≡ Γ ≡ x1:K1, ..., xn:Kn then [k/x]J ≡ x1:[k/x]K1, ...xn:[k/x]Kn. However
when substituting a variable special care needs to be taken to not capture free
variables, for example, let us look at [y:L]k′:K, where x does occur free in k′.
If we substitute x with y, we obtain [y:L]([y/x]k′):[y/x]K and now the bound
y:L also captures the replaced occurrences of x in k′ which were free before
the substitution, that is [y/x]([y:L]k′) 6≡ [y:L]([y/x]k′). This can be avoided
by using α-conversion which is essentially the procedure of renaming bound
variables. In our case, [y:L]([z/x]k′):K is α-convertible to [z:L]k′:K and now
we can freely substitute x with y without capturing any additional variable.
When a term t is α convertible to another term t′, we write t ≡ t′.
Definitional Equality. I will use the notation k1 = k2:K to denote that the
terms k1 and k2 are definitionally equal. This means that they are identical
up to βη - conversion. By β - conversion we mean ([x:K]k′)(k)→β [k/x]k′
and by η - conversion we mean [x:K]f(x)→η f when x does not occur free
in f . For a judgement Γ ` k = k′:K to be derivable we require that both
14
Γ ` k:K and Γ ` k′:K are derivable.
It is worth noting the difference between this kind of equality, also referred
to as judgemental equality, and propositional equality. Propositional equality
is a proposition and requires a proof, therefore a type which might be inhabited
or not. For a type A, for any two elements x:A and y:A, we define the type
IdA(x, y) which is the proposition that x and y are equal. Two terms of type
A, a1 and a2 can be proven to be equal or are propositionally equal if there
exists p:IdA(a1, a2). The type IdA(a, a) is always inhabited.
The inference rules of LF are presented in Figure 2.1 (and Figure A.1
in the Appendix A). The rules in the first section specify how to derive valid
contexts, or sequences of assumptions. For the dependent product kind section
of this figure, the first rule on the left hand side gives a way to form the kind,
the left rule on the second rule gives a way to introduce a term of this kind
and the left rule on the third row gives a way to eliminate such a term. The
last two rules from this section are for β and η conversions. The rest of the
rules specify how to derive definitional equality and the kind of elements of a
type.
2.1.2 Type Theories specified in LF
I mentioned Edinburgh Logical Framework ([HHP93]) has been used to repre-
sent natural deduction based on the correspondence judgements-as-types, the
Martin-Lo¨f’s intensional type theory [NPS90] is specified in Martin-Lo¨f’s log-
ical framework based on the correspondence propositions-as-types. How can
one use LF as a meta language to specify object theories?
Essentially, to specify an object type theory in LF , one has to specify new
constants and set of computation rules for each constant which represents how
a term of the newly introduced type can be used. For example, for dependent
15
Validity of Signature/Contexts, Assumptions
` 〈〉
Γ ` K kind x 6∈ dom(Γ)
` Γ, x:K
` Γ, x:K,Γ′
Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` x:K
Equality Rules
Γ ` K kind
Γ ` K = K
Γ ` K = K′
Γ ` K′ = K
Γ ` K = K′ Γ ` K′ = K′′
Γ ` K = K′′
Γ ` k:K
Γ ` k = k:K
Γ ` k = k′:K
Γ ` k′ = k:K
Γ ` k = k′:K Γ ` k′ = k′′:K
Γ ` k = k′′:K
Γ ` k:K Γ ` K = K′
Γ ` k:K′
Γ ` k = k′:K Γ ` K = K′
Γ ` k = k′:K′
Substitution Rules
` Γ0, x:K,Γ1 Γ0 ` k:K
` Γ0, [k/x]Γ1
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K′ kind Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K′ kind
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` L = L′ Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]L = [k/x]L′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` k′:K′ Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` l = l′:K′ Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]l = [k/x]l′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K′ kind Γ0 ` k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K′ = [k′/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` l:K′ Γ0 ` k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]l = [k′/x]l:[k/x]K′
Dependent Product Kinds
Γ ` K kind Γ, x:K ` K′ kind
Γ ` (x:K)K′ kind
Γ ` K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1 ` K′1 = K′2
Γ ` (x:K1)K′1 = (x:K2)K′2
Γ, x:K ` y:K′
Γ ` [x:K]y:(x:K)K′
Γ ` K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1 ` k1 = k2:K
Γ ` [x:K1]k1 = [x:K2]k2:(x:K1)K
Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ Γ ` k:K
Γ ` f(k):[k/x]K′
Γ ` f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Γ ` k1 = k2:K
Γ ` f(k1) = f ′(k2):[k1/x]K′
Γ, x:K ` k′:K′ Γ ` k:K
Γ ` ([x:K]k′)(k) = [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ x 6∈ FV (f)
Γ ` [x:K]f(x) = f :(x:K)K′
The kind Type
` Γ
Γ ` Type kind
Γ ` A:Type
Γ ` El(A) kind
Γ ` A = B:Type
Γ ` El(A) = El(B)
Figure 2.1: Inference Rules for LF
product type the constants are
Π : (A:Type)(B:(A)Type)Type
λ : (A:Type)(B:(A)Type)((x:A)B(x))Π(A,B)
app : (A:Type)(B:(A)Type)(Π(A,B))(x:A)B(x)
and the computation rule is
app(A,B, λ(A,B, f), a) = f(a) : B(a).
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It might be worth noting that dependent product kind is part of the logical
framework. In contrast, for a type theory specified in LF to have a dependent
product type, one needs to specify this type with constants as above.
To declare constant k:K typically corresponds to the addition of a new
inference rule
` Γ
Γ ` k:K
to the type theory specified by LF . Similarly each computation rule corre-
sponds to the addition of a new rule. For the example with dependent product
type, the constants correspond to the addition of the rules in Figure 2.2 (and
in Figure A.2 of the Appendix A).
Γ ` A : Type Γ, x:A ` B(x) : Type
Γ ` Π(A,B) : Type
Γ ` A : Type Γ ` B : (A)Type Γ ` f : (x:A)B(x)
Γ ` λ(A,B, f) : Π(A,B)
Γ ` g : Π(A,B) Γ ` a : A
Γ ` app(A,B, g, a) : B(a)
Γ ` A : Type Γ ` B : (A)Type
Γ ` f : (x:A)B(x) Γ ` a : A
Γ ` app(A,B, λ(A,B, f), a) = f(a) : B(a)
Figure 2.2: Inference Rules for Π-type specified in LF
Observe that we do not need to add structural equality rules for Π, λ
and app as they are constants and the above terms are obtained through the
application from LF which already has structural equality rules.
Similarly we can introduce the type of natural numbers which we have
already mentioned, Nat , with the following constants:
Nat : Type
0 : Nat
Succ : (Nat)Nat
rec : (C:(Nat)Type)(c:C(0))(f :(x:Nat)(C(x))C(Succ(x)))(n:N)(C(n))
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and the computation rules:
rec(C, c, f, 0) = c : C(0)
rec(C, c, f,Succ(n)) = f(n, rec(C, c, f, n)) : C(Succ(n))
Note that the rec constant corresponds to the induction principle and
in the second computation rule rec(C, c, f, n) can be seen as a proof of the
induction hypothesis. Just as the computation for Π tells us that, if we have
a function, we can use it by applying it to something, the computation rule
of Nat essentially tells that, if we have a natural number, we can use it by
counting to it. For example, one can use rec to define the addition of natural
numbers +(m,n) = rec([x:Nat ]Nat ,m, [:Nat ]Succ, n) Similarly to the Π type,
Nat also corresponds to the respective rules from Figure 2.3.
` Γ
Γ ` Nat : Type
` Γ
Γ ` 0:Nat
Γ ` n:Nat
Γ ` Succ(n):Nat
Γ ` C:(Nat)Type Γ ` n0:C(0) Γ ` f :(x:Nat)(C(x))C(Succ(x)) Γ ` n:Nat
Γ ` rec(C, n0, f, n):C(n)
Γ ` C:(Nat)Type Γ ` n0:C(0) Γ ` f :(x:Nat)(C(x))C(Succ(x)) Γ ` n:Nat
Γ ` rec(C, n0, f, 0) = n0:C(0)
Γ ` C:(Nat)Type Γ ` n0:C(0) Γ ` f :(x:Nat)(C(x))C(Succ(x)) Γ ` n:Nat
Γ ` rec(C, n0, f,Succ(n)) = f(n, rec(C, n0, f, n)) : C(Succ(n))
Figure 2.3: Inference Rules for Nat specified in LF
The Unifying Theory of Dependent Types UTT
UTT [Luo92, Luo94] is an important example of type theory specified in LF .
Martin-Lo¨f’s intensional type theory [NPS90] is specified in Martin-Lo¨f’s log-
ical framework based on the correspondence propositions-as-types. UTT dis-
tinguishes between data types and logical propositions and introduces a type
of logical propositions Prop as follows:
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Prop : Type
Prf : (Prop)Type
∀ : (A:Type)((A)Prop)Prop
Λ : (A:Type)(P :(A)Prop)((x:A)Prf (P (x)))Prf (∀(A,P ))
E∀ : (A:Type)(P :(A)Prop)(R:(Prf (∀(A,P )))Prop)((g:(x:A)Prf (P (x)))
Prf (R(Λ(A,P, g))))(z:Prf (∀(A,P )))Prf (R(z))
and the computation rule is
E∀(A,P,R, f,Λ(A,P, g)) = f(g):Prf (R(Λ(A,P, g))).
Inductive types are generated by inductive schemata as in [Dyb91, PM93,
Luo92, Luo94]. I mentioned earlier that a type is given by its canonical objects,
also called values or β normal forms which are generated by constructors.
Constructors of Nat for examples are 0 and Succ and any term of Nat can be
obtained with its constructors. Similarly λ is the constructor of Π. UTT uses
schemata to introduce inductive types. In what follows I will briefly define
what this means, more details can be found in [Luo94]. First some definitions
are required.
Definition 1. K is called a Γ - kind if Γ ` K kind is derivable. K is
called a small Γ - kind if K ≡ (x1:El(A1))...(xn:El(An))El(An+1) such that
Γ, x1:El(A1), ..., xi−1:El(Ai−1) ` Ai:Type for any i = 1, .., n.
For example El(A) is a small Γ - kind for any A such that Γ ` A:Type is
derivable but Type or (x:El(A))Type are not small kinds. In what follows I
will write simply A for El(A).
Definition 2 (Kind Schemata). Let Γ be a context and X a variable that does
not occur free in Γ (X 6∈ FV (Γ)). We say Φ is a strictly positive operator
in Γ and we write PosΓ(Φ) if Φ is of the form (x1:K1)...(xn:Kn)X where, for
19
any 0 ≤ i ≤ n, Ki is a small Γ, x1:K1, ...xi−1:Ki−1 - kind. We say Θ is a Γ -
schema and we write SchΓ(Θ) if
1. Θ ≡ X or
2. Θ ≡ (x:K)Θ0 where K is a small Γ - kind and SchΓ,x:K(Θ0) or
3. Θ ≡ ΦΘ0 where PosΓ(Φ) and SchΓ(Θ0)
For example any strictly positive operator in Γ is a Γ - schema.
With this we can form inductive types and introduce their terms. Let
Θ ≡< Θ1, ...,Θm > be a finite sequence of Γ - schema. Θ generates a type
constructor denoted by M[Θ] such that the judgement Γ ` M[Θ]:Type is
derivable. The logical framework constant will be
M[Θ]:Type
Further, for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we have a constructor represented by the logical
framework constant
ιi[Θ]:[M[Θ]/X]Θi
When I introduced Nat and Π-types, apart from the type formation and con-
structor constants, I mentioned there are some computation rules which use
an additional constant. That constant, when generated through schemata is
called the eliminator. To generate that constant and the computation rules
we need the following definitions.
Definition 3. Let PosΓ(Φ) we define
• For A:Type, C:(A)Type and z:[A/X]Φ, Φo(A,C, z) is
1. C(z) if Φ ≡ X or
2. (x:K)Φo0(A,C, z(x)) if Φ ≡ (x:K)Φ0
• For Φ\:(C:(A)Type)(f :(x:A)C(x))(z:[A/X]Φ)Φo(A,C, z) is defined as fol-
lows
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1. Φ\(A)(C, f) = f if Φ ≡ X or
2. Φ\(A)(C, f, z) = [x:K]Φ\0(A)(C, f, z(x)) if Φ ≡ (x:K)Φ0
Definition 4. Let SchΓ(Θ), with Θ ≡ (x1:M1), ..., (xn:Mn)X we define the
arity of Θ to be the subsequence 〈Mi1 , ...,Mik〉 of 〈M1, ...,Mn〉 that consists
of all strictly positive operators (obtained by induction on the structure of Θ).
We denote this arity by Ari(Θ). For A:Type, C:(A)Type and z:[A/X]Θ, we
define
Θo(A,C, z) = (x1:[A/X]M1)...(xn:[A/X]Mn)(M
o
i1(A,C, xi1))...
(Moik(A,C, xik))C(z(x1, ..., xn))
The eliminator for the type M[Θ] is
E[Θ] : (C:(M[Θ])Type)(f1:Θo1(M[Θ], C, ιi[Θ]))...(fn:Θon(M[Θ], C, ιn[Θ]))
(z:M[Θ])C(z)
Let Ari(Θi) = 〈Φi1 , ...,Φik〉 for each Θi from the composition of Θ. For every
constructor we have a computation rule
E[Θ](C, f, ιi(x)) = fi( x,Φ
\
i1
(M[Θ])(C,E[Θ](C, f), xi1), ...,
Φ\ik(M[Θ])(C,E[Θ](C, f), xik)
):C(ιi(x))
for f = f1, ..., fn and x = x1, ..., xn.
The eliminator of
Nat =M[X, (X)X]
is indeed the rec constant, however, for
Π = [A:Type][B:(A)Type]M[((x:A)B(x))X]
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observe that
app:(A:Type)(B:(A)Type)(Π(A,B))(x:A)B(x)
does not satisfy the definition of the eliminator given above. To introduce
Π-type through schemata we need to give instead the eliminator
EΠ : (A:Type)(B:(A)Type)(C:(Π(A,B))Type)
((f : (x:A)B(x))C(λ(A,B, f)))(z:Π(A,B))C(z)
and the computation rule will then become
EΠ(A,B,C, f, λ(A,B, g)) = f(g):C(λ(A,B, g))
This is a stronger way of introducing Π type and we can recover the app
operator by defining it as
app(A,B, F, a) = EΠ(A,B,C, [G:Π(A,B)]B(a), [g:(x:A)B(x)]g(a), F )
in which case we obtain the computation rule used earlier.
Similarly some other types are
• The empty type: ∅ =M[],
• The type of lists: List = [A:Type]M[X, (A)(X)X],
• The type of dependent pairs:
Σ = [A:Type][B:(A)Type]M[(x:A)(B(x))X].
I mentioned before that Π is the dependent function type. The function type
is just
−→= [A:Type][B:Type]M[((A)B)X]
Likewise Σ is the dependent pairs type and the constant pairs type is just
× = [A:Type][B:Type]M[(A)(B)X]
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2.1.3 Meta-theoretic properties of LF
LF has certain properties which are highly desirable due to decidability of
type checking. In this subsection, I list them and explain what they mean. I
will use the notion of reduction. For a detailed presentation of reduction see
Goguen [Gog94] but just for an intuition, an example of reduction in LF is
given by the β-conversion rule.
Canonicity Property. This property states that every object of a type
reduces to a canonical object of that type. The canonical objects of a type,
also called values, are generated by the constructors of that type. For example,
for natural numbers, 0, 1, 2... are all canonical objects. 2 + 2 reduces to 4
which is a canonical object of Nat . For Π type, the canonical objects are λ
terms. For instance for Π(Nat , λn:Nat .V ect(n)), the type of programs that
for a natural number n give a vector of length n, will be terms of the form
λ(Nat , λn:Nat .V ect(n), f) where f :(n:Nat)V ect(n).
Subject Reduction This property states that if a reduces to b and a:A,
then b:A as well. For example if we consider f :(Nat)Nat with
f ≡ λn:Nat .2 + n, then f(2) is of type Nat , and through β conversion it
reduces to 2 + 2 which also has to be of type Nat .
Strong normalization Every sequence of rewriting terminates with a canon-
ical object. Again, if we consider the example above, f(2) =β [2/n]f(n) =
2 + 2 = 4 is a sequence of rewriting and it terminates with a normal form.
Formally, for the rewriting 2+2 = 4, we define the sum of natural numbers
inductively as follows
1. m+ 0 = m
2. m+ Succ(n) = Succ(m+ n)
In this case 2 + 2 = 2 + Succ(1) = Succ(2 + 1) = Succ(2 + Succ(0)) =
Succ(Succ(2 + 0)) = Succ(Succ(2)) = Succ(3) = 4 is a reduction sequence.
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2.1.4 Universes
Girard [Gir72] showed that a type theory with type of all types becomes incon-
sistent in that all its formulas become provable. However, when adding induc-
tive types to a type theory like Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory or Luo’s UTT, one
needs a type of types which satisfies reflection principle, namely it is closed to
formation of these inductive types. Martin-Lo¨f [ML98, ML75, ML82, ML84]
introduced two kinds of universes for his intuitionistic type theory to satisfy
these needs without adding the paradox. More precisely, a universe is a type
whose objects are types closed to formation of inductive types and it is not an
object of itself. Universes can be used to prove that the constructors of a type
are distinct. Smith [Smi88] showed this property cannot be proved without
universes. Practical applications of universes include constructive formaliza-
tion of category theory, structured specifications of programs and abstract
mathematical structures. I mentioned in the previous subsection that UTT
adds a type Prop:Type. This is itself a universe, an impredicative one, in that
we can always form ∀(Prop, P ).
The two kinds of universes are Russell style and Tarski style. In what
follows I shall present both types of universes.
Russell style universes
Russell style is easy to use and expressive. It has been adopted in projects like
Homotopy Type Theory [Uni13]. Russell style can be found in Extended Cal-
culus of Constructions [Luo90] and Coq [Coq10] which implements Calculus
of Inductive Constructions [CP90, PM93].
The rules for Russell style universes are the ones in Figure 2.4 (and in
Figure B.1 of the Appendix B).
for i ∈ ω
Γ valid
Γ ` Ui : Type
Γ ` A : Ui
Γ ` A : Type
Γ valid
Γ ` Ui : Ui+1
Γ ` A : Ui
Γ ` A : Ui+1
Figure 2.4: Inference Rules for Russell Style Universes
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Observe that we have the hierarchy
U0:U1:...:Un
If we add Π type to the system, the rule corresponding to it will be
Γ ` A : Ui Γ ` B : (A)Ui
Γ ` Π(A,B) : Ui
If we add Σ type, the corresponding rule is
Γ ` A : Ui Γ ` B : (A)Ui
Γ ` Σ(A,B) : Ui
Similarly we can add other inductive types.
The last rule of Figure 2.4 represents cumulativity. This allows one to form
a type with A:Ui and Ui:Ui+1, such as pairs A × Ui or ΣX:UiX or functions,
A −→ U or Π(Ui, λX:Ui.X) as a term of Ui+1. We do this by simply regarding
A and X as a term of Ui+1. This way, for example ΣX:UiX arises directly from
the rule for Σ type with premise Γ ` Ui:Ui+1 and Γ ` λX:Ui.X : (Ui)Ui+1
The cumulativity rule induces a subsumptive relation between Ui and Uj
for any 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
Tarski style universes
Tarski style, on the other hand, is richer from a semantic point of view. An
example of Tarski style hierarchy is the universes of UTT . Plastic [CL01] is
an implementation of LF with universes.
The rules for Tarski style universes are given in Figure 2.5 (and Figure B.2
of he Appendix B).
In addition to these rules we also require the equation
Ti+1(ti+1(a)) = Ti(a):Type
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for i ∈ ω ` Γ
Γ ` Ui : Type
Γ ` a : Ui
Γ ` Ti(a) : Type
` Γ
Γ ` ti+1 : (Ui)Ui+1
where ti+1 are the lifting operators,
` Γ
Γ ` ui : Ui+1
` Γ
Γ ` Ti+1(ui) = Ui : Type
where ui is the name of Ui in Ui+1
Figure 2.5: Inference Rules for Tarski Style Universes
Observe that we no longer simply regard Ui as a term of Ui+1, instead we
say that the name of Ui is a term of Ui+1. Further, the terms of Ui are not
simply terms of Ui+1 through cumulativity, instead we say that they can be
converted to terms of Ui+1 via the lifting operator. Likewise, we no longer
regard its elements as types but just as names of types.
The rule for the names of Π-types is
Γ ` a : Ui Γ, x : Ti(a) ` b(x) : Ui
Γ ` pii(a, b) : Ui
together with the following:
1. And equation stating the type that the name refers to:
Γ ` Ti(pii(a, b)) = Π(Ti(a), [x:Ti(a)]Ti(b(x))) : Type
2. The fact that the name is unique, more precisely the names obtained via
lifting and via dependent product rule are equal:
Γ ` ti+1(pii(a, b)) = pii+1(ti+1(a), [x:Ti(a)]ti+1(b(x))) : Ui+1
If we want to add Σ types we add the rule
Γ ` a : Ui Γ, x : Ti(a) ` b(x) : Ui
Γ ` σi(a, b) : Ui
together with the following equations:
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1. Γ ` Ti+1(σi(a, b)) = Σ(Ti+1(a), [x:Ti(a)]Ti+1(b(x))) : Type
2. Γ ` ti+1(σi(a, b)) = σi+1(ti+1(a), [x:Ti(a)]ti+1(b(x))) : Ui+1
Let us now look at what motivated the cumulativity for Russell style uni-
verses, namely the possibility to form a type with Ui and its own terms. So
what is now the analogous for, say ΣX:UiX? Here the name of the type we
want to form comes simply from the rule for dependent sum, specifically we
have σi(ui, λx:Ti+1(ui).ti+1(x)). Observe that here instead of simply regarding
x:Ui as a term of Ui+1, as we did for Russell style universes, now we convert it
via the lifting operator ti+1 to such a term. The type we are looking for is sim-
ply given by the first equation and it is Σ(Ti+1(ui), [x:Ti+1(ui)]Ti+1(ti+1(x)))
which is Σ(Ui, [x:Ti+1(ui)]Ti+1(ti+1(x))), where ui is the name of Ui in Ui+1.
The second equation essentially says that if we know how to convert the name
of Ui in Ui+1 to a name in Ui+2 and ti+1(x), which is a name in Ui+1 for any x:Ui
to a name in Ui+2, then we can convert the name σi(ui, λx:Ti+1(ui).ti+1(x))
from Ui+1 to a name in Ui+2.
Of course, now it is obvious what I mean by the fact that Russell style uni-
verses are simpler to use than Tarski style. However if we follow the subtleties
of the discussion above, we notice that it is much more rigorous from the se-
mantic point of view. To begin with, in Russell style we silently interchange
using something as type with using the same thing as a term of a universe.
This is avoided in Tarski style by using something as a type and a name of it
as a term of a universe. Then in Russell style we are forced to employ a cu-
mulative behaviour in order to form certain types. This also makes us silently
interchange using something as a term of a universe with using it as a term
of a superior universe. In Tarski style we don’t have to do this as we can use
the lifting operators for such conversions.
Employing Russell style universes with its cumulative feature can lead to
some subtle inconsistencies. These problems were discussed by Luo [Luo12b]
and are related to the properties of canonicity or subject reduction. On the
one hand, if one adopts the standard notation of terms with full type informa-
27
tion, for instance, the term λX:U1.Nat , where Nat : U0, would be represented
as λ(U1, [ :U1]U0, [ :U1]Nat). This term, which is of type U0 → U0 (by sub-
sumption, since U1 → U0 ≤ U0 → U0 by contravariance), is not definitionally
equal to a canonical term which is of the form λ(U0, ...). On the other hand,
if we employed terms with less typing information like using (a, b) instead of
pair(A,B, a, b) to represent pairs, as in HoTT (see Appendix 2 of [Uni13]) not
only the property of type uniqueness fails, but we end up with a situation in
which a proof term may have incompatible types. For example, for a : A and
A : U , where U is a type universe, the pair (A, a) has both types U × A and
ΣX:U.X, which are incompatible in the sense that none of them is a subtype of
the other. This would lead to undecidability of type checking in a presentation
where type checking depends on type inference.
This justifies why Tarski style universes, although more tedious to work
with, are preferred to Russell style. We will see in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4
how we can put some of the syntactic difficulties of using Tarski style universes
in a black box without having to carry them along in all computations.
2.2 Signatures
We have seen that a judgement in a type theory specified in LF is of the form
Γ ` J where Γ is a sequence of assumptions which keeps track of the kinds
assigned to variables. In Figure A.1, we can see that LF provides rules such
as
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` k′:K ′ Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]k′:[k/x]K ′
and
Γ, x:K ` k:K ′
Γ ` [x:K]k:(x:K)K ′
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for substitution and abstraction of the variables in context. Because of rules
like this, if Γ, n:Nat ,m:n ∗ Nat `Σ J and Γ ` 2:Nat are derivable judgements
we can substitute n with 2 and derive Γ,m:2 ∗ Nat ` [2/n]J . Similarly, if
Γ, n:Nat `Σ m:n ∗Nat is a derivable judgement we could abstract over n and
derive the judgement Γ `Σ [n:Nat ]m:Π(n:Nat , n ∗Nat).
Sometimes it makes sense to declare some assumptions as constants and
not allow substitution and abstraction on them. For a clear distinction be-
tween assumptions about variables and assumptions about constants, Harper
et al.[HHP93] introduced signatures in Edinburgh Logical Framework. Judge-
ments in the system with signatures look like
1. Σ sig which states that Σ a valid signature,
2. `Σ Γ which states that Γ is a valid context under the signature Σ
3. Γ `Σ K which states that K is a valid kind under the signature Σ and
context Γ
4. Γ `Σ k:K which states that k is a term of kind K under the signature
Σ and context Γ
In this thesis I will use Σ valid instead of Σ sig.
In the formulation from [HHP93], initially contexts are sequences of type
assignments to variables and signatures are sequences of type and kinds as-
signments to constants and later in the paper they prove that a type theory
with signatures is essentially equivalent with a type theory with context ob-
tained from gluing signatures and contexts. This suggests that signatures can
be seen simply as prefixes of contexts. More concretely, if we consider their
logical framework with signatures λPS and the logical framework λP , the one
with contexts only, we have
1. Σ valid is derivable in λPS if and only if ` Σ is derivable in λP .
2. `Σ Γ is derivable in λPS if and only if ` Σ,Γ.
3. Γ `Σ J is derivable in λPS if and only if Σ,Γ ` J is derivable in λP .
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Note that, here, I also use ` Γ instead of their Γ ` Type.
I will use the same approach for keeping track of constants in LF from
[Luo94]. Note however that there are some subtle differences between LF , the
logical framework from [Luo94] and λP , the Edinburgh Logical Framework
from [HHP93], such as the η rule which holds for LF but not for λP .
2.3 Subtyping
In this section I shall give more details about subsumptive subtyping. After
this I will also present in more details coercive subtyping as it was previously
formulated for LF , the logical framework from [Luo94], and the motivations.
2.3.1 Subsumptive Subtyping
Subsumptive subtyping is typically represented through the idea that all ob-
jects of a type are also objects of its supertypes. I shall denote the fact that
A is a subtype of A′ under context Γ by the judgement Γ ` A ≤ A′. The rule
that represents the idea of subsumptive subtyping is
Γ `M :A Γ ` A ≤ A′
Γ `M :A′
I will refer to this as subsumption rule.
Some of the work done on subtyping for dependent type theories is by Be-
tarte and Tasistro [BT98] for Martin-Lo¨f’s logical framework analyzing sub-
kinding between kinds (called types), Barthe and Frade [BF99] on constructor
subtyping and Aspinall and Compagnoni [AC01] on a form of subsumptive
subtyping.
Because the latter inspires one of the practical situation that I will formally
represent in the system I introduce here, the one in Section 4.1.1, and it also
gives an understanding of how one can add subtyping for systems specified in
logical frameworks, I will briefly present it first. I will finish this subsection by
giving an intuition about how constructor subtyping works, this being another
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source of inspiration for practical situation discussed in Section4.3.
λP
The system developed by Aspinall and Compagnoni [AC01] is an extension
of Edinburgh Logical Framework (λP ) [HHP93] initially with a subsumption
rule. This system introduces subtyping through contexts which now contains,
apart from membership entries also subtyping entries α ≤ A. Aspinall and
Compagnoni [AC01] initially formulates a system which extends λP to λP≤
which add rules essentially like those in Figure 2.6.
General Subtyping Rules
Γ ` A:K Γ ` B:K Γ ` A =β B
Γ ` A ≤ B
Γ ` A ≤ B Γ ` B ≤ C
Γ ` A ≤ C
Γ ` a:A Γ ` A ≤ A′
Γ ` a:A′
Subtyping in Contexts
Γ ` A:K α 6∈ FV (Γ)
` Γ, α ≤ A:K
` Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′
Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′ ` α:Type
` Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′
Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′ ` α ≤ A:Type
Dependent Product
Γ ` A′ ≤ A Γ, x:A′ ` B ≤ B′
Γ ` Π(A,B) ≤ Π(A′, B′)
Γ, x:A ` B ≤ B′
Γ ` λx:A.B ≤ λx:AB′
Γ ` B ≤ B′ Γ ` B′M :K
Γ ` BM ≤ B′M
Figure 2.6: Subtyping Rules for λP≤
Note that there are some differences between λP and LF . In the first place
LF has rules to derive definitional equality, including β and η rules, whereas
λP leaves definitional equality and β conversion at meta-level and η rule does
not hold here.
The first three rules are rules for equality, transitivity and the subsumption
rule and the next three enable us to form assumptions with subtyping and to
consume them. Then we have the rule for dependent product, lambda terms
and application. The system also contains the rules inherited from λP among
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which is the rule for abstraction,
Γ, x:A `M :B
Γ ` λx:A.M :Π(A, λx:A.B(x))
They do not add rules for abstracting over subtyping entries, concretely,
there are no such rules as
Γ, α ≤ A `M :B
Γ ` λα ≤ A.M :Πα ≤ A.B
Similarly whereas the rule
Γ, x:A ` B ≤ B′
Γ ` Π(A,B) ≤ Π(A,B′)
is a particular case of the subtyping for dependent product rule when A ≡ A′,
there is no such rule as
Γ ` A′ ≤ A Γ, α ≤ A′ ` B ≤ B′
Γ ` Π(α ≤ A,B) ≤ Π(α ≤ A′, B′)
This last rule has been proven by Pierce [Pie93] to make the subtyping relation
undecidable for system F and hence the type checking.
The important point here is, that whenever we have a subtyping entry in
a context it blocks abstraction of all the variables occurring before it in the
context. This is because we do not have rules to move the subtyping entry
from context and the abstraction rules only apply when the last entry of the
context is a membership one. This observation is important because it poses
the question, how could we go around the undecidability noticed by Pierce
and at the same time be able to abstract freely over the variables in contexts?
Contexts do not seem to be suitable to keep track of subtyping entries so an
important point of this thesis is to find their suitable place.
Note that, as discussed by Aspinall and Companioni [AC01], we are not
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able to prove the subject reduction property for the system with subsumption
rule. The reason why proving subject reduction for dependent types subtyping
relation is complicated is due to the inability to prove that, if Γ ` Π(A,B) ≤
Π(A′, B′) then Γ ` A′ ≤ A and Γ, x:A′ ` B ≤ B′. Aspinall and Companion
solve this with the algorithmic system they developed in [AC01] which drops
some subtyping rules, among which is also the subsumption rule. In exchange
they change some rules inherited from λP , such as
Γ `M :Πx:A.B Γ ` N :A
Γ `MN :[N/x]B
which now becomes
Γ `M :Πx:A.B Γ ` N :A′ Γ ` A′ ≤ A
Γ `MN :[N/x]B
which essentially allows polymorphic application.
Constructor Subtyping
Constructor subtyping, studied by Barthe and Frade [BF99] is another form
of subsumptive subtyping in which an (inductive) type is considered to be a
subtype of another if the latter has more constructors than the former. For
example, if we consider Even Numbers as a subtype of Nat with the argument
that the constructors of Even are 0 and successor of Odd , where Odd is the
type of Odd Numbers given by the constructor successor of Even. Then, in
Nat the successor constructor is overloaded to a lifting of these constructors.
Formally they write:
datatype Odd = S o f Even and
Even = 0
| S o f Odd
datatype Nat = 0
| S o f Nat
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| S o f Odd
| S o f Even
What this essentially says is that, if A ≤ B then the constructors of A are
among the constructors of B. This is a development which does not refer to a
setting similar to LF , but rather to functional programming practices. How-
ever, this perspective is a very interesting as it achieves, through overloading,
the same feel for the concept of subtypes as for the concept of subsets, where
the values of a set are also values of its supersets.
2.3.2 Coercive Subtyping
I mentioned earlier, in Subsection 2.3.1 that a logical framework and a type
theory specified in a logical framework has some useful properties like canon-
icity, subject reduction and strong normalization. Subsumptive subtyping, if
introduced in such a type theory, does not preserve these properties. In par-
ticular for inductive types, in order to preserve the canonicity property, values
given by constructors of the subtype should reduce to values given by construc-
tors of the supertypes, which does not happen. For example, the empty list
of even natural numbers will not reduce to the empty list of natural numbers
as noted in [Luo99, Luo96, LSX13, Luo12b].
When talking about a subtyping relation between A and B we need to
have a way of understanding terms of A as terms of B. When the types
are sets we can simply say that the values of A are values of B, however,
when talking about inductive types, this is not trivial anymore. Let us con-
sider A ≤ A′ and the constant pairs types A × A and A′ × A′. Let us
then consider the eliminator operator for × type applied to C:(A′ ×A′)Type,
f :(x:A′)(y:A′)C(pair(A′, A′, x, y)), a:A and b:A
Elim(A′, A′, C, f, pair(A,A, a, b)):C(pair(A,A, a, b))
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By the computation rule this reduces to
f(a, b):C(pair(A′, A′, a, b))
However, to prove subject reduction we need to prove that
C(pair(A,A, a, b)) = C(pair(A′, A′, a, b)):Type
which we cannot. The general problem here is that the types that are subject
to subtyping occur in objects of types affected by this subtyping and a fix for
this will be shown in the next subsection.
Coercive Subtyping through Sets of Judgements
What Luo et al. [Luo96, LSX13, SL02, Luo05, Xue13b] proposed with coercive
subtyping is to add a set of initial coercive subtyping judgements and some
rules to further infer subtyping judgements. A coercive subtyping judgement
is of the form Γ ` A <c B. For a type theory T , specified in LF , we denote
its enrichment with a set of coercive subtyping judgements C and all the rules
that will follow in Figure 2.7 as T [C].
First note that subkinding is essentially a structural lifting of subtyping.
Then, the last three rules (two coercive application rules and one coercive
definition rule) in this figure assume if c is a coercion between two kinds then
it is a mapping between the two kinds. Also note that if we had two coercions
between the same kinds, the last rule would make two terms definitionally
equal even if these terms were not definitionally equal in the system without
subtyping. This is precisely why, for the system above to be consistent, the
restricted system, without these last three rules, denoted by T[C]0K , would
have to satisfy what was introduced in [LSX13, Xue13b] as coherence condition
which essentially says that, if c is a coercion between A and A′, then c is a
mapping from A to A′ and it is the only coercion between the two types up
to definitional equality. Formally the following three, conditions are satisfied:
35
Subtyping Rules
Γ ` A <c B:Type ∈ C
Γ ` A <c B:Type
Congruence
Γ ` A <c B : Type Γ ` A = A′ : Type Γ ` B = B′ : Type Γ ` c = c′ : (A)B
Γ ` A′ <c′ B′ : Type
Transitivity
Γ ` A <c A′ : Type Γ ` A′ <c′ A′′ : Type
Γ ` A <c′◦c A′′ : Type
Weakening
Γ,Γ′ ` A ≤d B : Type Γ ` K kind
Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` A ≤d B : Type (x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ
′))
Context Replacement
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` A <c BType Γ0 ` K = K′
Γ0, x:K
′,Γ1 ` A <c BType
Substitution
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` A <c BType Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]A <[k/x]c [k/x]B:Type
Basic Subkinding Rule and Identity
Γ ` A <c B:Type
Γ ` El(A) <c El(B)
Γ ` K kind
Γ ` K <[x:K]x K
Structural Subkinding Rules
Γ ` K1 <c K2 Γ ` K1 = K′1 Γ ` K2 = K′2 Γ ` c = c′:(K1)K2
Γ ` K′1 <c′ K′2
Γ ` K <c K′ Γ ` K′ <c′ K′′
Γ ` K <c′◦c K′′
(x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ′)) Γ,Γ
′ ` K ≤d K′ Γ ` K0 kind
Γ, x:K0,Γ
′ ` K ≤d K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` L ≤d L′ Γ0 ` K = K′
Γ0, x:K′,Γ1 ` L ≤d L′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K1 <c K2 Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K1 <[k/x]c [k/x]K2
Coercive Application
(CA1)
Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ Γ ` k0:K0 Γ ` K0 <c K
Γ ` f(k0):[c(k0)/x]K′
(CA2)
Γ ` f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Γ ` k0 = k′0:K0 Γ ` K0 <c K
Γ ` f(k0) = f ′(k′0):[c(k0)/x]K′
Coercive Definition
(CD)
Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ Γ ` k0:K0 Γ ` K0 <c K
Γ ` f(k0) = f(c(k0)):[c(k0)/x]K′
Figure 2.7: Inference Rules for T[C]
• Γ ` A <c A is not derivable in T[C]0K for any Γ ` A:Type and
Γ ` c:(A)A;
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• if Γ ` A <c B is derivable in T[C]0K then Γ ` c:(A)B is derivable in
T[C]0K ;
• if Γ ` A <c B and Γ ` A <c′ B are derivable in T[C]0K then
Γ ` c = c′:(A)B is derivable in T[C]0K .
Indeed, with these conditions, Luo et al. [LSX13, Xue13b] prove that the
judgements in the system such constructed are consistent with the original
system (without subtyping), the coercive application rule being nothing more
than an abbreviation of the ordinary application. In other words, this formu-
lation enables us to benefit from the ability to use objects of a type wherever
objects of a super type are expected.
With this let us examine again the example considered earlier, the one
with A × A as a subtype of A′ × A′ whenever A is a subtype of A′ and let
us rewrite it with coercive subtyping. If we consider ×-type then T[C] should
also have the structural subtyping rule
Γ ` A <c A′ Γ ` B <c′ B′
Γ ` A×B <(c,c′) A′ ×B′
where (c, c′)(pair(A,B, a, b)) = pair(A′, B′, c(a), c′(b)):A′ × B′ as studied in
[LA08]. Now, if A ≤c A and A×A ≤d A′ ×A′, with (CA1), we infer
C(pair(A,A, a, b)) = C(d(pair(A,A, a, b))):Type
with (CD), we infer
C(d(pair(A,A, a, b))) = C((c, c)(pair(A,A, a, b))):Type
and, with (CA1) again, we infer
C(pair(A′, A′, a, b)) = C(pair(A′, A′, c(a), c(b))):Type
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which at last proves
C(pair(A,A, a, b)) = C(pair(A′, A′, a, b)):Type
The system presented above offers an alternative to the notion of sub-
sumptive subtyping which is correct and adequate from theoretical point of
view. However, in practice, for example for proof assistants which use such
type theories there are two aspects in which this theoretical development is
not completely satisfactory.
In the first place if we look at the rules in Figure 2.7 we will see that
deciding subtyping relation between two types eventually amounts to deciding
whether a judgement or more belong to a set, which in theory can be infinite
so there is no formal guarantee on the decidability of subtyping relation.
The second point is that there is a presentation difference between proof
assistants which support coercive subtyping such as Coq [Coq10] and the sys-
tem from [LSX13, Xue13b]. To relate two types via subtyping, in Coq, one
annotates a predefined map coercion as part of the assumptions. The system
from [LSX13, Xue13b] adds the coercions to the system through a separate
set of coercive subtyping judgements and then, in order for the obtained sys-
tem to be consistent, it asks for the fulfillment the coherence condition, which
includes that coercions are mappings.
Local Coercions
I mentioned that the approach of adding coercive subtyping through sets of
coercions does not entirely reflect a possible programming model of tools that
use a dependent type theory. Some work to adjust coercive subtyping to
achieve this objective has been initiated in [LP13] where the authors add
coercive subtyping entries in contexts. They named this kind of coercions
local coercions. Of course, when adding coercions in contexts the question
that follows is how to use these assumptions. In [LP13] this was expressed
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through the rule
Γ, A ≤c B ` k:K
Γ ` (coercion A ≤c B in k):(coercion A ≤c B in K)
which enables us to move coercions to the right of the ` or else they would
obstruct the abstraction for anything in their left.
The system such presented, although powerful, has a difficult meta-theory.
For instance, to make this work one should consider additional computation
rules like
Γ, A ≤c B valid Γ ` J
Γ ` J = (coercion A ≤c B in J)
For example for Γ ` (coercion A ≤c B in k) = k:(coercion A ≤c B in K)
and Γ ` (coercion A ≤c B in k)(coercion A ≤c B in l) = (coercion A ≤c
B in kl):[(coercion A ≤c B in l)/x](coercion A ≤c B in K).
Although, it was claimed earlier (Luo et al. [LL01, LLS02]) that coercive
subtyping is a general approach to subtyping, it has been presented over the
years as an alternative to subsumptive subtyping and it has not been explained
in what way it is a generalization and the relation between the two forms of
subtyping has not yet been discussed. What I propose in this thesis is a system
that is able to represent some practical situations of subtyping. On the one
hand it represents some subsumptive subtyping systems as particular cases
of coercive subtyping, which intuitively is the case, and on the other hand
it offers a type theory with subtyping entries at assumption level which is
close to the programming model of proof assistants like Coq [Coq10] without
becoming too difficult to work with.
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Chapter 3
Coercive Subtyping in
Signatures
In this chapter I introduce a system with coercive subtyping at assumption
level, specifically in signatures, and I prove its consistency.
As mentioned in the previous chapter the aim is to formulate a system
which achieves a balance between a reasonably easy meta-theory and being
able to represent practical situations. Essentially the aim is a system which
exhibits the same level of theoretical correctness as the system in [LSX13,
Xue13b] but in which subtyping relations are introduced as part of assump-
tions rather than through a set of judgements.
Previous work done to introduce subtyping relations as assumption can be
found in Aspinall and Compagnoni [AC01], for subsumptive subtyping and Luo
and Part [LP13] for coercive subtyping. Both these approaches add subtyping
in contexts. The first one has entries of the form α ≤ A with α a variable and
poses restrictions on abstraction and substitution of the variables occurring in
the context before the last subtyping entry, as discussed in Subsection 2.3.1.
The second has entries of the form A ≤ B in the context with techniques to
move such an entry to the righthand side of the ` which complicate the meta-
theory, as discussed in the Subsection 2.3.2. I argue that this complication is
unnecessary to represent certain practical situation and a much simpler version
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with coercive subtyping entries in signatures is enough.
Why Signatures? Because we don’t abstract or substitute entries of sig-
natures and these operations are not affected in any way by the presence of
subtyping entries in the signatures and we don’t have to find a way to move
them to the righthand side of the ` sign. Signatures were first introduced in
[HHP93] to differentiate between the kinds assigned to constants and kinds
assigned to variables.
In this chapter, first I introduce the logical framework with signatures,
then, for a type system specified in this logical framework, I present what it
means to extend it with coercive subtyping and I finish by giving a proof of
adequacy of such an extension.
An important part of the work presented in this chapter and in the next
chapter is also presented in [LLss]. The system introduced here was also
mentioned in a talk given at BCTCS’17.
3.1 LFS
LFS is a logical framework with signatures obtained from Luo’s logical frame-
work, LF [Luo94] by adding signatures and inference rules for signature va-
lidity and assumption in signatures. In addition, it also has weakening and
context and signature replacement as rules, as in the formulation of LF given
by Luo et al. [SL02, LSX13, Xue13b]. In LFS , there are six forms of judge-
ments:
• 〈〉 valid is the signature of length 0
• Σ valid, asserting that Σ is a valid signature.
• `Σ Γ, asserting that Γ is a valid context under Σ.
• Γ `Σ K kind, asserting that K is a kind in Γ under Σ.
• Γ `Σ k : K, asserting that k is an object of kind K in Γ under Σ.
• Γ `Σ K1 = K2, asserting that K1 and K2 are equal kinds in Γ under Σ.
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• Γ `Σ k1 = k2 : K, asserting that k1 and k2 are equal objects of kind K
in Γ under Σ.
The inference rules of the logical framework LFS are given in Figure 3.1.
3.2 TS,≤
To a type theory TS , specified in LFS , I add subtyping in signatures by ex-
tending it with the form of judgement
Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type
to represent subtyping. As we have seen, whenever Γ `Σ` A:Type is derivable
we also have the derivable judgement Γ `Σ` El(A) kind. In what follows I
will often omit El() and use A to also refer to the kind of the elements of the
type A.
Subtyping, not subkinding relations, can be specified in a signature by
means of entries A ≤c B : Type (or simply written as A ≤c B), where A and
B are types and c : (A)B. To infer this judgement and to use it, I add the
rules in Figure 3.2.
I also add the form of judgement
Γ `Σ K ≤c L
to represent subkinding judgements and the corresponding rules in Figure 3.3
to infer and use such judgements.
Let the system composed by the rules in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 be denoted
by T0KS,≤. All the rules for it are also put together in the Appendix C. As in the
formulation from [LSX13, Xue13b], the specifications of subtyping relations
are also required to be coherent. Coherence is crucial as it ensures a coercive
application abbreviates a unique functional application. Here is the definition
of coherence of a signature, which intuitively says that, under a coherent
signature, there cannot be two different coercions between the same types.
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Validity of Signature/Contexts, Assumptions
〈〉 valid
`Σ K kind c 6∈ dom(Σ)
Σ, c:K valid
`Σ,c:K,Σ′ Γ
Γ `Σ,c:K,Σ′ c:K
Σ valid
`Σ 〈〉
Γ `Σ K kind x 6∈ dom(Σ) ∪ dom(Γ)
`Σ Γ, x:K
`Σ Γ, x:K,Γ′
Γ, x:K,Γ′ `Σ x:K
Weakening
Γ `Σ, Σ′ J `Σ K kind c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ′)
Γ `Σ, c:K, Σ′ J
Γ,Γ′ `Σ J Γ `Σ K kind x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ′)
Γ, x:K,Γ′ `Σ J
Equality Rules
Γ `Σ K kind
Γ `Σ K = K
Γ `Σ K = K′
Γ `Σ K′ = K
Γ `Σ K = K′ Γ `Σ K′ = K′′
Γ `Σ K = K′′
Γ `Σ k:K
Γ `Σ k = k:K
Γ `Σ k = k′:K
Γ `Σ k′ = k:K
Γ `Σ k = k′:K Γ `Σ k′ = k′′:K
Γ `Σ k = k′′:K
Γ `Σ k:K Γ `Σ K = K′
Γ `Σ k:K′
Γ `Σ k = k′:K Γ `Σ K = K′
Γ `Σ k = k′:K′
Signature Replacement
Γ `Σ0,c:L,Σ1 J `Σ0 L = L′
Γ `Σ0,c:L′,Σ1 J
Context Replacement
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ J Γ0 `Σ K = K′
Γ0, x:K
′,Γ1 `Σ J
Substitution Rules
`Σ Γ0, x:K,Γ1 Γ0 `Σ k:K
`Σ Γ0, [k/x]Γ1
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ K′ kind Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]K′ kind
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ L = L′ Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]L = [k/x]L′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ k′:K′ Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ l = l′:K′ Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]l = [k/x]l′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ K′ kind Γ0 `Σ k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]K′ = [k′/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ l:K′ Γ0 `Σ k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]l = [k′/x]l:[k/x]K′
Dependent Product Kinds
Γ `Σ K kind Γ, x:K `Σ K′ kind
Γ `Σ (x:K)K′ kind
Γ `Σ K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1 `Σ K′1 = K′2
Γ `Σ (x:K1)K′1 = (x:K2)K′2
Γ, x:K `Σ y:K′
Γ `Σ [x:K]y:(x:K)K′
Γ `Σ K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1 `Σ k1 = k2:K
Γ `Σ [x:K1]k1 = [x:K2]k2:(x:K1)K
Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K′ Γ `Σ k:K
Γ `Σ f(k):[k/x]K′
Γ `Σ f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Γ `Σ k1 = k2:K
Γ `Σ f(k1) = f ′(k2):[k1/x]K′
Γ, x:K `Σ k′:K′ Γ `Σ k:K
Γ `Σ ([x:K]k′)(k) = [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K′ x 6∈ FV (f)
Γ `Σ [x:K]f(x) = f :(x:K)K′
The kind Type
`Σ Γ
Γ `Σ Type kind
Γ `Σ A:Type
Γ `Σ El(A) kind
Γ `Σ A = B:Type
Γ `Σ El(A) = El(B)
Figure 3.1: Inference Rules for LFS
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Signature Rules for Subtyping
`Σ A : Type `Σ B : Type `Σ c : (A)B
Σ, A ≤c B valid
`Σ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ1 Γ
Γ `Σ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ1 A ≤c B : Type
Congruence
Γ `Σ A ≤c B : Type Γ `Σ A = A′ : Type Γ `Σ B = B′ : Type Γ `Σ c = c′ : (A)B
Γ `Σ A′ ≤c′ B′ : Type
Transitivity
Γ `Σ A ≤c A′ : Type Γ `Σ A′ ≤c′ A′′ : Type
Γ `Σ A ≤c′◦c A′′ : Type
Weakening
Γ `Σ, Σ′ A ≤d B : Type `Σ K kind
Γ `Σ, c:K, Σ′ A ≤d B : Type (c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ
′))
Γ,Γ′ `Σ A ≤d B : Type Γ `Σ K kind
Γ, x:K,Γ′ `Σ A ≤d B : Type (x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ
′))
Signature Replacement
Γ `Σ0,c:L,Σ1 A ≤d B : Type `Σ0 L = L′
Γ `Σ0,c:L′,Σ1 A ≤d B : Type
Context Replacement
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ A ≤d B : Type Γ0 `Σ K = K′
Γ0, x:K
′,Γ1 `Σ A ≤d B : Type
Substitution
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ A ≤c B Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]A ≤[k/x]c [k/x]B
Identity Coercion
Γ `Σ A : Type
Γ `Σ A ≤[x:A]x A : Type
Figure 3.2: Inference Rules for Subtyping in T 0KS,≤ (1)
Definition 5. A signature Σ is coherent if, in T0KS,≤, Γ `Σ A ≤c B and
Γ `Σ A ≤c′ B imply Γ `Σ c = c′ : (A)B.
Note that, in comparison with earlier formulations such as [LSX13, Xue13b],
I have switched from strict subtyping relation < to ≤ and the coherence condi-
tion is changed accordingly as well; in particular, under a coherent signature,
any coercion from a type to itself must be equal to the identity function. This
is a special case of the above condition when B ≡ A: because we always have
A ≤[x:A]x A, if A ≤c A, then c = [x:A]x : (A)A. Note also that, it is easy to
prove by induction that, if Γ `Σ A ≤c B : Type, then Γ `Σ A,B : Type and
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Basic Subkinding Rule and Identity Coercion
Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type
Γ `Σ El(A) ≤c El(B)
Γ `Σ K kind
Γ `Σ K ≤[x:K]x K
Structural Subkinding Rules
Γ `Σ K1 ≤c K2 Γ `Σ K1 = K′1 Γ `Σ K2 = K′2 Γ `Σ c = c′:(K1)K2
Γ `Σ K′1 ≤c′ K′2
Γ `Σ K ≤c K′ Γ `Σ K′ ≤c′ K′′
Γ `Σ K ≤c′◦c K′′
Γ `Σ, Σ′ K ≤d K′ `Σ K0 kind
Γ `Σ, c:K0, Σ′ K ≤d K′
(c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ′))
Γ,Γ′ `Σ K ≤d K′ Γ `Σ K0 kind
Γ, x:K0,Γ
′ `Σ K ≤d K′ (x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ
′))
Γ `Σ0,c:L,Σ1 K ≤d K′ `Σ0 L = L′
Γ `Σ0,c:L′,Σ1 K ≤d K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ L ≤d L′ Γ0 `Σ K = K′
Γ0, x:K
′,Γ1 `Σ L ≤d L′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ K1 ≤c K2 Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]K1 ≤[k/x]c [k/x]K2
Subkinding for Dependent Product Kind
Γ `Σ K′1 ≤c1 K1 Γ, x:K1 `Σ K2 kind Γ, x′:K′1 `Σ K′2 kind Γ, x:K1 `Σ [c1(x′)/x]K2 ≤c2 K′2
Γ `Σ (x:K1)K2 ≤[f :(x:K1)K2][x′:K′1]c2(f(c1(x′))) (x:K
′
1)K
′
2
Figure 3.3: Inference Rules for Subkinding in T 0KS,≤ (2)
Γ `Σ c : (A)B.
It is also important to note the difference between a judgement with sig-
nature in the current calculus and that in the calculus employed in [LSX13,
Xue13b] where there are no signatures. For example, the signatures Σ1 ≡
Σ0, A ≤c B and Σ2 ≡ Σ0, A ≤d B can both be coherent signatures even if
the only difference between them are the coercions and it is not the case that
Γ `Σ0 c = d:(A)B is derivable, while such a situation can only be considered
in the earlier setting by having two different type systems T [C1] and T [C2] as
we will see in Subsection 3.4.4. Otherwise, if we had Γ ` A ≤c B ∈ C and
Γ ` A ≤d B ∈ C with the judgement Γ ` c = d:(A)B not being derivable, C
would not be coherent.
At this point, I can add the rules for coercive application and coercive
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definition in Figure 3.4.
Coercive Application
(CA1)
Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K′ Γ `Σ k0:K0 Γ `Σ K0 ≤c K
Γ `Σ f(k0):[c(k0)/x]K′
(CA2)
Γ `Σ f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Γ `Σ k0 = k′0:K0 Γ `Σ K0 ≤c K
Γ `Σ f(k0) = f ′(k′0):[c(k0)/x]K′
Coercive Definition
(CD)
Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K′ Γ `Σ k0:K0 Γ `Σ K0 ≤c K
Γ `Σ f(k0) = f(c(k0)):[c(k0)/x]K′
Figure 3.4: The coercive application and definition rules in TS,≤
I denote by TS,≤ the system obtained with the rules in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3
and 3.4. The rules for this system are also listed in the Appendix C.
Again, as in Subsection 2.3.2, when I mentioned coherence as defined in
[LSX13, Xue13b] for the system T [C], note that coherence condition only
makes sense for the signatures of the system T 0KS,≤ and not TS,≤. The rea-
son is that the coercive definition rule (CD) will force any two coercions to
be equal, therefore, if I defined the notion of coherence for the system in-
cluding the (CD) rule, every signature would be coherent by definition but
inconsistent. For instance, let the judgements Γ ` c:(A)B and Γ ` d:(A)B be
derivable in TS such that the judgement Γ ` c = d:(A)B is not derivable in TS .
If the judgements Γ `Σ A ≤c B and Γ `Σ A ≤d B are derivable in TS,≤ and
coherence was not be defined before introducing this system, then, with the
coercive definition rule and symmetry and transitivity of defintional equality
we could derive Γ `Σ f(c(k0)) = f(d(k0)):[k0/x]C in TS,≤ for any f , C and k0
such that Γ `Σ f :(x:B)C and Γ `Σ k0:A are derivable in TS,≤. In particular
we could have some f , C and k0 such that Γ `Σ f :(x:B)C and Γ `Σ k0:A are
derivable in TS and Γ `Σ f(c(k0)) = f(d(k0)):[k0/x]C would be syntactically
in TS but not derivable in this system. The extension TS,≤ would then be
inconsistent with the original system.
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3.3 Meta-theoretic properties of TS,≤
In this section I present some of the results related to the consistency of the
system TS,≤ as an extension of TS .
3.3.1 Coherence for Kinds
Note that the coherence definition 5 refers to types. In what follows I prove
that coherence for types implies coherence for kinds. I first categorise kinds
and show that they can be related via definitional equality or subtyping only
if they are of the same category. For this, I define the degree of a kind K
which intuitively denotes how many dependent product occurrences are in K.
The next two lemmas state that a coercive subtyping or subkinding relation
between two types or kinds must be associated with an underlying mapping
between the two types or kinds.
Lemma 1. If Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type is derivable in TS,≤ then Γ `Σ c:(A)B is
derivable in TS,≤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivations.
Note that this lemma shows precisely that the second coherence condition
according to the definition in [LSX13, Xue13b] which I reproduced in Subsec-
tion 2.3.2 is naturally admissible for the system I introduced in this chapter.
Lemma 2. If Γ `Σ K ≤c L is derivable in T0KS,≤ then Γ `Σ c:(K)L is derivable
in T0KS,≤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivations.
• If the last rule of the derivation tree is
Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type
Γ `Σ El(A) ≤c El(B)
then we know by the previous lemma that Γ `Σ c:(A)B is derivable and
hence Γ `Σ c:(El(A))El(B) is derivable.
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• If the last rule is
Γ `Σ K kind
Γ `Σ K ≤[x:K]x K
then we already know that Γ `Σ [x:K]x:(K)K is derivable if Γ `Σ
K kind is derivable.
• If the last rule is
Γ `Σ K1 ≤c K2 Γ `Σ K1 = K ′1 Γ `Σ K2 = K ′2 Γ `Σ c = c′:(K1)K2
Γ `Σ K ′1 ≤c′ K ′2
then, by induction hypothesis we have that Γ `Σ c:(K1)K2 is derivable
and then, by equality rules of TS we can derive Γ `Σ c′:(K ′1)K ′2
• If the last rule is
Γ `Σ K ≤c K ′ Γ `Σ K ′ ≤c′ K ′′
Γ `Σ K ≤c′◦c K ′′
then by induction hypothesis, Γ `Σ c:(K)K ′ and Γ `Σ c′:(K ′)K ′′ are
derivable and from them we can derive Γ `Σ c′ ◦ c:(K)K ′′
• If the last rule is one of weakening in signatures like
Γ `Σ, Σ′ K ≤d K ′ `Σ K0 kind
Γ `Σ, c:K0, Σ′ K ≤d K ′
with (c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ′)), by induction hypothesis we have Γ `Σ, Σ′ d:(K)K ′
and by weakening rule inherited from LFS , we can derive Γ `Σ, c:K0, Σ′
d:(K)K ′. Similarly, if the last rule is weakening in contexts.
• If the last rule is one for signature replacement like
Γ `Σ0,c:L,Σ1 K ≤d K ′ `Σ0 L = L′
Γ `Σ0,c:L′,Σ1 K ≤d K ′
we have by induction hypothesis that Γ `Σ0,c:L,Σ1 d:(K)K ′ and hence
by the signature replacement rule inherited from LFS , we have that
Γ `Σ0,c:L′,Σ1 d:(K)K ′ is derivable. The case for context replacement is
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the same.
• If the last rule is
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ K1 ≤c K2 Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]K1 ≤[k/x]c [k/x]K2
then, by induction hypothesis, Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ c:(K1)K2 is derivable and
by the substitution rule inherited from LFS , we can derive Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ
[k/x]c:([k/x]K1)[k/x]K2
• The more interesting case is if K ≡ (x:K1)K2 and L ≡ (x:L1)L2 and
a derivation tree for Γ `Σ K ≤c L ends with the rule for dependent
product kind with premises Γ `Σ L1 ≤c1 K1, Γ, x:K1 `Σ K2 kind,
Γ, y:L1 `Σ L2 kind and Γ, y:L1 `Σ [c1(y)/x]K2 ≤c2 L2.
By induction hypothesis we have Γ `Σ c1:(L1)K1 and
Γ, y:L1 `Σ c2:([c1(y)/x]K2)L2.
By weakening Γ, f :(x:K1)K2, y:L1 `Σ c2:([c1(y)/x]K2)L2 and
Γ, f :(x:K1)K2, y:L1 `Σ c1:(L1)K1.
We have Γ, f :(x:K1)K2, y:L1 `Σ y:L1 so by application
Γ, f :(x:K1)K2, y:L1 `Σ c1(y):K1.
We have Γ, f :(x:K1)K2, y:L1 `Σ f :(x:K1)K2 so by application we have
Γ, f :(x:K1)K2, y:L1 `Σ f(c1(y)):[c1(y)/x]K2. By application again we
have Γ, f :(x:K1)K2, y:L1 `Σ c2(f(c1(y))):L2 and by abstraction
Γ `Σ [f :(x:K1)K2][y:L1]c2(f(c1(y))):((x:K1)K2)(y:L1)L2.
Lemma 3. If Γ `Σ K ≤c L is derivable in T0KS,≤ then
• if K ≡ El(A) for some A such that Γ `Σ A:Type is derivable in T0KS,≤
then L ≡ El(B) for some B such that Γ `Σ B:Type is derivable in T0KS,≤.
• if L ≡ El(B) for some B such that Γ `Σ B:Type is derivable in T0KS,≤
then K ≡ El(A) for some A such that Γ `Σ A:Type is derivable in T0KS,≤.
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• if K ≡ El(A) and L ≡ El(B) then Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type is derivable in
T0KS,≤.
• if K ≡ (x:K1)K2 for some K1 and K2 such that Γ `Σ K1 kind and
Γ, x:K1 `Σ K2 kind are derivable in T0KS,≤ then L ≡ (x:L1)L2 for some
L1 and L2 such that Γ `Σ L1 kind and Γ, x:L1 `Σ L2 kind are derivable
in T0KS,≤.
• if L ≡ (x:L1)L2 for some L1 and L2 such that Γ `Σ L1 kind and
Γ, x:L1 `Σ L2 kind are derivable in T0KS,≤ then K ≡ (x:K1)K2 for some
K1 and K2 such that Γ `Σ K1 kind and Γ, x:K1 `Σ K2 kind are deriv-
able in T0KS,≤.
Proof. Induction on the structure of derivations of Γ `Σ K ≤c L. By induction
on the structure of derivations.
• If the last rule of the derivation tree is
Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type
Γ `Σ El(A) ≤c El(B)
then we are done.
• If the last rule is
Γ `Σ K kind
Γ `Σ K ≤[x:K]x K
then it is obvious.
• If the last rule is
Γ `Σ K1 ≤c K2 Γ `Σ K1 = K ′1 Γ `Σ K2 = K ′2 Γ `Σ c = c′:(K1)K2
Γ `Σ K ′1 ≤c′ K ′2
then, if K ′1 ≡ El(A′), for Γ `Σ A′:Type, then K1 ≡ El(A) for Γ `Σ
A:Type and, by induction hypothesis K2 ≡ El(B) for Γ `Σ B:Type,
hence K ′2 ≡ El(B′) for Γ `Σ B′:Type. The case for K ′1 ≡ (x:L′1)L′2 is
identical. Likewise are K ′2 ≡ El(B′) and K ′2 ≡ (x:L′′1)L′′2
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For the third case, if K ′1 ≡ El(A′) and K ′2 ≡ El(B′), then, K1 ≡ El(A)
and K2 ≡ El(B) with Γ `Σ A = A′:Type and Γ `Σ B = B′:Type and
by induction hypothesis Γ `Σ A ≤ B:Type
• For the first two points, if it comes from transitivity from the premises
Γ `Σ K ≤c0 K0 and Γ `Σ K0 ≤c1 L with c ≡ c1 ◦ c0 then by induction
hypothesis first point, if K ≡ El(A) for some Γ `Σ A:Type, then K0 ≡
El(C) for some Γ `Σ C:Type and further by induction hypothesis second
point, L ≡ El(B) for some Γ `Σ B:Type and the statement is proven.
The last two point are identical to the first two.
For the third point if the judgement follows from transitivity from premises
Γ `Σ K ≤c1 M and Γ `Σ M ≤c2 L with Γ `Σ c = c2 ◦ c1:(K)L then by
the previous points we have that M ≡ El(C) for some Γ `Σ C:Type and
by induction hypothesis Γ `Σ A ≤c1 C:Type and Γ `Σ C ≤c2 B:Type
and we can apply transitivity to obtain Γ `Σ A ≤c2◦c1 B:Type
• If the last rule is one of weakening in signatures like
Γ `Σ, Σ′ K ≤d K ′ `Σ K0 kind
Γ `Σ, c:K0, Σ′ K ≤d K ′
with (c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ′)), it simply follows by induction hypothesis and
then weakening. Similarly, if the last rule is weakening in contexts.
• If the last rule is one for signature replacement like
Γ `Σ0,c:L,Σ1 K ≤d K ′ `Σ0 L = L′
Γ `Σ0,c:L′,Σ1 K ≤d K ′
again, if follows by induction hypothesis and then signature replacement.
The case for context replacement is the same.
• If the last rule is
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ K1 ≤c K2 Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]K1 ≤[k/x]c [k/x]K2
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with [k/x]K1 ≡ El(A) for Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ A:Type then K1 ≡ El(A′)
for Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ A′:Type s.t. [k/x]El(A′) ≡ El(A), and, by induc-
tion hypothesis, we have K2 ≡ El(B′) for Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ A′:Type so
[k/x]K1 ≡ [k/x]B′.
For the third point, of the lemma, if [k/x]K1 ≡ El(A) and [k/x]K2 ≡
El(B), then K1 ≡ El(A′) and K2 ≡ El(B′) s.t. [k/x]El(A′) ≡ El(A)
and [k/x]El(B′) ≡ El(B), hence [k/x]A′ ≡ A and [k/x]B′ ≡ B. By
induction hypothesis Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ A′ ≤c B′:Type so by substitution
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ A ≤[k/x]c B:Type.
• For the last two points, if the judgement follows from a subkinding for
dependent product kind rule then the statement holds trivially.
As many of the cases for induction on the structure of derivations are
straightforward or similar, in what follows, I will only present the interesting
cases.
The following lemma states that, if there is a subkinding relation between
two dependent kinds, then the coercion can be obtained by the subtyping for
dependent product kind rule from Figure 3.3. Note that for this to hold it is
essential that we only have subtyping entries in signatures and not subkind-
ing. It might be worth noting again that subkinding is a structural lifting of
subtyping relation.
Lemma 4. If Γ `Σ (x:K1)K2 ≤d (y:L1)L2 is derivable in T0KS,≤ then there exist
derivable judgements in T0KS,≤ Γ `Σ c1:(L1)K1 and Γ, y:L1 `Σ c2:([c1(y)/x]K2)L2
such that
• Γ `Σ L1 ≤c1 K1
• Γ, y:K ′1 `Σ [c1(y)/x]K2 ≤c2 L2 and
• Γ `Σ d = [f :(x:K1)K2][y:L1]c2(f(c1(y))):((x:K1)K2)(y:L1)L2
are derivable in T0KS,≤.
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Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation of
Γ `Σ (x:K1)K2 ≤d (y:L1)L2. The only non trivial case is when it comes from
transitivity.
Γ `Σ (x:K1)K2 ≤d1 C Γ `Σ C ≤d2 (y:L1)L2
Γ `Σ (x:K1)K2 ≤d2◦d1 (y:L1)L2
By the previous lemma C ≡ (z:M1)M2. By induction hypothesis we have that
• Γ `Σ M1 ≤c′1 K1
• Γ, z:M1 `Σ [c′1(z)/x]K2 ≤c′2 M2
• Γ `Σ d1 = [f :(x:K1)K2][z:M1]c′2(f(c′1(z))):((x:K1)K2)(z:M1)M2
and
• Γ `Σ L1 ≤c′′1 M1
• Γ, y:L1 `Σ [c′′1(y)/z]M2 ≤c′′2 L2
• Γ `Σ d2 = [f :(z:M1)M2][y:L1]c′′2(f(c′′1(y))):((z:M1)M2)(y:L1)L2
are derivable.
We apply transitivity to obtain Γ `Σ L1 ≤c′1◦c′′1 K1 and by weakening
and substitution in addition, Γ, y:L1 `Σ [c′1(c′′1(y))/x]K2 ≤c′′2◦[c′′1 (y)/z]c′2 L2 and
what is left to prove is that
Γ `Σ d2 ◦ d1 = [f :(x:K1)K2][y:L1](c′′2 ◦ [c′′1(y)/z]c′2)(f((c′1 ◦ c′′1)(y)))
:((x:K1)K2)(y:L1)L2
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Let Γ `Σ F :(x:K1)K2
d2 ◦ d1(F ) = d2(d1(F ))
= d2([f :(x:K1)K2][z:M1]c
′
2(f(c
′
1(z)))(F ))
= d2([F/f ][z:M1]c
′
2(f(c
′
1(z))))
= d2([z:M1]c
′
2(F (c
′
1(z))))
= ([f :(z:M1)M2][y:L1]c
′′
2(f(c
′′
1(y))))([z:M1]c
′
2(F (c
′
1(z))))
= [z:M1]c
′
2(F (c
′
1(z)))/f ]([y:L1]c
′′
2(f(c
′′
1(y))))
= [y:L1]c
′′
2([z:M1]c
′
2(F (c
′
1(z)))(c
′′
1(y)))
= [y:L1]c
′′
2([c
′′
1(y)/z]c
′
2(F (c
′
1(c
′′
1(y)))))
= [y:L1]c
′′
2([c
′′
1(y)/z]c
′
2(F (c
′
1(c
′′
1(y)))))
= [y:L1](c
′′
2 ◦ [c′′1(y)/z]c′2)(F ((c′1 ◦ c′′1)(y)))
= ([f :(x:K1)K2][y:L1](c
′′
2 ◦ [c′′1(y)/z]c′2)(f((c′1 ◦ c′′1)(y))))(F )
The following definition gives us a measure for the structure of kinds. I will
use this measure when proving coherence for kinds. It is particularly important
and I will use the fact that this measure is not increased by substitution.
Definition 6. For Γ `Σ K we define the degree of Γ `Σ K kind deg(K) ∈ N
as follows:
1. deg(Type) = 1
2. deg(El(A)) = 1
3. deg((x:K)L) = deg(K) + deg(L)
The following lemma shows that if two kinds are related by equality or
subtyping then their degree is the same.
Lemma 5. The following hold:
• if Γ `Σ K = L then deg(K) = deg(L)
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• if Γ `Σ K ≤c L then deg(K) = deg(L)
Proof. We do induction on the structure of derivations of Γ `Σ K = L respec-
tively Γ `Σ K ≤ L. For example if it comes from the rule
Γ `Σ K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1 `Σ K ′1 = K ′2
Γ `Σ (x:K1)K ′1 = (x:K2)K ′2
by induction hypothesis, deg(K1) = deg(K2) and deg(K
′
1) = deg(K
′
2), hence
deg((x:K1)K
′
1) = deg((x:K2)K
′
2)
Lemma 6 (Coherence for Kinds). If Γ `Σ K ≤c L and Γ `Σ K ≤c′ L are
derivable in T0KS,≤, then Γ `Σ c = c′ : (K)L is derivable in T0KS,≤.
Proof. By induction on n = deg(K).
1. For n = 1:
• If Γ `Σ K = El(A) and Γ `Σ L = El(B) then by Lemma 3 we
have Γ `Σ A ≤c B and Γ `Σ A ≤c′ B and from coherence for types
Γ `Σ c = c′:(A)B, hence Γ `Σ c = c′:(K)L
• If Γ `Σ K = Type and Γ `Σ L = Type then we can only have
Γ `Σ c = Id:(K)L.
2. For n > 1, K ≡ (x:K1)K2 and L ≡ (x:L1)L2, by Lemma 4
• Γ `Σ L1 ≤c1 K1,
• Γ, x:K1 `Σ [c1(y)/x]K2 ≤c2 L2 and
• Γ `Σ c = [f :(x:K1)K2][y:L1]c2(f(c1(y))):((x:K1)K2)(y:L1)L2
are derivable for some Γ `Σ c1:(L1)K1 and Γ, x:K1 `Σ c2:([c1(x)/x]K2)L2
and deg(L1), deg(K1), deg([c1(y)/x]K2), deg(L2) are all smaller than n.
If
• Γ `Σ L1 ≤c′1 K1,
• Γ, x:K1 `Σ [c′1(y)/x]K2 ≤c′2 L2 and
• Γ `Σ c′ = [f :(x:K1)K2][y:L1]c′2(f(c′1(y))):((x:K1)K2)(y:L1)L2
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are derivable for some other coercions Γ `Σ c′1:(L1)K1 and
Γ, x:K1 `Σ c′2:([c′1(y)/x]K2)L2 then by induction hypothesis we have
Γ `Σ c1 = c′1:(L1)K1 and Γ, x:K1 `Σ c2 = c′2:([c′1(y)/x]K2)L2 and we
are done.
3.3.2 Weakening and Context/Signature Replacement
If we look at the rules in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 or in the Appendix C at
Figures C.1, C.3 and C.5. We observe that there are rules for weakening and
signature replacement for a membership entry. I will use later in this chapter
weakening and replacement for subtyping entries as well. The following lemma
proves the admissibility of such a result.
Lemma 7. The following hold:
• If Γ `Σ,Σ′ J and `Σ,A≤cB:Type,Σ′ Γ are derivable in T 0KS,≤ then
Γ `Σ,A≤cB:Type,Σ′ J is derivable in T 0KS,≤.
• If Γ `Σ,A≤cB:Type,Σ′ J , `Σ A = A′:Type, `Σ B = B′:Type and
`Σ c = c′:(A)B are derivable in T 0KS,≤ then Γ `Σ,A′≤c′B′:Type,Σ′ J is deriv-
able in T 0KS,≤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation.
Note that rules are not required for weakening and context/signature re-
placement to hold as they are naturally admissible even for membership entries
in the system TS,≤. I express the admissibility result in the following lemma
only for completion purpose as the rest of the chapter will be using the corre-
sponding rules.
Lemma 8 (Weakening and Signature/Context Replacement).
1. (Weakening)
• If Γ `Σ,Σ′ J and `Σ L kind are derivable in TS,≤ and l 6∈ dom(Γ)∪
dom(Σ,Σ′), then Γ `Σ,l:L,Σ′ J is derivable in TS,≤.
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• If Γ,Γ′ `Σ J and Γ `Σ K kind are derivable in TS,≤ and x 6∈
dom(Γ,Γ′) ∪ dom(Σ), with x 6= l, then Γ, x:K,Γ′ `Σ J is derivable
in TS,≤.
Note that, in the above hypothesys, if l 6∈ dom(Γ) ∪ dom(Σ,Σ′) then
`Σ,l:LΣ′ Γ is derivable in TS,≤ and similarly if x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ′)∪ dom(Σ).
2. (Context and Signature Replacement)
• If Γ `Σ,m:M,Σ′ J and `Σ M = N then Γ `Σ,m:N,Σ′ J .
• If Γ, x:K,Γ′ `Σ J , and Γ `Σ K = L then Γ, x:L,Γ′ `Σ J .
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation. I only illustrate a case for
weakening.
If Γ `Σ,Σ′ J is Σ,Σ′ valid, coming from the rule
(∗)`Σ1 L
′ kind l′ 6∈ dom(Σ1)
Σ1, l′:L′ valid
with Σ′ ≡ Σ′′, l′:L′ or Σ ≡ Σ′′, l′:L′ and Σ′ ≡ 〈〉.
• If Σ′ ≡ Σ′′, l′:L′, for Σ,Σ′′ valid, we have, by induction hypothesis, that
`Σ,l:L,Σ′′ L′ kind, and since l 6= l′, if l′ 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ′′) then
l′ 6∈ dom(Σ, l:L,Σ′′) and we can apply the rule (∗) to get
Σ, l:L,Σ′′, l′:L′ valid.
• If Σ ≡ Σ′′, l′:L′ and Σ′ ≡ 〈〉, then the lemma is precisely the rule (∗).
The reason I will use the corresponding rules instead of the admissibility
results is because I prove the well-behavedness of this system by establishing
a relation with the previous formulation from [LSX13, Xue13b]. These rules
are not admissible for the system T [C] from Figure 2.7, in particular for the
case of subtyping judgements. For example, without the weakening rule we
do not have that if Γ0,Γ1 ` A ≤c B ∈ C then Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` A ≤c B. The
necessity of such properties has first been studied by Soloviev and Luo [SL02]
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and Yong Luo [Luo05] where the author denotes the set C which satisfies such
properties as a well-defined set of coercions (WDC). A WDC is a set which is
coherent, and respects congruence, transitivity, substitution and weakening.
The latter four properties have been adopted as rules in [LSX13, Xue13b].
3.4 Subtyping in signatures as a well-behaved ex-
tension
In this section I prove that the system TS,≤ is a well-behaved extension of
TS in that it is conservative - if a judgement is syntactically in TS and it is
derivable in TS,≤, then it is derivable in TS too.
Another way in which the system introduced in this chapter is well-behaved
is that, if a judgement can be derived in TS,≤, then a corresponding judge-
ment can be derived in TS . This section will present what it means for a
derivable judgement J in TS to correspond to a derivable judgement J
′ in
TS,≤, but roughly, it means that any judgement J ′ derivable in TS,≤ is related
by definitional equality to a judgement J0 derivable in T
0K
S,≤ and for every such
judgement J0, there exists a certain set of judgements derivable in TS .
First I formulate the relation given by definitional equality:
Definition 7. In the system TS,≤
• 〈〉 = 〈〉, Σ, c:K = Σ′, c:K ′ if and only if Σ = Σ′ and `Σ K = K ′ are
derivable in TS,≤
• `Σ Γ, x:K =`Σ′ Γ′, x:K ′ if and only if `Σ Γ =`Σ′ Γ′ and Γ `Σ K = K ′
are derivable in TS,≤
• Γ `Σ K kind = Γ′ `Σ′ K ′ kind if and only if `Σ Γ =`Σ′ Γ′ and
Γ `Σ K = K ′ are derivable in TS,≤
• Γ `Σ k:K = Γ′ `Σ′ k′:K ′ if and only if Γ `Σ K kind = Γ′ `Σ′ K ′ kind
and Γ `Σ k = k′:K are derivable in TS,≤
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• Γ `Σ k = l:K = Γ′ `Σ′ k′ = l′:K ′ if and only if Γ `Σ K kind = Γ′ `Σ′
K ′ kind and Γ `Σ k = k′:K and Γ `Σ l = l′:K are derivable in TS,≤
• Γ `Σ A ≤c B = Γ′ `Σ′ A′ ≤c′ B′ if and only if
Γ `Σ A:Type = Γ′ `Σ′ A′:Type and Γ `Σ B:Type = Γ′ `Σ′ B′:Type and
Γ `Σ c:(A)B = Γ′ `Σ′ c′:(A′)B′ are derivable in TS,≤
Similarly we define this relation on judgements in T0KS,≤ and TS
A similar relation was formulated in [LSX13, Xue13b, Xue13a] for the
system T [C]. Observe that there, unless C was coherent, one could have a
situation in which Γ ` c:(A)B = Γ ` c′:(A)B hold in T [C] because they are
both declared as coercions but Γ ` c:(A)B = Γ ` c′:(A)B might not hold in T
if C is not coherent. However this cannot happen for the system in this thesis
because, if Γ `Σ c:(A)B = Γ `Σ c′:(A)B and they are both coercions, it cannot
be that Σ is a signature in TS unless they are both the identity coercions, in
which case they are trivially equal in TS .
In what follows, unless otherwise specified when using the definitional
equality between judgements, I will refer to the relation defined on judgements
in TS,≤.
Lemma 9. The above relation is an equivalence relation on judgements deriv-
able in TS,≤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation of the judgement at the
lefthand side of the equal. I just exemplify for the case `Σ Γ, x:K =`Σ′
Γ′, x:K ′, the other cases being similar.
By induction hypothesis, `Σ′ Γ′ =`Σ Γ.
By context and signature replacement for each entry in Σ and Γ, if
Γ `Σ K = K ′, then Γ′ `Σ′ K = K ′
This kind of well-behavedness was first studied in [LSX13, Xue13b, Xue13a]
where the authors generalise Kleene’s [Kle52] formulation of extension by def-
inition from first order logic, essentially naming definitional extension of a
system T an extension of it T ′ which
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1. is conservative: any judgement in T derivable in T ′ is derivable in T and
2. every valid derivation tree D′ in T ′ can be translated into a valid deriva-
tion tree D in T such that the conclusion of D′ is definitionally equal to
the conclusion of D
This expresses that the extension is nothing more than an abbreviation for
certain judgements in the base system. A further discussion about this follows
in Section 5.1.
For the conservativity condition, the authors of [LSX13, Xue13b] prove
that T [C] is equivalent to a classically conservative extension T [C]∗ of T [C]0K ,
where coercive applications of the form Γ ` f ∗ k0:[c(k0)/x]K ′ are derivable
whenever Γ ` f :(x:K)K ′, Γ ` K0 ≤ K and Γ ` k0:K0 are derivable in
T [C]∗. Further, T [C]0K is a conservative extension of T as it only derives
subtyping judgements which are not syntactically in T . They also prove that
T [C] respects the second condition as an extension of T [C]0K whenever C is
coherent in T [C]0K . Essentially, they define a translation which transforms
valid derivation trees in T [C] in valid derivation trees in T [C]0K by inserting
the coercions wherever coercive application rules are used. T [C]0K is further
a definitional extension of T because subtyping judgements can only be used
to infer other subtyping judgements in the restricted system. So any non-
subtyping judgement derivable in T [C]0K is definitionally equal to a judgement
in T , and for subtyping judgements the second condition of coherence from
the definition in [LSX13, Xue13b] guarantees that there exists a corresponding
non-subtyping judgements representing the well-typedness of the underlying
mapping.
For the system I introduced here, it is not true that any non-subtyping
judgement derivable in T 0KS,≤ is definitionally equal to a judgement in TS , be-
cause we have subtyping entries in signatures. However I will prove that
there exists a corresponding set of derivable judgements. For a non subtyp-
ing judgement Γ `Σ J , this set will include the judgement Γ `Σ∗ J , where
Σ∗ is just Σ without the subtyping entries. If J is of the form A ≤c B,
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then the set will contain simply the judgement for the underlying coercion
Γ `Σ∗ c:(A)B. Apart from this, in both cases the set will contain corre-
sponding judgements for all the subtyping entries of Σ. For example, for the
signature Σ1, A ≤c B:Type,Σ2 valid in T 0KS,≤, the judgement corresponding to
the subtyping entry A ≤c B:Type will be `Σ1 c:(A)B.
I have mentioned often the system T [C] in analogy or in contrast with the
system I introduced in this chapter. It is indeed a very strong relation between
these two systems, or to be more precise, between TS,≤ and an adjustment of
T [C] which I will denote by T [C];. I will use this relation to prove that TS,≤
is also well-behaved in a similar sense.
3.4.1 Conservativity of TS,≤ as an extension of TS
The system T [C] from [LSX13, Xue13b] is equivalent to a conservative exten-
sion of T . TS,≤ is a classically conservative extension of TS and this follows
directly from the fact that TS,≤ keeps track of subtyping entries in the signa-
tures and it carries them along in derivations. More precisely we prove that
if a judgement is derivable in TS,≤ and not in TS then it cannot be written in
TS .
The following two lemmas state that any subtyping or subkinding judge-
ment can only be derived with a signature containing subtyping entries, and
hence the signature cannot be written in TS
Lemma 10. If Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type is derivable in TS,≤, then Σ contains at
least a subtyping entry or Γ `Σ A = B:Type and Γ `Σ c = Id:(A)A are
derivable in TS,≤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation. For example if it comes
from transitivity from premises Γ `Σ A ≤c A′ : Type and Γ `Σ A′ ≤c′ B : Type
then the statement simply is true by induction hypothesis.
If it comes from a dependent product rule with premises
Γ `Σ A2 ≤c1 A1:Type and Γ, x:A1 `Σ B1(x) ≤c2[x] B2(x), with
Γ `Σ Π(A1, B1) ≤c Π(A2, B2):Type ≡ Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type where
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c ≡ [F : Π(A1, B1)]λ(A2, B2 ◦ c1, [x:A2]c2[x](app(A1, B1, F, c1(x)))). By induc-
tion hypothesis, if at least one of the c1 or c2[x] is not the identity, Σ contains
at least one subtyping entry and we are done. If both are the identity, then c
is also the identity.
Lemma 11. If Γ `Σ K ≤c L is derivable, then Σ contains at least a subtyping
entry or Γ `Σ K = L and Γ `Σ c = Id:(K)L are derivable in TS,≤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation.
If it comes from the rule
Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type
Γ `Σ El(A) ≤c El(B)
then it follows from Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type by the previous lemma.
For all the other cases, the proof mirrors the proof of the previous lemma.
For example if it comes from transitivity from premises Γ `Σ K ≤c M and
Γ `Σ M ≤c′ L then the statement simply is true by induction hypothesis and
similarly for dependent product kind.
The following lemma extends the statement to express the fact that it is
enough for a judgement to contain a non trivial subtyping or subkinding entry
(not the identity coercion) in its derivation tree to have a signature that cannot
be written in TS . This is important because it allows us to conclude that the
extension cannot derive judgements syntactically in TS which are not already
derivable in TS .s
Lemma 12. If D is a derivation tree with the conclusion Γ `Σ J , valid in
TS,≤ and Γ1 `Σ1 K1 ≤c0 K2 is present in D then, either Σ contains at least
a subtyping entry or Γ1 `Σ1 K1 = K2 and Γ1 `Σ1 c0 = IdK1 :(K1)K1 are
derivable in TS,≤.
Proof. If Γ `Σ J is a subtyping or subkinding judgement it follows directly
from the previous lemmas 10, 4. Otherwise we do induction on the depth of
D.
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We have two possibilities for the last rule in D.
If it ends with a rule in T 0KS,≤, for instance
Γ `Σ K kind Γ, x:K `Σ K ′ kind
Γ `Σ (x:K)K ′ kind
then the subkinding judgements must be in at least one of the subderivations
concluding Γ `Σ K kind and Γ, x:K `Σ K ′ kind. The statement then holds
by induction hypothesis. The other rules are similar.
The second possibility is that D ends with a coercive application or coer-
cive definition rule. Let us assume, for instance, that the judgement Γ `Σ J is
Γ `Σ f(k0):[c(k0)/x]K ′ and a derivation tree for it ends with a coercive appli-
cation rule with premises Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K ′, Γ `Σ k0:K0 and Γ `Σ K0 ≤c K,
then by the previous lemma either c is trivial or Σ contains at least a subtyping
entry. If Σ contains at least one subtyping entry then we are done. If c is trivial
then by induction hypothesis either the derivation trees for Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K ′,
Γ `Σ k0:K0 and Γ `Σ K0 ≤c K contain no judgement of non trivial subtyping
or subkinding or Σ contains at least a subtyping entry.
The following lemma states that, if a judgements is derived in TS,≤ using
only trivial coercions then it can be derived in TS .
Lemma 13. If in a derivation tree of a judgement derivable in TS,≤ which
is not subtyping or subkinding judgement all of the subtyping and subkinding
judgements are of the form Γ1 `Σ1 A ≤IdA A:Type respectively
Γ1 `Σ1 K ≤[x:K]x K then the judgement is derivable in TS.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivations. If the derivation tree D
that only contains trivial coercions ends with one of the rules of TS ,
D1
J1
...DnJn
J
(R)
then J1,..., Jn also have derivation trees D1,...,Dn which only contain at most
trivial coercions, hence, by induction hypothesis, they are derivable in TS . We
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can apply to them, with D1,...,Dn replaced by their derivation in TS the same
rule R to obtain the judgement J and the derivation is in TS .
Otherwise, if for example the derivation containing only trivial coercions
ends with coercive application
Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K ′ Γ `Σ k0:K Γ `Σ K ≤[x:K]x K
Γ `Σ f(k0):[[x:K]x(k0)/x]K ′
Γ `Σ [[x:K]x(k0)/x]K ′ = [k0/x]K ′ and Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K ′ and Γ `Σ k0:K are
derivable in TS by induction hypothesis, and from them it follows directly by
functional application, in TS , Γ `Σ f(k0):[k0/x]K ′
Finally, the following corollary states the conservativity of TS,≤ as an ex-
tension of TS , namely that it does not derive judgements syntactically written
in TS which can not already be derived in TS . This happens because, for a
judgement to be derived using subtyping judgements it needs to keep track of
them in its own syntax, specifically in its signature. Again, this is unlike in
the system T [C];, which does not carry references to the subtyping judgements
it uses in the syntax and hence is just equivalent to a classically conservative
extension.
Corollary 1 (Conservativity). If a judgement is derivable in TS,≤ but not in
TS, its signature will contain subtyping entries, and hence it cannot be written
in TS.
Proof. From the previous lemma, a judgement can only be derivable in TS,≤
but not in TS when it contains in all of its derivation trees non trivial subtyping
or subkinding judgements. If the judgements is itself a subtyping or subkinding
judgement then it vacuously cannot be written in TS . Otherwise, by Lemma 12
it follows that either all of the subtyping and subkinding judgements are of the
form Γ1 `Σ1 A ≤IdA A:Type respectively Γ1 `Σ1 K ≤[x:K]x K in which case
the judgement is derivable in TS or its signature contains subtyping entries,
in which case it cannot be written in TS .
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3.4.2 The relation between T 0KS,≤ and TS
Here I show that, if a judgement J is derivable in T 0KS,≤, we obtain a set of
judgements, one of which is of same nature as J up to erasing the subtyping
entries from a signature. The idea here is that, for any the valid signature
in T 0KS,≤ and all the judgements using it, we can remove the subtyping entries
from it to obtain a valid signature in TS and corresponding judgements using
this signature.
Definition 8. We define erase(·), a map which simply removes subtyping
entries from signature as follows:
• erase(〈〉) = 〈〉
• erase(Σ, c:K) = erase(Σ), c:K
• erase(Σ, A ≤c B) = erase(Σ)
Lemma 14. For Σ ≡ Σ0, A0 ≤c0 B0,Σ1, ..., An−1 ≤cn−1 Bn−1Σn a valid
signature in T 0KS,≤ we will consider the following set of judgements (?)(Σ) =
{`erase(Σ0,...,Σi) ci:(Ai)Bi}, where i ∈ 0, ..., n. Then the following statements
hold:
1. `Σ Γ is derivable in T 0KS,≤ if and only if `erase(Σ) Γ and all the judgements
in (?) are derivable in TS.
2. Γ `Σ J is not a subtyping judgement and is derivable in T 0KS,≤ if and only
if Γ `erase(Σ) J and all the judgements in (?) are derivable in TS.
3. If Γ `Σ A ≤c B is derivable in T 0KS,≤ then Γ `erase(Σ) c:(A)B and all the
judgements in (?) are derivable in TS.
4. If Γ `Σ K ≤c L is derivable in T 0KS,≤ then Γ `erase(Σ) c:(K)L and all the
judgements in (?) are derivable in TS.
Proof. The only if implication for the first two cases goes by induction on
the structure of derivations. Since subtyping judgements do not contribute to
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deriving any other type of judgement in T 0KS,≤, the proof is relatively straight-
forward. It is worth stressing that, if Σ ≡ 〈〉, the whole judgement needs to be
in TS and (?)(Σ). I am mentioning this as I will consider the cases for Σ ≡ 〈〉
trivial in this proof and will not mention them.
For the first point, if Γ ≡ 〈〉, then `Σ 〈〉 can only follow from the judgement
Σ valid. We have two subcases. If Σ ≡ Σ′, k:K, then it can only follow from
the premise `Σ′ K kind with k 6∈ Dom(Σ′). By induction hypothesis we know
that `erase(Σ′) K kind is derivable in TS and all the judgements in (?)(Σ′) are
derivable. If k 6∈ Dom(Σ′) then k 6∈ Dom(erase(Σ′)). So we can derive
erase(Σ′), k:K valid. But erase(Σ′), k:K ≡ erase(Σ′, k:K) and
Σ′, k:K ≡ Σ, so we have that erase(Σ) valid is derivable in TS , hence
`erase(Σ) 〈〉 is derivable in TS . Likewise, by how we defined (?)(·),
(?)(Σ′) = (?)(Σ).
The second case is when Σ ≡ Σ′, A ≤c B:Type. Now the judgement for
the validity of Σ can only come from the premise `Σ′ c:(A)B. By induction
hypothesis `erase(Σ′) c:(A)B and all the judgements in (?)(Σ′) are derivable
in TS . But erase(Σ
′) ≡ erase(Σ) and (?)(Σ) = (?)(Σ′) ∪ {`erase(Σ′) c:(A)B}
which we already know are all derivable and we can derive `erase(Σ′) 〈〉.
If Γ ≡ Γ′, x:K then, the proof is straightforward as, by induction hypoth-
esis, Γ `Σ K kind is derivable in T 0KS,≤ only if Γ `erase(Σ) K kind is derivable
in TS and we are done.
The second case is also straight forward.
For the if implication, Lemma 7 is used.
For the fourth point let us assume the judgement comes from a derivation
tree ending with the rule
`Σ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ1 Γ
Γ `Σ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ1 A ≤c B:Type
Again, as above we have the case when Γ ≡ 〈〉 and the case when
Γ ≡ Γ0, x:K. If we consider the first one, its validity judgement can only
come from the premise Σ0, A ≤c B:Type,Σ1 valid. Now we have again the
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subcases Σ1 ≡ 〈〉 Σ1 ≡ Σ′, cK and Σ1 ≡ Σ′, A′ ≤c′ B′. For the first subcase,
Σ0, A ≤c B:Type valid can only be derived from `Σ0 c:(A)B. By induction
hypothesis, `erase(Σ0) c:(A)B and all the judgements in (?)(Σ0) are derivable
in TS . But erase(Σ0) ≡ erase(Σ) and
(?)(Σ) = (?)(Σ0)∪{`erase(Σ0) c:(A)B} so we are done. For the second subcase,
we have by induction hypothesis that `erase(Σ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′) K kind and all
the judgements in (?)(Σ0, A ≤c B:Type,Σ′) are derivable in TS . We have that
`erase(Σ0) c:(A)B ∈ (?)(Σ0, A ≤c B:Type,Σ′) so the judgement is derivable.
By weakening, the judgement `erase(Σ0,Σ′,c:K) c:(A)B is also derivable in TS .
Note that we can apply weakening because if `erase(Σ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′) K kind is
derivable in TS , and k 6∈ dom(erase(Σ0, A ≤c B:Type,Σ′)) then we can derive
erase(Σ0, A ≤c B:Type,Σ′), k:K valid. The other cases and the next point
are similar.
3.4.3 T [C];
The system T [C] from [LSX13, Xue13b] was proven to be a well behaved
extension of T in that it is equivalent to a classically conservative extension
and any valid derivation tree of T [C] can be translated into a derivation tree of
T such that their conclusion are definitionally equal in T [C]. The translation
essentially transforms all the coercive application and coercive definition rules
of the derivation tree in T [C] into ordinary functional application and equality
judgements such as reflexivity. The result is that all the coercions are inserted
into the judgement obtained as conclusion.
Here I consider a system T [C]; similar to the system T [C] as presented in
[LSX13, Xue13b]. The difference is that here we fix some prefixes of a context,
not allowing substitution and abstraction for these prefixes. In more details,
the judgements of T [C]; will be of the form Σ; Γ ` J instead of Γ ` J , where
Σ and Γ are just contexts and substitution and abstraction can be applied to
entries in Γ but not Σ. We call this system T [C];. To delimitate these prefixes
we use the symbol ”;” and the judgement forms will be as follows:
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• ` Σ; Γ
• Σ; Γ ` K kind
• Σ; Γ ` k:K
• Σ; Γ ` K = K ′
• Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K
where the first judgement says that Σ; Γ is a valid context. The rules of
the system T [C]; are the ones in Figures 3.5,3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. These rules
are also listed in the Appendix The difference between these rules and those
described in [LSX13, Xue13b] is that there is now an additional set of rules for
the prefixes of contexts, apart from substitution and abstraction rules which
are only available for regular contexts. More detailed, I duplicate contexts,
assumptions, weakening, context replacement. For example, the assumption
rule
` Γ, x:K,Γ′
Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` x:K
now becomes the set of two rules
` Σ, c:K,Σ′; Γ
Σ, c:K,Σ′; Γ ` c:K
` Σ; Γ, x:K,Γ′
Σ; Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` x:K
For all other rules I adjust them to the new forms of judgements by replacing
Γ ` J with Σ; Γ ` J . Notice that I do not duplicate substitution as only the
context at the righthand side of the ; supports substitution. I will consider
the system T [C];0K to be the one without coercive application and definition
rules, namely it only contains the rules in Figures 3.5,3.6 and 3.7. C is formed
of subtyping judgements and we have the following rule in T [C];0K
Γ ` A ≤c B ∈ C
Γ ` A ≤c B
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For the system T [C] coercive application is added as an abbreviation to ordi-
nary functional application and this is ensured by coercive definition together
with coherence of C. Indeed, it was proved in [LSX13, Xue13b] that, when
C is coherent, T [C] is a well behaved extension of T [C]0K in that every valid
derivation tree D in T [C] can be translated into a valid derivation tree D′ in
T [C]0K and the conclusion of D is definitionally equal to the conclusion of D′
in T [C]. I want to avoid doing the complex proof in [LSX13, Xue13b] again
and assume that the properties of T [C] carry over to T [C];. So next I give the
definition of coherence for the set C.
Definition 9. The set C of subtyping judgements is coherent if the following
two conditions hold in T [C];0K :
• If Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B is derivable, then Σ; Γ ` c:(A)B is derivable.
• If Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B and Σ; Γ ` A ≤c′ B are derivable, then
Σ; Γ ` c = c′:(A)B is derivable.
Note that in the original formulation Σ; Γ ` A <[x:A]x A was not allowed.
The fact that there is no coercion between a type and itself which I mentioned
when I described the system T [C] from Subsection 2.3.2 of the previous chap-
ter was used to prove the consistency of the system in [LSX13] and [Xue13b]
essentially to prove that a coercive application judgement cannot come from
a functional application of the same function. However with the current con-
dition one can prove that, if this is the case, the coercion has to be equal to
the identity.
I will also refer to a relation given by definitional equality for the system
T [C];:
Definition 10.
• 〈〉 = 〈〉, Σ, c:K = Σ′, c:K ′ if and only if Σ = Σ′ and Σ; 〈〉 ` K = K ′.
• ` Σ; Γ, x:K =` Σ′; Γ′, x:K ′ if and only if ` Σ; Γ =` Σ′; Γ′ and
Σ; Γ ` K = K ′.
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Validity of Signature/Contexts, Assumptions
` 〈〉
Σ; 〈〉 ` K kind c 6∈ dom(Σ)
` Σ, c:K
` Σ, c:K,Σ′; Γ
Σ, c:K,Σ′; Γ ` c:K
` Σ
` Σ; 〈〉
Σ; Γ ` K kind x 6∈ dom(Σ) ∪ dom(Γ)
` Σ; Γ, x:K
` Σ; Γ, x:K,Γ′
Σ; Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` x:K
Weakening
Σ,Σ′; Γ ` J Σ; 〈〉 ` K kind c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ′)
Σ, c:K, Σ′; Γ ` J
Σ; Γ,Γ′ ` J Σ; Γ ` K kind x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ′)
Σ; Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` J
Equality Rules
Σ; Γ ` K kind
Σ; Γ ` K = K
Σ; Γ ` K = K′
Σ; Γ ` K′ = K
Σ; Γ ` K = K′ Σ; Γ ` K′ = K′′
Σ; Γ ` K = K′′
Σ; Γ ` k:K
Σ; Γ ` k = k:K
Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K
Σ; Γ ` k′ = k:K
Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K Σ; Γ ` k′ = k′′:K
Σ; Γ ` k = k′′:K
Σ; Γ ` k:K Σ; Γ ` K = K′
Σ; Γ ` k:K′
Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K Σ; Γ ` K = K′
Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K′
Context Replacement
Σ0, c:L,Σ1; Γ ` J Σ0 ` L = L′
Σ0, c:L′,Σ1; Γ ` J
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` J Σ; Γ0 ` K = K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K′,Γ1 ` J
Substitution Rules
` Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
` Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K′ kind Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K′ kind
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` L = L′ Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]L = [k/x]L′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` k′:K′ Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` l = l′:K′ Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]l = [k/x]l′:[k/x]K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K′ kind Σ; Γ0 ` k = k′:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K′ = [k′/x]K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` l:K′ Σ; Γ0 ` k = k′:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]l = [k′/x]l:[k/x]K′
Dependent Product Kinds
Σ; Γ ` K kind Σ; Γ, x:K ` K′ kind
Σ; Γ ` (x:K)K′ kind
Σ; Γ ` K1 = K2 Σ; Γ, x:K1 ` K′1 = K′2
Σ; Γ ` (x:K1)K′1 = (x:K2)K′2
Σ; Γ, x:K ` y:K′
Σ; Γ ` [x:K]y:(x:K)K′
Σ; Γ ` K1 = K2 Σ; Γ, x:K1 ` k1 = k2:K
Σ; Γ ` [x:K1]k1 = [x:K2]k2:(x:K1)K
Σ; Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ Σ; Γ ` k:K
Σ; Γ ` f(k):[k/x]K′
Σ; Γ ` f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Σ; Γ ` k1 = k2:K
Σ; Γ ` f(k1) = f ′(k2):[k1/x]K′
Σ; Γ, x:K ` k′:K′ Σ; Γ ` k:K
Σ; Γ ` ([x:K]k′)(k) = [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Σ; Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ x 6∈ FV (f)
Σ; Γ ` [x:K]f(x) = f :(x:K)K′
The kind Type
` Σ; Γ
Σ; Γ ` Type kind
Σ; Γ ` A:Type
Σ; Γ ` El(A) kind
Σ; Γ ` A = B:Type
Σ; Γ ` El(A) = El(B)
Figure 3.5: Inference Rules for LF ;
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Subtyping Rules
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B ∈ C
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B
Congruence
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B : Type Σ; Γ ` A = A′ : Type Σ; Γ ` B = B′ : Type Σ; Γ ` c = c′ : (A)B
Σ; Γ ` A′ ≤c′ B′ : Type
Transitivity
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c A′ : Type Σ; Γ ` A′ ≤c′ A′′ : Type
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c′◦c A′′ : Type
Weakening
Σ,Σ′; Γ ` A ≤d B : Type Σ ` K kind
Σ, c:K, Σ′; Γ ` A ≤d B : Type (c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ
′))
Σ; Γ,Γ′ ` A ≤d B : Type Σ; Γ ` K kind
Σ; Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` A ≤d B : Type (x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ
′))
Context Replacement
Σ0, c:L,Σ1; Γ ` A ≤c B Σ0 ` L = L′
Σ0, c:L′,Σ1; Γ ` A ≤c B
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` A ≤c B Σ; Γ0 ` K = K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K′,Γ1 ` A ≤c B
Substitution
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` A ≤c B Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]A ≤[k/x]c [k/x]B
Identity Coercion
Σ; Γ ` A:Type
Σ; Γ ` A ≤[x:A]x A:Type
Figure 3.6: Subtyping Rules for T [C];0K (1)
• Σ; Γ ` K = Σ′; Γ′ ` K ′ if and only if ` Σ; Γ =` Σ′; Γ′ and
Σ; Γ ` K = K ′.
• Γ `Σ k:K = Γ′ `Σ′ k′:K ′ if and only if
Σ; Γ ` K kind = Σ′; Γ′ ` K ′ kind and Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K.
• Σ; Γ ` k = l:K = Σ′; Γ′ ` k′ = l′:K ′ if and only if
Σ; Γ ` K kind = Σ′; Γ′ ` K ′ kind and Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K and
Σ; Γ ` l = l′:K.
• (Σ; Γ ` K = L) = (Σ′; Γ′ ` K ′ = L′) if and only if
Σ; Γ ` K kind = Σ′; Γ′ ` K ′ kind and
Σ; Γ ` L kind = Σ′; Γ′ ` L′ kind
• Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B = Σ′; Γ′ ` A′ ≤c′ B′ if and only if
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Basic Subkinding Rule and Identity
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B:Type
Σ; Γ ` El(A) ≤c El(B)
Σ; Γ ` K kind
Σ; Γ ` K ≤[x:K]x K
Structural Subkinding Rules
Σ; Γ ` K1 ≤c K2 Σ; Γ ` K1 = K′1 Σ; Γ ` K2 = K′2 Σ; Γ ` c = c′:(K1)K2
Σ; Γ ` K′1 ≤c′ K′2
Σ; Γ ` K ≤c K′ Σ; Γ ` K′ ≤c′ K′′
Σ; Γ ` K ≤c′◦c K′′
Σ,Σ′; Γ ` K ≤d K′ Σ; 〈〉 ` K0 kind
Σ, c:K0,Σ
′; Γ ` K ≤d K′ (c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ
′))
Σ; Γ,Γ′ ` K ≤d K′ Σ; Γ ` K0 kind
Σ; Γ, x:K0,Γ
′ ` K ≤d K′ (x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ
′))
Σ0, c:L,Σ1; Γ ` K ≤d K′ Σ0; 〈〉 ` L = L′
Σ0, c:L
′,Σ1; Γ ` K ≤d K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` L ≤d L′ Σ; Γ0 ` K = K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K
′,Γ1 ` L ≤d L′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K1 ≤c K2 Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K1 ≤[k/x]c [k/x]K2
Subkinding for Dependent Product Kind
Σ; Γ ` K′1 ≤c1 K1 Σ; Γ, x:K1 ` K2 kind Σ; Γ, x′:K′1 ` K′2 kind Σ; Γ, x:K1 ` [c1(x′)/x]K2 ≤c2 K′2
Σ; Γ ` (x:K1)K2 ≤[f :(x:K1)K2][x′:K′1]c2(f(c1(x′))) (x:K
′
1)K
′
2
Figure 3.7: Subtyping Rules for T [C];0K (2)
Coercive Application
(CA1)
Σ; Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ Σ; Γ ` k0:K0 Σ; Γ ` K0 ≤c K
Σ; Γ ` f(k0):[c(k0)/x]K′
(CA2)
Σ; Γ ` f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Σ; Γ ` k0 = k′0:K0 Σ; Γ ` K0 ≤c K
Σ; Γ ` f(k0) = f ′(k′0):[c(k0)/x]K′
Coercive Definition
(CD)
Σ; Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ Σ; Γ ` k0:K0 Σ; Γ ` K0 ≤c K
Σ; Γ ` f(k0) = f(c(k0)):[c(k0)/x]K′
Figure 3.8: The coercive application and definition rules in T [C];
Σ; Γ ` A:Type = Σ′; Γ′ ` A′:Type and Σ; Γ ` B:Type = Σ′; Γ′ ` B′:Type
and Σ; Γ ` c:(A)B = Σ′; Γ′ ` c′:(A′)B′.
Similar relations can be defined on subsystems T [C];0K and T ;. Note how-
ever that now there can be a case like Σ; Γ ` c:(A)B = Σ; Γ ` c′:(A)B in T [C];
and the judgements Σ; Γ ` c:(A)B and Σ; Γ ` c′:(A)B derivable in T ; but such
that Σ; Γ ` c:(A)B = Σ; Γ ` c′:(A)B is not the case in T ; for C not coherent
72
because the coercions now are tracked separately in a set.
As the relation from the Definition 7, this is also an equivalence relation
on judgements derivable in T [C];.
Observe that this system, unlike T [C] from [LSX13, Xue13b], has fixed
prefixes of contexts, which do not allow abstraction or substitution. By using
T [C];, we place our argument close enough to TS,≤ as the prefixes of contexts
before ; act just like signatures. The difference between T [C]; and TS,≤ will be
in how the subtyping judgements are introduced in the system and with this
regards, the system T [C]; is like T [C] for which we have the well behavedness
result from [LSX13, Xue13b].
3.4.4 The relation between TS,≤ and T [C];
There are important differences between the new TS,≤ and T [C]; following from
the fact that I introduce coercive subtyping through signature. More precisely
coercions are now local to the signatures that introduce them. This enables us
to have more coercions between two types under the same kinding assumptions
(of the form c:K, x:K) and still have coherence satisfied, whereas by enriching a
system with a set of coercive subtyping, our coercions are introduced globally
and only one coercion (up to definitional equality) can exist between two
types under the same kinding assumptions. I illustrate this with the following
example. Let us consider the two signature Σ0, A ≤c B:Type,Σ1 and Σ0, A ≤d
B:Type,Σ1 with Σ0 and Σ1 free of subtyping entries. In T
0K
S,≤, both these
signatures are coherent provided they are valid, however, if we introduced
coercive judgements through a set C which contains Σ0; Σ1 ` A ≤c B:Type
and Σ0; Σ1 ` A ≤d B:Type, then this set would not be coherent in T [C];0K .
Another very important difference is that TS,≤ here is classically conser-
vative extension of TS as we saw earlier in Subsection 3.4.1 which cannot be
proven for system T [C]; as an extension of T ; since this one does not carry
the coercive entries in the syntax. Yet another important difference is that,
in TS,≤, weakening and context and signature replacement are admissible as
we saw in Subsection 3.3.2. This is not true for the system T [C]; without
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additional properties of C as if, for example, Σ; Γ0,Γ1 ` A ≤c B:Type is a
judgement in C and hence derivable in T [C];, we could not derive, without the
weakening rule and without adding the requirement of closure under weaken-
ing, that Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` A ≤c B:Type is derivable.
However, because signatures are technically just prefix of contexts for
which abstraction and substitution are not available (in [HHP93] it is proven
that the derivability of the judgements in the system with signatures is equiva-
lent to the derivability of the corresponding judgements obtained from moving
the signatures before contexts in the system with contexts only), we naturally
expect that there is a relation between TS,≤ and T [C];. And indeed here we
shall show that for any valid signature Σ in TS,≤, we can represent a class of
judgements of TS,≤ depending on Σ as judgements in a T [CΣ];, where CΣ is
defined below in Definition 11.
In what follows some proofs are more interesting if dependent types are
introduced to the system and the more interesting case is the one that derives
that type. Because I would like to present these cases, let us consider T 0KS,≤
with the dependent product type rules with the subtyping rule
Γ `Σ A : Type Γ, x:A `Σ B(x) : Type
Γ `Σ Π(A,B) : Type
Γ `Σ A : Type Γ `Σ B : (A)Type Γ `Σ f : (x:A)B(x)
Γ `Σ λ(A,B, f) : Π(A,B)
Γ `Σ g : Π(A,B) Γ `Σ a : A
Γ `Σ app(A,B, g, a) : B(a)
Γ `Σ A : Type Γ `Σ B : (A)Type
Γ `Σ f : (x:A)B(x) Γ `Σ a : A
Γ `Σ app(A,B, λ(A,B, f), a) = f(a) : B(a)
Figure 3.9: Inference Rules for Π-type
Γ `Σ A′ ≤c1 A : Type Γ `Σ B,B′ : (A)Type Γ, x:A `Σ B(x) ≤c2[x] B′(x) : Type
Γ `Σ Π(A,B) ≤d Π(A′, B′ ◦ c1) : Type
where d ≡ [F : Π(A,B)]λ(A′, B′ ◦ c1, [x:A′]c2[x](app(A,B, F, c1(x))))
This system will be introduced in more detail in Subsection 4.1.2 of the
next chapter.
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First I consider just T 0KS,≤ and T [C];0K which are the systems without coer-
cive application and coercive definition and we define a way to transfer coercive
subtyping entries of a signature Σ in T 0KS,≤ to a set of coercive subtyping judge-
ments of T [CΣ];0K . For this I give the following definition which extracts from
a signature Σ of T 0KS,≤ the sequence of nonsubtyping entries which we shall later
see that is a valid context prefixes in T [C];0K provided that Σ. For any valid
signature Σ, I also define a way to extract a set formed by subtyping judge-
ments corresponding to the subtyping entries of Σ. The set will be denoted
as CΣ and the subtyping judgements contained in it will be syntactically in
T [CΣ];0K
Definition 11. Let Σ be a signature (not necessarily valid) in T 0KS,≤. We define
ΓΣ as follows:
• Γ〈〉 = 〈〉
• ΓΣ0,k:K = ΓΣ0 , k:K
• ΓΣ0,A≤cB:Type = ΓΣ0
If Σ is valid in T 0KS,≤ we define CΣ as follows:
• C〈〉 = ∅
• CΣ0,k:K = CΣ0
• CΣ0,A≤cB:Type = CΣ0 ∪ {ΓΣ0 ; 〈〉 ` A ≤c B:Type}
Lemma 15. Let Σ ≡ Σ0, A ≤c B:Type,Σ1. If Σ valid is derivable in T 0KS,≤,
then ΓΣ ≡ ΓΣ0,Σ1 and CΣ = CΣ0,Σ1 ∪ {ΓΣ0 ; 〈〉 ` A ≤c B:Type}.
Proof. By induction on the length of Σ1. If Σ1 ≡ 〈〉, then, by definition,
ΓΣ ≡ ΓΣ0 and CΣ = CΣ0 ∪ {ΓΣ0 ; 〈〉 ` A ≤c B:Type}. Otherwise, we have two
cases.
If Σ1 ≡ Σ′1, A′ ≤c′ B′:Type, then, by definition, ΓΣ ≡ ΓΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1
and CΣ = CΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1 ∪ {ΓΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1 ; 〈〉 ` A′ ≤c′ B′:Type}. But by
induction, the statement holds for Σ′1 so ΓΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1 ≡ ΓΣ0,Σ′1 ≡ ΓΣ0,Σ1
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and
CΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1 ∪ {ΓΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1 ; 〈〉 ` A′ ≤c′ B′:Type} =
= CΣ0,Σ′1∪{ΓΣ0 ; 〈〉 ` A ≤c B:Type}∪{ΓΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1 ; 〈〉 ` A′ ≤c′ B′:Type} =
= CΣ0,Σ1 ∪ {ΓΣ0 ; 〈〉 ` A ≤c B:Type}.
If Σ1 ≡ Σ′1, k:K then, by definition ΓΣ ≡ ΓΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1 , k:K. But by
induction hypothesis, ΓΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1 ≡ ΓΣ0,Σ′1 . By definition,
ΓΣ0,Σ′1 , k:K ≡ ΓΣ0,Σ′1,k:K . For CΣ = CΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1 , again, by induction
CΣ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ′1 = CΣ0,Σ′1 ∪ {ΓΣ0 ; 〈〉 ` A ≤c B:Type} =
= CΣ0,Σ′1,k:K ∪ {ΓΣ0 ; 〈〉 ` A ≤c B:Type}
The results that follow will analyse what happens when we interleave se-
quences in valid signature. The reason why I do so is because, for a signature
Σ valid in T 0KS,≤, I consider the system T [CΣ];0K . In this system, I can always
obtain new judgements, by weakening or context replacement in ΓΣ and it’s
prefixes and I am studying precisely the consequence of this. Note that ΓΣ
and its prefixes cannot be altered by substitution, unlike in [LSX13, Xue13b],
as it is not allowed for the part of the context before ;. Note further that
abstraction is not allowed either, so the entries of ΓΣ are not variables, the
only difference between ΓΣ is that it does not contain subtyping entries, but
instead it it participates in the subtyping judgements belonging to CΣ.
Lemma 16. Let Σ1,Σ3 and Σ1,Σ2,Σ3 be valid signatures in T
0K
S,≤. If J is
derivable in T [CΣ2,Σ3 ];0K then J is derivable in T [CΣ1,Σ2,Σ3 ];0K .
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation of J .
According to Luo et al. [LSX13, Xue13b], if we add coercive subtyping
and coercive definition rules from Figure 3.8 to a system enriched with a
coherent set of subtyping judgements CΣ, any derivation tree in T [CΣ]; can be
translated to a derivation tree in T [CΣ];0K (that is a derivation tree that does
not use coercive application and definition rules - CA1, CA2 and CD) and
their conclusions are definitionally equal in T [CΣ];. I aim to use that result to
prove that for any judgement using a coherent signature in TS,≤, there exists
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a judgement definitionally equal to it in T 0KS,≤. For this I shall first prove that
CΣ is coherent in the sense of the Definition 9 if Σ is coherent in the sense of
the Definition 5. To prove this we need to describe the possible contexts at
the lefthand side of ; in T [CΣ];0K used to infer coercive subtyping judgements.
I first prove a theorem used throughout the section which allows us to
argue about judgements in T 0KS,≤ and judgements in T [CΣ];0K interchangeably.
I start by presenting a lemma representing the base case and then the theorem
appears as an extension proven by induction. The lemma is not required to
prove the theorem but it gives a better intuition. The theorem essentially
states that, for contexts at the lefthand side of ; obtained by interleaving
membership entries in the image through Γ· of a valid signature Σ or its
prefixes give judgements in T [CΣ];0K corresponding to judgements in T 0KS,≤. We
will see later that all the contexts at the lefthand side of ; in T [CΣ];0K are in
fact obtained by interleaving membership entries in prefixes of Σ.
Lemma 17. Let Σ ≡ Σ1,Σ2,Σ3 be a valid signature in T 0KS,≤ then, for any
c,K and Σ′1,Σ′2 such that Σ1 = Σ′1 and Σ1,Σ2 = Σ′1,Σ′2 the following hold:
• ` ΓΣ′1 , c:K,ΓΣ′2 ; 〈〉 is derivable in T [CΣ]
;
0K if and only if
Σ′1, c:K,Σ′2 valid is derivable in T 0KS,≤
• ` ΓΣ′1 , c:K,ΓΣ′2 ; Γ is derivable in T [CΣ]
;
0K if and only if `Σ′1,c:K,Σ′2 Γ is
derivable in T 0KS,≤
• ΓΣ′1 , c:K,ΓΣ′2 ; Γ ` J is derivable in T [CΣ]
;
0K if and only if Γ `Σ′1,c:K,Σ′2 J
is derivable in T 0KS,≤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation.
By repeatedly applying the previous lemma (except for the case when we
weaken with the empty sequence, which is straight forward by induction on
the structure of derivations) we can prove:
Theorem 1 (Equivalence for T 0KS,≤). Let Σ ≡ Σ1, ...,Σn be a valid signature in
T 0KS,≤ then, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n, for any {Γi}i∈{0..k} sequences free of subtyping
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entries and and Σ′1, ...,Σ′k such that Σ1, ...,Σk = Σ
′
1, ...,Σ
′
k for any i ∈ {1..k}
the following hold:
• ` Γ0,ΓΣ′1 ,Γ1,ΓΣ′2 ,Γ2, ...,Γk−1ΓΣ′k ,Γk; 〈〉 is derivable in T [CΣ]
;
0K if and
only if Γ0,Σ
′
1,Γ1,Σ
′
2,Γ2, ...,Γk−1,Σ′k,Γk valid is derivable in T
0K
S,≤
• ` Γ0,ΓΣ′1 ,Γ1,ΓΣ′2 ,Γ2, ...,Γk−1ΓΣ′k ,Γk; Γ is derivable in T [CΣ]
;
0K if and
only if `Γ0,Σ′1,Γ1,Σ′2,Γ2,...,Γk−1Σ′k,Γk Γ is derivable in T 0KS,≤
• Γ0,ΓΣ′1 ,Γ1,ΓΣ′2 ,Γ2, ...,Γk−1ΓΣ′k ,Γk; Γ ` J is derivable in T [CΣ]
;
0K if and
only if Γ `Γ0,Σ′1,Γ1,Σ′2,Γ2,...,Γk−1Σ′k,Γk J is derivable in T 0KS,≤.
Now the aim is to prove that we do not introduce any new subtyping
entries in T 0KS,≤ by weakening (up to definitional equality). Note that, for
this, it is essential that the weakening rules do not add subtyping entries.
More precisely, in the following lemma I prove a form of strengthening, which
roughly says that by strengthening the assumptions of a subtyping judgement,
we can still derive it (up to definitional equality).
Lemma 18. Let Σ ≡ Σ1,Σ2 a valid signature in T 0KS,≤, for any c,K, Σ′1 = Σ1
and Σ′1,Σ′2 = Σ1,Σ2, if Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 A ≤c B is derivable in T 0KS,≤ then there
exists A′, c′, B′ such that `Σ A′ ≤c′ B′, Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 A = A′:Type,
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 B = B′:Type and Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 c = c′:(A)B derivable in T 0KS,≤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation of Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 A ≤c B.
If it comes from transitivity with the premises Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 A ≤c1 C and
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 C ≤c2 B then, by induction hypothesis, there exist A′, C ′, c′1, C ′′,
B′, c′2 such that `Σ A′ ≤c′1 C ′ and `Σ C ′′ ≤c′2 B′ and
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 A = A′:Type, Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 B = B′:Type,
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 C = C ′:Type, Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 C = C ′′:Type,
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 c1 = c′1:(A)C and Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 c2 = c′2:(C)B. By transitivity
of equality we have Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 C ′ = C ′′:Type. By Lemma 14 we have that
Γ `erase(Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2) C ′ = C ′′:Type is derivable in TS . Similarly, because
`Σ C ′:Type and `Σ C ′′:Type we have that `erase(Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2) C ′:Type and `erase(Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2)
C ′′:Type are derivable in TS . From Strengthening Lemma from [Gog94] which
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holds for TS we have that `erase(Σ) C ′ = C ′′:Type is derivable. Again, by 14 we
obtain `Σ C ′ = C ′′:Type. At last, we can apply congruence and transitivity
`Σ A′ ≤c′2◦c′1 B′.
Let us now consider the dependent product rule
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 A′′ ≤c1 A′
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 B′, B′′ : (A′)Type
Γ, x:A′ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 B′(x) ≤c2[x] B′′(x)
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 Π(A′, B′) ≤c Π(A′′, B′′ ◦ c1)
with A ≡ Π(A′, B′), B ≡ Π(A′′, B′′ ◦ c1) and
c ≡ [F : Π(A′, B′)]λ(A′′, B′′ ◦ c1, [x:A′′]c2[x](app(A′, B′, F, c1(x)))).
By induction hypothesis, there exist A′′0, A′0, c′1, B′0, B′′0 , c′2 such that
`Σ A′′0 ≤c′1 A′0, `Σ B′ ≤c′2 B′′ and Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 A′′ = A′′0:Type,
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 A′ = A′0:Type, Γ, x:A′ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 B′′(x) = B′′0 :Type,
Γ, x:A′ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 B′(x) = B′0:Type, Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 c1 = c′1:(A′′)A′ and
Γ, x:A′ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 c2(x) = c′2:(B′(x))B′′(x):Type are derivable. We apply
dependent product rule for the case when types are constants and obtain
` A′0 −→ B′0 ≤′c A′′0 −→ B′′0 with c′ ≡ [F : A′0 −→ B′0][x:A′′0](c′′2(F (c′1(x)))).
By normal equality rules for dependent product and its terms we have that
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 A′0 −→ B′0 = Π(A′, B′), Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 A′′0 −→ B′′0 = Π(A′′, B′′) and
Γ `Σ′1,k:K,Σ′2 c = c′:(Π(A′, B′))Π(A′′, B′′)
By repeatedly applying the previous lemma we obtain
Corollary 2. For Σ valid derivable in T 0KS,≤, for any partition Σ ≡ Σ1, ...,Σn,
for any
{Γi}i∈{0..n} sequences free of subtyping entries and {Σ′i}i∈{1..n} such that
Σ1, ...,Σi = Σ
′
1, ....,Σ
′
i for any i ∈ {1..n}, if
Γ `Γ0,Σ1,Γ1,Σ2,Γ2,...,Γn−1Σn,Γn A ≤c B is derivable in T 0KS,≤ then there exists
A′, c′, B′ such that `Σ A′ ≤c′ B′, Γ `Γ0,Σ1,Γ1,Σ2,Γ2,...,Γn−1Σn,Γn A = A′:Type,
Γ `Γ0,Σ1,Γ1,Σ2,Γ2,...,Γn−1Σn,Γn B = B′:Type and
Γ `Γ0,Σ1,Γ1,Σ2,Γ2,...,Γn−1Σn,Γn c = c′:(A)B derivable in T 0KS,≤.
Next I prove that weakening does not break coherence:
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Lemma 19. For Σ valid in T 0KS,≤, if Σ ≡ Σ1,Σ2,Σ3 is coherent, for any Σ′1,Σ′2
such that Σ1 = Σ
′
1 and Σ1,Σ2 = Σ
′
1,Σ
′
2, for any c,K such that Σ
′
1, c:K,Σ
′
2 is
valid, Σ′1, c:K,Σ′2 coherent.
Proof. Let us consider the derivable judgements Γ `Σ′1,c:K,,Σ′2 A ≤c B and
Γ `Σ′1,c:K,,Σ′2 A ≤d B. Then we know from Corollary 2 that there exist A′, B′,
A′′, B′′, c′, d′ such that `Σ1,Σ2 A′ ≤c′ B′, `Σ1,Σ2 A′′ ≤d′ B′′,
Γ `Σ′1,c:K,,Σ′2 A′ = A:Type, Γ `Σ′1,c:K,,Σ′2 B′′ = B:Type,
Γ `Σ′1,c:K,,Σ′2s B′′ = B:Type Γ `Σ′1,c:K,,Σ′2 c = c′:(A)B and
Γ `Σ′1,c:K,,Σ′2 d = d′:(A)B are derivable in derivable in T 0KS,≤. As in the proof of
the previous lemma, using Lemma 14 and Strengthening Lemma from [Gog94]
we have that `Σ1,Σ2 A′ = A′′:Type, `Σ1,Σ2 B′ = B′′:Type. By congruence we
have that `Σ1,Σ2 A′ ≤d′ B′ is derivable in T 0KS,≤. If Σ is coherent then any prefix
of it Σ1, ...,Σk is coherent so `Σ1,Σ2 c′ = d′:(A′)B′. Further, by weakening and
Lemma 7, we have the desired result.
By repeatedly applying the previous lemma we obtain:
Lemma 20. For Σ valid in T 0KS,≤, if Σ ≡ Σ1, ...,Σn is coherent, for any
1 ≤ k ≤ n, for any {Γi}i∈{0..k} sequences free of subtyping entries, for any
{Σ′i}i∈{0..k} such that Σ1, ...,Σi = Σ′1, ...,Σ′i for any i ∈ {1..k} such that
Γ0,Σ1,Γ1,Σ2,Γ2, ...,Γk−1,Σk,Γk is valid, then Γ0,Σ1,Γ1,Σ2,Γ2, ...,Γk−1,Σk,Γk
is coherent.
Finally, the following lemma describes the relation between parts of the
context at the lefthand side of the ; of judgements in T [CΣ];0K and Σ. This is a
very important result for proving the coherence of CΣ based on the coherence of
Σ. It states that any such context is in fact obtained from weakening of a prefix
of Σ. In addition from this Lemma, because all the derivable judgements in
T [CΣ];0K that are not in T ; are subtyping judgements, we have as a consequence
that all the judgements of T [CΣ];0K are equivalent to judgements in T 0KS,≤.
Lemma 21. For Σ a valid signature in T 0KS,≤, for any derivable judgement
Γ′; Γ ` J in T [CΣ];0K there exists a partition of Σ ≡ Σ1, ...,Σn, 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
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Γ0, ...,Γk free of subtyping entries and Σ
′
1, ...,Σ
′
k with Σ
′
1, ...,Σ
′
i = Σ
′
1, ...,Σ
′
i
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that Γ′ ≡ ΓΓ0,Σ1,Γ1,...,Σk,Γk
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation of the judgement in T [CΣ];0K .
I only prove a case for third point when the judgement is Γ′; Γ ` A ≤c B. The
only nontrivial case is when the judgements follows from weakening. Let us
assume it comes from a derivation tree ending with
Γ′1,Γ′2; Γ ` A ≤c B Γ′1; 〈〉 ` K kind
Γ′1, c:K,Γ′2; Γ ` A ≤c B
with Γ′ ≡ Γ1, c:K,Γ2.
By induction hypothesis we know that there exists a partition
Σ ≡ Σ1, ...,Σn and 1 ≤ k ≤ n and Γ0, ...,Γk and Σ′1, ...,Σ′k with
Σ′1, ...,Σ′i = Σ
′
1, ...,Σ
′
i for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that Γ′1,Γ′2 ≡ ΓΓ0,Σ′1,Γ1,...,Σ′k,Γk
with Γ `Γ0,Σ′1,Γ1...,Σ′k,Γk A ≤c B. Let us consider the case when
Γ′1 ≡ ΓΓ0,Σ′1,Γ1,...,Γi−1,Σ1′i and Γ′2 ≡ ΓΣ2′i ,Γi,...,Σ′k,Γk . With Σ
′
i ≡ Σ1′i ,Σ2′i for some
1 ≤ i ≤ k. We consider the partition Σ ≡ Σ1, ...,Σ1i ,Σ2i , ...,Σn such that
Σ′1, ...,Σ1′i ,Σ
2′
i , ...,Σ
′
n Σ1, ...,Σl = Σ
′
1, ...,Σ
′
l for any l ∈ 1..i− 1, Σ1, ...,Σ1i =
Σ′1, ...,Σ1′i , Σ1, ...,Σ
1
i ,Σ
2
i = Σ
′
1, ...,Σ
1′
i ,Σ
2′
i and Σ1, ...,Σl = Σ
′
1, ...,Σ
′
l for any
l ∈ i+ 1..n and Γ0, ...,Γi−1, c:K,Γi, ...,Γk such that
Γ′ = ΓΓ0,Σ1,...,Γi−1,Σ1i ,c:K,Σ2i ,Γi,...,Σk,Γk .
The next lemma refers to the ability to argue about coherence of a set of
coercive subtyping judgements corresponding to a signature.
Theorem 2 (Equivalence of Coherence). Let Σ be a valid signature in T 0KS,≤.
Then Σ is coherent in the sense of Definition 5 if and only if CΣ is coherent
for T [CΣ];0K in the sense of Definition 9.
Proof. Only if: Let Γ′; Γ ` A ≤c B and Γ′; Γ ` A ≤d B be derivable in
T [CΣ];0K . From Lemma 21, it follows that there exists a partition of
Σ ≡ Σ1, ...,Σn and 1 ≤ k ≤ n and Γ0, ...,Γk such that Γ′ = ΓΓ0,Σ1,...,Σk,Γk .
If Σ is coherent, then Γ0,Σ1, ...,Σk,Γk is coherent (from Lemma 20). From
Theorem 1, Γ′; Γ ` A ≤c B and Γ′; Γ ` A ≤d B are derivable in T [CΣ];0K if and
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only if Γ `Γ0,Σ1,...,Σk,Γk A ≤c B and Γ ` Γ0,Σ1, ...,Σk,ΓkA ≤d B are derivable
in T 0KS,≤. From coherence here we have Γ `Γ0,Σ1,...,Σk,Γk c = d:(A)B which is
derivable in T 0KS,≤ if and only if Γ
′; Γ ` c = d:(A)B is derivable in T [CΣ];0K
(again by Theorem Theorem 1).
If: By Theorem 1, Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type and Γ `Σ A ≤d B:Type are derivable
in T 0KS,≤ if and only if ΓΣ; Γ ` A ≤c B and ΓΣ; Γ ` A ≤d B are derivable in
T [CΣ];0K . Because CΣ is coherent, ΓΣ; Γ ` c = d:(A)B is derivable in T [CΣ];0K
which happens if and only if Γ `Σ c = d:(A)B is derivable in T 0KS,≤
To prove that the system TS,≤ is well behaved I first prove that it is well
behaved when all the signatures considered are valid in the restricted system
T 0KS,≤. First I prove another equivalence lemma for this situation.
Theorem 3 (Equivalence between TS,≤ and T [CΣ];). For Σ valid in T 0KS,≤, the
following hold:
• ` ΓΣ; Γ is derivable in T [CΣ]; if and only if `Σ Γ is derivable in TS,≤
• ΓΣ; Γ ` J is derivable in T [CΣ]; if and only if Γ `Σ J is derivable in
TS,≤.
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivation.
The following theorem shows that the system we defined here is well be-
haved and that every coercive subtyping application is really just an abbrevi-
ation.
Lemma 22. If a valid signature Σ in T 0KS,≤ is coherent the following hold:
1. If `Σ Γ is derivable in TS,≤ then there exists Γ′ such that `Σ Γ′ is
derivable in T 0KS,≤ and `Σ Γ = Γ′ is derivable in TS,≤.
2. If Γ `Σ J is derivable in TS,≤ then there exists Γ′, J ′ such that
Γ′ `Σ J ′ is derivable in T 0KS,≤ and `Σ Γ = Γ′ and Γ `Σ J = J ′ are
derivable in TS,≤.
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Proof. By Theorem 2, since Σ is coherent in, CΣ is coherent. If we look at the
last case, by Theorem 3, Γ `Σ J is derivable in TS,≤ if and only if ΓΣ; Γ ` J is
derivable in T [CΣ];. From [LSX13, Xue13b] we know that, when CΣ is coherent,
any derivation tree of ΓΣ; Γ ` J can be translated into a derivation tree in
T [CΣ];0K which concludes with the judgement definitionally equal to ΓΣ; Γ ` J .
So let us consider one such derivation tree, its translation and the definitionally
equal conclusion ΓΣ; ∆ ` J ′ (` ΓΣ; 〈〉 is already derivable in T [CΣ];0K so by
inspecting the definition of the translation in [LSX13, Xue13b] we observe that
ΓΣ will not be changed by the translation). We have ` ΓΣ; Γ = ΓΣ; ∆ and
ΓΣ; Γ ` J = J ′ are derivable in T [CΣ];. From Theorem 3 we know that in this
case `Σ Γ = ∆ and Γ `Σ J = J ′ are derivable in TS,≤ so the desired derivable
judgement is simply ∆ `Σ J ′.
3.4.5 The relation between TS,≤ and TS
I can, at last, express the well behavedness of TS,≤. Note that Theorem 22 cov-
ers the well-behavedness of judgements derived under a signature that is valid
in T 0KS,≤. We now prove further that any signature valid in TS,≤ is definition-
ally equal to a signature valid in T 0KS,≤, then because of signature replacement
we have that any judgement derivable in in TS,≤ is definitionally equal to a
judgement derivable in T 0KS,≤.
Lemma 23. For any signature Σ valid in TS,≤ there exists Σ′ valid in T 0KS,≤
such that Σ = Σ′ is derivable in TS,≤.
Proof. By induction on the length of Σ. We assume Σ = Σ0, c:K. By induction
hypothesis we have that there exists Σ′0 valid in T 0KS,≤ such that Σ0 = Σ
′
0. By
repeatedly applying signature replacement to `Σ0 K kind we have
`Σ′0 K kind is derivable in TS,≤. By Lemma 22, we have that there exists K ′
such that `Σ′0 K ′ kind is derivable in T 0KS,≤ with `Σ′0 K = K ′. That means we
can derive, in T 0KS,≤, Σ
′
0, c:K
′ valid. Going back with context replacement we
also have `Σ0 K = K ′ derivable, so Σ′0, c:K ′ is the signature we are looking
for.
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I finish this section with the following theorem:
Theorem 4. If a valid signature Σ in TS,≤ is coherent the following hold:
1. If `Σ Γ is derivable in TS,≤ then there exists Σ′ and Γ′ such that `Σ′ Γ′
is derivable in T 0KS,≤ and Σ = Σ
′ and `Σ Γ = Γ′ are derivable in TS,≤.
2. If Γ `Σ J is derivable in TS,≤ then there exists Σ′,Γ′, J ′ such that
Γ′ `Σ′ J ′ is derivable in T 0KS,≤ and Σ = Σ′, `Σ Γ = Γ′ and Γ `Σ J = J ′
are derivable in TS,≤.
Proof. According to the Lemma 23 there exist Σ′ valid in T 0KS,≤ such that
Σ = Σ′. If we consider the last point, by signature replacement Γ `Σ′ J is
derivable TS,≤. Because Σ′ valid in T 0KS,≤, we can apply the Lemma 22 to obtain
Γ′ `Σ′ J ′ such that `Σ′ Γ = Γ′ and Γ `Σ′ J = J ′ are derivable in TS,≤. Again
by signature replacement `Σ Γ = Γ′ and Γ `Σ J = J ′.
Further, according to the Lemma 14, the derivability of any nonsubtyping
judgement in T 0KS,≤ is equivalent to the derivability of a judgement in TS and
any subtyping judgement in T 0KS,≤ implies a judgement in TS .
To review, in this chapter I proved that, for any derivable judgement J in
TS,≤, there exists a set of derivable judgements in TS for which J is an abbre-
viation. The set of derivable judgements from TS is formed by a corresponding
judgement and the typing judgements for the underlying mappings of all co-
ercions from signatures. I also proved that TS,≤ is a conservative extension of
TS in the classical sense.
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Chapter 4
Case Studies: Subsumptive
Subtyping, Universes,
Injectivity
The aim of this chapter is to explore some practical situations and the condi-
tions in which they can be represented by the system previously defined. First,
I will consider a system with subsumptive subtyping Π≤, with subtyping en-
tries in contexts, inspired by the system of Aspinall and Compagnoni [AC01].
To represent this system, I will use an instance of the system previously de-
fined, more precisely that when TS is the system specified in LFS with Π-type.
I will refer to this system as ΠS and to its extension with coercive subtyping
as ΠS,≤. The result in this first part is a faithful embedding of Π≤ into ΠS,≤.
This is important because it establishes the connection between coercive
subtyping and a form of subsumptive subtyping, more precisely I claim that
coercive subtyping is a more general notion of subtyping which can, in partic-
ular, represent a form of subsumptive subtyping as opposed to giving coercive
subtyping only as an alternative to subsumptive subtyping as it was previously
done.
The second part of the chapter considers two forms of universes subtyping,
Russell style universes with subsumptive subtyping and Tarski style universes
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with coercive subtyping. I will argue that the Tarski style setting with coer-
cive subtyping entries in signatures can be used to represent the Russell style
hierarchy.
I finish the chapter with a discussion on a property commonly exhibited by
inclusions, namely injectivity and present a way to add it to the system with
coercive subtyping entries in signatures. I will consider constructor subtyping
with Leibniz equality as the practical situation that exhibits injectivity.
4.1 Embedding Subsumptive Subtyping in Coercive
Subtyping
I start by presenting the system with subsumptive subtyping, then I will con-
cretely present TS,≤ when TS ≡ ΠS and, at last, I will show how to embed Π≤
in ΠS,≤.
4.1.1 Π≤
Here I consider the logical framework LF obtained from LF by changing ` to
. It has the following forms of judgements
1. Γ valid,
2. Γ  K kind,
3. Γ  k:K,
4. Γ  K = K ′ and
5. Γ  k = k′:K
and the rules from Figure 4.1
I specify the Π-type constants from Figure 4.2 as described in Subsec-
tion 2.1.2. This constants give the rules in Figure 4.3.
I add the forms of judgements Γ  A ≤ B:Type and Γ  K ≤ K ′ obtained
with the rules from Figure 4.4. The rules from Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 consti-
tute the system denoted by Π≤. This rules are also listed in the Appendix E.
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Validity of Signature/Contexts, Assumptions
 〈〉
Γ  K kind x 6∈ dom(Γ)
 Γ, x:K
 Γ, x:K,Γ′
Γ, x:K,Γ′  x:K
Equality Rules
Γ  K kind
Γ  K = K
Γ  K = K′
Γ  K′ = K
Γ  K = K′ Γ  K′ = K′′
Γ  K = K′′
Γ  k:K
Γ  k = k:K
Γ  k = k′:K
Γ  k′ = k:K
Γ  k = k′:K Γ  k′ = k′′:K
Γ  k = k′′:K
Γ  k:K Γ  K = K′
Γ  k:K′
Γ  k = k′:K Γ  K = K′
Γ  k = k′:K′
Substitution Rules
 Γ0, x:K,Γ1 Γ0  k:K
 Γ0, [k/x]Γ1
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  K′ kind Γ0  k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]K′ kind
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  L = L′ Γ0  k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]L = [k/x]L′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  k′:K′ Γ0  k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  l = l′:K′ Γ0  k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]l = [k/x]l′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  K′ kind Γ0  k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]K′ = [k′/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  l:K′ Γ0  k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]l = [k′/x]l:[k/x]K′
Dependent Product Kinds
Γ  K kind Γ, x:K  K′ kind
Γ  (x:K)K′ kind
Γ  K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1  K′1 = K′2
Γ  (x:K1)K′1 = (x:K2)K′2
Γ, x:K  y:K′
Γ  [x:K]y:(x:K)K′
Γ  K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1  k1 = k2:K
Γ  [x:K1]k1 = [x:K2]k2:(x:K1)K
Γ  f :(x:K)K′ Γ  k:K
Γ  f(k):[k/x]K′
Γ  f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Γ  k1 = k2:K
Γ  f(k1) = f ′(k2):[k1/x]K′
Γ, x:K  k′:K′ Γ  k:K
Γ  ([x:K]k′)(k) = [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ  f :(x:K)K′ x 6∈ FV (f)
Γ  [x:K]f(x) = f :(x:K)K′
The kind Type
 Γ
Γ  Type kind
Γ  A:Type
Γ  El(A) kind
Γ  A = B:Type
Γ  El(A) = El(B)
Figure 4.1: Inference Rules for LF
Constant declarations:
Π : (A:Type)(B:(A)Type)Type
λ : (A:Type)(B:(A)Type)((x:A)B(x))Π(A,B)
app : (A:Type)(B:(A)Type)(Π(A,B))(x:A)B(x)
Definitional equality rule
app(A,B, λ(A,B, f), a) = f(a) : B(a).
Figure 4.2: Constants for Π-types in logical framework
Besides the ordinary variables from contexts in Π, I allow contexts in Π≤
to have subtyping variables like α ≤ A.
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Γ  A : Type Γ, x:A  B(x) : Type
Γ  Π(A,B) : Type
Γ  A : Type Γ  B : (A)Type Γ  f : (x:A)B(x)
Γ  λ(A,B, f) : Π(A,B)
Γ  g : Π(A,B) Γ  a : A
Γ  app(A,B, g, a) : B(a)
Γ  A : Type Γ  B : (A)Type
Γ  f : (x:A)B(x) Γ  a : A
Γ  app(A,B, λ(A,B, f), a) = f(a) : B(a)
Figure 4.3: Inference Rules for Π - types specified in LF
General Subtyping Rules
Γ  K = K′
Γ  K ≤ K′
Γ  K ≤ K′ Γ  K′ ≤ K′′
Γ  K ≤ K′′
Γ  A = B:Type
Γ  A ≤ B:Type
Γ  A ≤ B:Type Γ  B ≤ C:Type
Γ  A ≤ C:Type
Subtyping in Contexts
Γ  A:Type α 6∈ FV (Γ)
Γ, α ≤ A valid
Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′ valid
Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′  α:Type
Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′ valid
Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′  α ≤ A:Type
Type Lifting and Subtyping
Γ  A ≤ B:Type
Γ  El(A) ≤ El(B)
Γ  k:K Γ  K ≤ K′
Γ  k:K′
Γ  k = k′:K Γ  K ≤ K′
Γ  k = k′:K′
Dependent Product
Γ  Π(A,B):Type Γ  Π(A′, B′):Type
Γ  A′ ≤ A:Type Γ, x:A′  B ≤ B′:Type
Γ  Π(A,B) ≤ Π(A′, B′):Type
Figure 4.4: Subtyping Rules for Π≤
Π≤ is the subsumptive subtyping system specified in LF that corresponds
to the system λP≤ in [AC01]. Note that there are some subtle differences
between Edinburgh LF (λP ) [HHP93] and the logical framework LF we use
(LF has rules to derive definitional equality, including β and η rules, whereas
λP leaves definitional equality and β conversion at meta-level and η rule does
not hold here.), but they are irrelevant to the point of this chapter: the system
with coercive subtyping in signatures can be used to faithfully represent a
subsumptive subtyping system.
88
4.1.2 ΠS,≤
Here I shall consider the system described in Section 3.2 of the previous chapter
for the particular case when TS is in fact ΠS . ΠS is the system specified in
LFS given by the rules in Figure 3.1 with the Π-type constants as in Figure 4.2
from the previous section which give the rules in Figure 4.5. A complete listing
of the rules of this system can also be found in the Appendix C.
Γ `Σ A : Type Γ, x:A `Σ B(x) : Type
Γ `Σ Π(A,B) : Type
Γ `Σ A : Type Γ `Σ B : (A)Type Γ `Σ f : (x:A)B(x)
Γ `Σ λ(A,B, f) : Π(A,B)
Γ `Σ g : Π(A,B) Γ `Σ a : A
Γ `Σ app(A,B, g, a) : B(a)
Γ `Σ A : Type Γ `Σ B : (A)Type
Γ `Σ f : (x:A)B(x) Γ `Σ a : A
Γ `Σ app(A,B, λ(A,B, f), a) = f(a) : B(a)
Figure 4.5: Inference Rules for Subtyping in ΠS
In order to extend this system with subtyping, we need to add the struc-
tural subtyping rule for dependent product type to the subtyping rules from
Figure 3.2. The rule is the following
Γ `Σ A′ ≤c1 A : Type
Γ `Σ B,B′ : (A)Type
Γ, x:A `Σ B(x) ≤c2[x] B′(x) : Type
Γ `Σ Π(A,B) ≤d Π(A′, B′ ◦ c1) : Type (∗)
where d ≡ [F : Π(A,B)]λ(A′, B′ ◦ c1, [x:A′]c2[x](app(A,B, F, c1(x))))
Let us now consider the system Π0KS,≤ given by the rules in Figures 3.1, 4.5,
3.2 and 3.3 and the rule (∗). All these rules can also be found listed in the
Appendix C. Coherence in the sense of the Definition 5 is now considered for
signatures in the system Π0KS,≤.
At this point, as studied by Luo and Adams [LA08], we need to make sure
that we cannot produce incoherence from derivable premises. It turns out
that for this particular way of adding dependent product, we don’t need to do
anything further. For example, if we consider the situation when we have a
coercion obtained from transitivity and one from the (∗) rule. Let us assume
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we have a
Γ`ΣA′′≤c′1A
′≤c1A:Type
Γ`ΣA′′≤c1◦c′1A:Type
Γ`ΣB,B′,B′′:(A)Type Γ,x:A`ΣB(x)≤c2[x]B′(x)≤c′2[x]B
′′(x):Type
Γ,x:A′′`ΣB(x)≤c′2[x]◦c2[x]B
′′(x):Type
Γ `Σ Π(A,B) ≤d Π(A′′, B′′ ◦ (c1 ◦ c′1)) : Type
where d(F ) = λ(A′′, B′′◦(c1◦c′1), [x:A′′](c′2[x]◦c2[x])(app(A,B, F, (c1◦c′1)(x)))
for F : Π(A,B) and (omitting :Type)
Γ`ΣA′′≤c′1A
′ Γ,x:A′`ΣB′(x)≤c′2[x]B
′′(x)
Γ`ΣΠ(A′,B′)≤d2Π(A′′,B′′◦(c′1))
Γ`ΣA′≤c1A Γ,x:A`ΣB(x)≤c2[x]B′(x)
Γ`ΣΠ(A,B)≤d1Π(A′,B′◦(c1))
Γ `Σ Π(A,B) ≤d2◦d1 Π(A′′, B′′ ◦ (c1 ◦ c′1))
where d1(F ) = λ(A
′, B′ ◦ c1, [x:A]c2[x](app(A,B, F, c1(x))) for F : Π(A,B)
and d2(G) = λ(A
′′, B′′ ◦ c′1, [x:A′′]c′2[x](app(A′, B′, G, c′1(x))) for G : Π(A′, B′).
The question is, whether, for F : Π(A,B), (d2 ◦ d1)(F ) = d(F ).
(d2 ◦ d1)(F ) = d2(d1(F ))
= d2(λ(A
′, B′ ◦ c1, [x:A′]c2[x](app(A,B, F, c1(x))))
= λ(A′′, B′′ ◦ c′1, [x:A′′]c′2[x](app(A′, B′, λ(A′, B′ ◦ c1,
[x:A′]c2[x](app(A,B, F, c1(x))), c′1(x)))
= λ(A′′, B′′ ◦ (c1 ◦ c′1),
[x:A′′](c′2[x] ◦ c2[x])(app(A,B, F, (c1 ◦ c′1)(x)))
= d(F )
Note that here I used the app constant instead of the eliminator discussed
in Subsection 2.1.2 which is lazy and the above equality happens with η rule.
It turns out that if we used the eliminator for dependent product which is
strict in defining the structural coercion we would no longer be able to prove
this. Let
EΠ : (A:Type)(B:(A)Type)(C:(Π(A,B))Type)(g:((f : (x:A)B(x))
C(λ(A,B, f))))(z:Π(A,B))C(z)
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and
d(F ) = EΠ(A,B, [f :Π(A,B)]Π(A
′′, B′′), [g:(x:A)B(x)]λ(A′′, B′′ ◦ (c1 ◦ c′1),
[x:A′′]c′2[x](c2[x]g((c1 ◦ c′1)(x)))), F )
then we have
(d2 ◦ d1)(F ) = d2(d1(F ))
= d2(EΠ(A,B, [f1:Π(A,B)]Π(A
′, B′),
[g:(x:A)B(x)]λ(A′, B′ ◦ (c1), [x:A′]c2[x]g(c1(x))), F ))
= EΠ(A
′, B′, [f2:Π(A′, B′)]Π(A′′, B′′),
[h:(x:A′)B′(x)]λ(A′′, B′′ ◦ (c′1), [x:A′′]c′2[x]h(c′1(x))),
EΠ(A,B, [f1:Π(A,B)]Π(A
′, B′), [g:(x:A)B(x)]λ(A′, B′ ◦ (c1),
[x:A′]c2[x]g(c1(x))), F ))
and this cannot be reduced any further.
As studied by Luo and Adams [LA08], a solution for this is the addition of
a functoriality rule. In this chapter, for simplicity I will stick to the usage of
app. Similarly, one can add structural subyping rule for dependent sum with
projections.
With coherence defined for signatures of the system Π0KS,≤, I form the system
ΠS,≤ from the rules Figures 3.1, 4.5, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 and the rule (∗). The
rules for this system can also be found listed together in the Appendix C.
Note that the fact that we consider Π and the structural subtyping rule for Π
- type does not impact the well-behavedness proof from the Section 3.4 of the
previous chapter. It carries over simply by considering Π;, the type system
specified in LF ; with Π-type, Π[C]; instead of T [C]; and it should also have
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structural subtyping rule for dependent product type
ΣΓ`A′≤c1A:Type Σ;Γ`B,B′:(A)Type Σ;Γ,x:A`B(x)≤c2[x]B′(x):Type
Σ;Γ`Π(A,B)≤dΠ(A′,B′◦c1):Type (∗)
where d ≡ [F : Π(A,B)]λ(A′, B′ ◦ c1, [x:A′]c2[x](app(A,B, F, c1(x))))
4.1.3 The embedding of Π≤ in ΠS,≤
Once introduced Π≤ I proceed by giving an interpretation of it in the sys-
tem with coercive subtyping in signatures ΠS,≤, namely I will show that this
calculus can be faithfully embedded in the coercive subtyping one.
In this system, an important thing to note is how placing subtyping en-
tries in contexts interferes with abstraction, specifically, the abstraction is not
allowed at the lefthand side of subtyping entries. I will give a mapping that
sends the contexts with subtyping entries in the subsumptive system to sig-
natures in the coercive system, prove that these signatures are coherent, and,
finally, that we can embed the subsumptive subtyping system into the coer-
cive subtyping system via this mapping. I am motivated by giving a coercive
subtyping system in which I can represent this subsumptive system and at the
same time allowing abstraction to happen freely.
I will assume that ∆ is an arbitrary context in Π≤. We can also assume
without loss of generality that ∆ ≡ ∆1, α1 ≤ A1, ...,∆n, αn ≤ An,∆n+1, where
{αi ≤ Ai}i=1,n are all of the subtyping entries of ∆. If ∆n+1 is free of sub-
typing entries we can abstract over its entries freely but the abstraction is
obstructed by αn ≤ An for the entire prefix. I move this prefix, together
with the obstructing entry to the signature using constant coercions Σ∆ =
∆1, α1:Type, c1:(α1)A1, α1 ≤c1 A1:Type, ...,∆n, αn:Type, cn:(αn)An, αn ≤cn An:Type.
I map the left ∆n+1 to a context. This way, for
∆ ≡ ∆1, α1 ≤ A1, ...,∆n, αn ≤ An,∆n+1, the judgement ∆ ` J from Π≤ gets
translated to ∆n+1 `Σ∆ J in ΠS,≤, with Σ∆ as above. In the rest of the sec-
tion we shall prove that mapping subsumptive subtyping entries in context to
constant coercions in signature is indeed adequate. For this, I first prove that
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such a signature is coherent.
Lemma 24. For any valid context ∆ in Π≤, Σ∆ is coherent w.r.t. ΠS,≤.
Proof. We need to show that, in ΠS,≤, if we have Γ `Σ∆ T1 ≤c T2 and
Γ `Σ∆ T1 ≤c′ T2, then c = c′:(T1)T2. There are two cases:
1. T1 ≡ α is a constant. By the validity of ∆, we have that, if αi ≤ Ai
and αj ≤ Ai are two different subtyping entries in ∆, then αi 6= αj ,
therefore, if αi ≤ci Ai and αj ≤cj Ai are two different coercions in Σ∆,
then necessarily, αi 6= αj .
2. T1 ≡ Π(A,B) and T2 ≡ Π(A′′, B′′). In this case the non trivial situation
is:
Γ `Σ Π(A,B) ≤c1 C Γ `Σ C ≤c2 Π(A′′, B′′)
Γ `Σ Π(A,B) ≤c2◦c1 Π(A′′, B′′)
and C is equal to dependent product too. What we need to show is
that applying dependent product rule followed by transitivity leads to
the same coercion as applying transitivity first and then the dependent
product rule. Namely that, for some A′, B′ such that
Γ `Σ∆ A′′ ≤c2 A′ ≤c1 A Γ `Σ∆ B ≤d1 B′ ≤d2 B′′
Γ `Σ∆ Π(A,B) ≤e1 Π(A′, B′) ≤e2 Π(A′′, B′′)
where, for F :A −→ B andG:Π(A′, B′), e1(F ) = λ[x′:A′]d1(app(F, c1(x′)))
and e2(G) = λ[x
′′:A′′]d2(app(G, c2(x′′))) applying transitivity rule, first
to A, A′, A′′ and to B, B′, B′′ and then to Π(A,B), Π(A′, B′), Π(A′′, B′′)
results in the same coercion, that is:
e2 ◦ e1 = e2(e1(F ))
= λ[x′′:A′′]d2(app(e1(F ), c2(x′′)))
=β λ[x
′′:A′′]d2(d1(app(F, c1(c2(x′′)))))
= d2 ◦ d1(app(F, c1(c2(x′′))))
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Notation If Γ `Σ k:K and Γ `Σ K ≤c K ′ are derivable in ΠS,≤, I write
Γ `Σ k :: K ′.
Theorem 5 (Embedding Subsumptive Subtyping). Let ∆ and Γ be valid con-
texts in Π≤, such that Γ does not contain any subtyping entries. Then we have:
1. If ∆,Γ is valid in Π≤ then `Σ∆ Γ valid in ΠS,≤.
2. If ∆,Γ  K kind is derivable in Π≤, then Γ `Σ∆ K kind is derivable
in ΠS,≤.
3. If ∆,Γ  K = K ′ is derivable in Π≤, then Γ `Σ∆ K = K ′ is derivable
in ΠS,≤.
4. If ∆,Γ  k:K is derivable in Π≤, then Γ `Σ∆ k::K in ΠS,≤.
5. If ∆,Γ  k = k′:K is derivable in Π≤, then Γ `Σ∆ k = k′::K in ΠS,≤.
6. If ∆,Γ  A ≤ B:Type is derivable in Π≤ then Γ `Σ∆ A ≤c B:Type, for
some coercion c:(A)B, is derivable in ΠS,≤.
7. If ∆,Γ  K ≤ K ′is derivable in Π≤, then Γ `Σ∆ K ≤c K ′, for some
c:(K)K ′, is derivable in ΠS,≤.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on derivations for all the points of
the theorem and I only exhibit it for the sixth point here and in particular
when the last rule in the derivation tree is the one for the dependent product.
We have, by induction hypothesis, that, for Γ `Σ∆ Π(A,B)::Type and Γ `Σ∆
Π(A′, B′)::Type we have Γ `Σ∆ A′ ≤c A:Type and
Γ, x:A′ `Σ∆ B ≤c′ B′:Type. Note that, if K ≤c Type, then K ≡ Type, so
Γ `Σ∆ Π(A,B)::Type is equivalent to Γ `Σ∆ Π(A,B):Type, and
Γ `Σ∆ Π(A′, B′)::Type is equivalent to Γ `Σ∆ Π(A′, B′):Type, hence we can
directly apply the rule for dependent product in ΠS,≤ to obtain
Γ `Σ∆ Π(A,B) ≤d Π(A′, B′):Type where
F :Π(A,B), d(F ) = λ[x:A′]c′(app(F, c(x))).
94
What this proves is that we can represent the previously introduced sub-
sumptive subtyping system in the system with coercive subtyping in signa-
tures, meaning that we can argue about the former system with the sematic
richness of the latter.
4.2 Representing Russell style universes in Tarski
style universes
Universes were introduced by Martin-Lo¨f [ML98, ML75, ML82, ML84] for his
intuitionistic type theory to enable the formulation of type of types motivated
by the need to have reflection principle (it is closed to formation of inductive
types) and at the same time avoid the paradox of having all formulas in the
system provable which is caused by having a type of all types studied by
Girard [Gir72] and later presented presented by Coquand [Coq86]. Two forms
of universes were introduced, Russell and Tarski style. I introduced these forms
of universes in Subsection 2.1.4 and I explained how Russell style is easier to
use than Tarski style. I also mentioned that Russell style universes bear a
subsumptive hierarchy induced by cumulativity. I gave an example of how
Tarski style can be used to form these inductive types without cumulativity
but at the expense of a more complicate system to work with.
In what follows I will present two forms of subtyping for the two styles of
universes, I will explain why one of them can introduce issues for meta-theory
and how we can use signatures to represent it in the other style.
Russell-style Universes and Subsumptive Subtyping.
Let us extend the subsumptive subtyping system Π≤ from Section 4.1 with
Russell-style universes by adding the rules in Figure 4.6.
Problems with Russell style universes were observed by Luo [Luo12b]. This
straightforward formulation of universes does not satisfy the properties of
canonicity or subject reduction if one adopts the standard notation of terms
with full type information. For instance, the term λX:U1.Nat , where Nat : U0,
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for i ∈ ω
Γ valid
Γ  Ui : Type
Γ  A : Ui
Γ  A : Type
Γ valid
Γ  Ui : Ui+1
Γ valid
Γ  Ui ≤ Ui+1
Γ  A : Ui Γ  B : (A)Ui
Γ  Π(A,B) : Ui
Figure 4.6: Inference Rules for Russell Style Universes with Π-type
would be represented as λ(U1, [ :U1]U0, [ :U1]Nat), but this term, which is of
type U0 → U0 (by subsumption, since U1 → U0 ≤ U0 → U0 by contravari-
ance), is not definitionally equal to any canonical term which is of the form
λ(U0, ...).
An alternative is to use proof terms with less typing information like using
(a, b) instead of pair(A,B, a, b) to represent pairs, as in HoTT (see Appendix
2 of [Uni13]). The problem with this approach is that not only the property
of type uniqueness fails, but a proof term may have incompatible types. For
example, for a : A and A : U , where U is a type universe, the pair (A, a)
has both types U ×A and ΣX:U.X, which are incompatible in the sense that
none of them is a subtype of the other. This would lead to undecidability
of type checking which is unacceptable for type theories with logics based on
the propositions-as-types principle. To see the problem of type checking, it
may be worth pointing out that, for a dependent type theory, type checking
depends on type inference that is, in a type-checking algorithm one has to
infer the type of a term in many situations, however, it has not been studied
what happens in presentations where, in our case pairs are only type-checked.
Tarski Style Universes with Coercive Subtyping to represent Russell
Style Universes
The Tarski-style universes are introduced into ΠS,≤ by adding the rules in
Figure 4.7.
Further, I annotate the lifting operators ti+1 as coercions, as suggested
in [Luo12b]. Already the example considered in Subsection 2.1.4 is simpli-
fied with coercive application. The analogous to Σ(Ui, λX:Ui.X) from Russell
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for i ∈ ω `Σ Γ
Γ `Σ Ui : Type
Γ `Σ a : Ui
Γ `Σ Ti(a) : Type
`Σ Γ
Γ `Σ ti+1 : (Ui)Ui+1
where ti+1 are the lifting operators,
`Σ Γ
Γ `Σ ui : Ui+1
`Σ Γ
Γ `Σ Ti+1(ui) = Ui : Type
where ui is the name of Ui in Ui+1
With the equation: Ti+1(ti+1(a)) = Ti(a):Type
Γ `Σ a : Ui Γ, x : Ti(a) `Σ b(x) : Ui
Γ `Σ pii(a, b) : Ui
which satisfy the following equations:
Γ `Σ Ti(pii(a, b)) = Π(Ti(a), [x:Ti(a)]Ti(b(x))) : Type
Γ `Σ ti+1(pii(a, b)) = pii+1(ti+1(a), [x:Ti(a)]ti+1(b(x))) : Ui+1
Figure 4.7: Inference Rules for Tarski Style Universes with Π-type
style, which we considered then, and which was Σ(Ui, [x:Ti+1(ui)]Ti+1(ti+1(x)))
now becomes Σ(Ui, [x:Ti+1(ui)]Ti+1(x)).
At this point we can further ask that all the signatures start with the prefix
Σi ≡ U0 ≤t0 U1, ..., Ui−1 ≤ti Ui where i is bigger than the largest universe
index that is used in an application. If universes are specified in the Tarski-
style as above with the lifting operators declared as coercions, together with
several notational conventions (eg, Ti is omitted, ui is identified with Ui, etc.),
they can now be used easily in Russell-style. The lifting operators are not
seen (implicit) by the users. In particular, in this setting, all the Russell-style
universe rules become derivable. Theorem 5 can now be extended in such a
way that the Russell-style universes are faithfully emulated by the Tarski-style
universes with coercive subtyping.
4.3 Injectivity and Constructor Subtyping
In subsumptive subtyping, A ≤ B means that A is directly embedded in B.
Intuitively, this may imply that, for a and a′ in A, if they are not equal in
B, then they are not equal in A, either. If we think of sets, we know that if
a set A is a subset of another set B, then one can always define an injective
mapping from A to B. If we consider coercive subtyping A ≤c B, this would
97
translate to the requirement that c is injective in the sense that c(a) = c(a′)
implies that a = a′. Here I shall formally discuss this issue in the context of
representing intuitive subtyping notions by means of coercions.
In what follows I explore a particular situation which exhibits injectivity.
More precisely, I look at Leibniz equality for a system with constructor sub-
typing as developed by Barthe and Frade [BF99]. I introduced this example
in Subsection 2.3.1. In this setting an (inductive) type is considered to be a
subtype of another if the latter has more constructors than the former. Here
I discuss the example they start from, namely Even Numbers(Even) being a
subtype of Natural Numbers (Nat) with the argument that the constructors
of Even are 0 and successor of Odd , where Odd is given by the constructor
successor of Even. Then, in Nat the successor constructor is overloaded to a
lifting of these constructors as well. Formally they write:
datatype Odd = S o f Even and Even = 0
| S o f Odd
datatype Nat = 0
| S o f Nat
| S o f Odd
| S o f Even
Leibniz equality is defined as follows: x = y if for any predicate P ,
P (x) ⇐⇒ P (y). We denote by x =A y for some type A the Leibniz equality
between x and y related to a certain domain. Then, we have injectivity of sub-
typing if, given x =Nat y, with x, y:Even it is the case that x =Even y. Namely,
whether for any predicate Q:Even −→ Prop, it is the case that Q(x)⇐⇒ Q(y).
For this it is enough to show that any predicate Q:Even −→ Prop admits a
lifting Q′:Nat −→ Prop such that for any x:Even, Q′(x) =⇒ Q(x). We can
easily define such a Q′ as follows:
Q’ ( x ) = Q(0) i f x = 0
Q(S(n ) ) i f x = S o f n : Odd
true i f x = S o f n : Even
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t rue i f x = S o f n : Nat
Injectivity of the embedding holds here but it does not transfer without addi-
tionally imposing properties for the coercion.
To represent the example above in a coercive subtyping calculus we can
consider a predicate subtyping as in [BB08], or if we want to see even natural
numbers as a dependent pair(Sigma Type), as described by Luo [Luo99] when
talking about adjectives associated with nouns. In either case, the coercion
will be the first projection. In Coq proof assistant [Coq10] for example, we
can write it like this:
Induct ive Nat : Type :=
| O : Nat
| S : Nat −> Nat .
Induct ive even : Nat −> Prop :=
| O1 : even O
| S1 : f o r a l l n1 , even n1 −> even (S (S n1 ) ) .
Induct ive Even := pa i r {n : Nat ; e : even n } .
D e f i n i t i o n pro j1 ( ev : Even ) :=
match
ev with pa i r n e => n
end .
Coercion pro j1 : Even >−> Nat .
Note that the definition of Even changed and we refer to it as a feature of
the natural numbers rather than as a subset. In order for a natural number
to be even we require a proof of that. Also note that this discussion uses first
order data types, and it would be considerably more complicated for higher
order data types.
We can have two proofs that 4 is even p1, p2:even4, and hence, two pairs
(4, p1), (4, p2):Even mapped to the same 4:Nat . Enforcing injectivity here is
similar to enforcing proof irrelevance. This happens to hold for this example,
in particular, as proved by Hedberg [Hed98]. Simply put, any two proofs that
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O is even will be equal as they reduce to O1. Then, for any even number
n = S(S(m)) (where the even number m can be understood as n− 2), we do
induction on n and we have by induction hypothesis that any two proofs that
m is even are equal. Let such a proof be p:even(S(S(m))), then any proof
q:even(S(S(n))) that n is even is of the form S1(S(S(m)))p so any two such
proofs are also equal.
An extended example that no longer proves injectivity is as follows.
Induct ive Nat : Type :=
| O : Nat
| S : Nat −> Nat .
Induct ive even : Nat −> Prop :=
| O1 : even O
| O2 : even O
| S1 : f o r a l l n1 , even n1 −> even (S (S n1 ) ) .
Induct ive Even := pa i r {n : Nat ; e : even n } .
D e f i n i t i o n pro j1 ( ev : Even ) :=
match
ev with pa i r n e => n
end .
Coercion pro j1 : Even >−> Nat .
The reason this coercion is not injective is that we can have two dif-
ferent proofs that O is even O1, O2:evenO, and hence, two different pairs
(O,O1), (O,O2):Even, both of them being mapped to the same O:Nat .
So the following definition makes sense. For functions f :(x:A)B I denote
injective(f) = ∀x, y:A.f(x) =B f(y) −→ x =A y
. A function f is then injective if ∃p:injective(f).
Definition 12. Let Σ, A, B, c such that `Σ A:Type, `Σ B:Type, `Σ A ≤c B
are derivable. Then c is injective under Σ if `Σ p:injective(c) is derivable
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for some p.
In particular, for a constant coercion (namely of the form
`Σ0,c:(A)B,Σ1,A≤cB,Σ2,Σ3 A ≤c B) we can add the assumption that it is injective
`Σ0,c:(A)B,Σ1,A≤cB,Σ2,p:injective(c),Σ3 A ≤c B
If we embed a subsumptive subtyping that propagates an equality from a type
throughout its subtypes, we represent it as a constant coercion, thus, all we
need to do is add the assumption that a coercion is injective. It is obvious
that the transitivity and congruence preserve the injectivity property.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Topics
In this thesis I introduced a new formulation of subtyping in type theories spec-
ified in a logical framework with signatures. The logical framework considered
here is a variant of Luo’s logical framework [Luo94] but I expect a similar
development can be done for type theories such as Martin-Lo¨f’s specified in
Martin-Lo¨f’s logical framework [NPS90] as they are similar.
This formulation achieves a balance between being powerful enough to rep-
resent some practical situations from the area of subsumptive subtyping and
having a reasonably easy meta-theory. In addition. it is a formulation closer
to the programming model of proof assistants compared to the previous sys-
tems of coercive subtyping from [LSX13, Xue13b] but still very much related
to it, a thing which I have used to prove that the system I introduced here is
well-behaved as an extension of the original system without subtyping in that
it is a conservative extension and every derivable judgement in it is only an
abbreviation of a derivable judgement in the base system.
For the examples considered here, I chose certain inductive types but other
inductive types can be considered in a similar manner. More precisely, I dis-
cussed in Subsection 4.1.2 the coherence of the system with Π - types intro-
duced with app constant. I expect the same situation for a system with Σ -
types introduced with projections. I also discussed why an additional functo-
riality rule discussed in [LA08] would be required to ensure the coherence if
the eliminator was used instead of app constant. A functoriality rule would
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also ensure coherence for other inductive types introduced with eliminator.
The development in this thesis raised some questions open for future work
which is what I present in the rest of this chapter.
5.1 Definitionality
The discussion in this section was also presented during a talk at Types’17
using Sigma - types. Here I shall use Π - types as the system Π has been often
discussed in the thesis and the rules for it can be found in the Appendix A.
I mentioned in Section 3.4 that Luo et al. [LSX13, Xue13b, Xue13a] refer
to the well-behavedness in which T ′ is an extension of T and
1. T ′ is conservative: any judgement in T derivable in T ′ is derivable in T
2. every valid derivation tree D′ in T ′ can be translated into a valid deriva-
tion tree D in T such that the conclusion of D′ is definitionally equal to
the conclusion of D
as definitional extension.
Indeed, this definition captures a generalization of the Kleene’s [Kle52]
idea of extension by definition by expressing that the extension is nothing
more than an abbreviation for certain judgements in the base system. But
how comprehensive is it for type theory?
If we consider a straightforward translation of Kleene’s definition, we ob-
tain a notion of definitional extension related to the notion of conservativity
as studied in [Hof95, Lum10] where an embedding of a type theory into its
extension is used and induces a particular notion of definitional extension with
new symbols. In the setting of this thesis, it can be formulated as follows.
1. Let T and T ′ be type theories specified in LF and T ′ an extension of T
by adding new terms and rules.
2. Let f be a mapping from the terms of T ′ to those of T such that
• f |T = idT , and
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• the new rules involving the new terms in T ′ all become admissible
under f in T .
Then T ′ is a definitional extension of T if and only if T ′ is a conservative
extension of T and the definition rules of the form
Γ ` k:K Γ ` f(k):K
Γ ` k = f(k) : K
are admissible in T ′.
Another way to think of this is that T ′ extends T with new terms and
new rules, including those definition rules which correspond to the definition
axiom in Kleene’s setting of first-order theories.
Observe that f induces a mapping on judgements f as follows:
1. x1:K1, ..., xn:Kn ` El(A) kind
7−→ x1:f(K1), ..., xn:f(Kn) ` El(f(A)) kind
2. x1:K1, ..., xn:Kn ` (x:K)L kind
7−→ x1:f(K1), ..., xn:f(Kn) ` (x:f(K))f(L) kind
3. x1:K1, ..., xn:Kn valid 7−→ x1:f(K1), ..., xn:f(Kn) valid
4. x1:K1, ..., xn:Kn ` K = L 7−→ x1:f(K1), ..., xn:f(Kn) ` f(K) = f(L)
5. x1:K1, ..., xn:Kn ` k:K 7−→ x1:f(K1), ..., xn:f(Kn) ` f(k):f(K)
6. x1:K1, ..., xn:Kn ` k = l:K
7−→ x1:f(K1), ..., xn:f(Kn) ` f(k) = f(l):f(K)
and because of definition rules, context replacement and equality rules we
obtain that if J is derivable in T ′, then f(J) is also derivable in T .
In this setting, some meta-theoretic properties are carried over from T to
its definitional extension T ′. For instance, if kind uniqueness holds for T , so
does it for T ′. To show this, let us consider Γ ` k:K and Γ ` k:L derivable
in T ′. Then f(Γ) ` f(k):f(K) and f(Γ) ` f(k):f(L) are derivable in T and
because kind uniqueness holds here we know that f(Γ) ` f(K) = f(L). By
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repeated application of definition rules and context replacement, f(Γ) = Γ and
Γ ` f(K) = f(L) are derivable in T ′. Again by definition rules Γ ` f(K) = K
Γ ` f(L) = L are derivable in T ′, we have that Γ ` K = L is also derivable in
T ′.
To exemplify the syntactic mapping justification of definitionality, we can
consider Π, a type theory specified in LF with Π-types and Π[−→], the ex-
tension of Π with function type and the rules in Figure 5.1
Γ ` A : Type Γ ` B : Type
Γ ` A −→ B : Type
Γ ` A : Type Γ ` B : Type Γ ` f : (A)B
Γ ` λ−→(A,B, f) : A −→ B
Γ ` g:A −→ B Γ ` a : A
Γ ` app−→(A,B, g, a) : B
Γ ` A : Type Γ ` B : Type
Γ ` f : (A)B Γ ` a : A
Γ ` app−→(A,B, λ−→(A,B, f), a) = f(a) : B
Figure 5.1: Inference Rules for −→ - type
A syntactic map f :Term(Π[−→]) −→ Term(Π) can be defined as follows
1. f |Term(Π) = IdTerm(Π)
2. f(A −→ B) = Π(A, [x:A]B)
3. f(λ−→(A,B, f)) = λ(A, [x:A]B, f)
4. f(app−→(A,B, g, a)) = app(A,B, g, a)
Then, if in Π[−→] the definition rules
Γ ` A:Type Γ ` B:Type
Γ ` A −→ B = Π(A, [x:A]B)
Γ ` A : Type Γ ` B : Type Γ ` f : (A)B
Γ ` λ−→(A,B, f) = λ(A, [x:A]B, f) : Π(A, [x:A]B
Γ ` g:A −→ B Γ ` a : A
Γ ` app−→(A,B, g, a) = app(A, [x:A]B, g, a) : ([x:A]B)(a)
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are admissible, then Π[−→] is a definitional extension of Π. Note that, in this
case, ([x:A]B)(a) = [a/x]B = B as B does not depend on A.
Unfortunately this straightforward way of expressing definitionality in type
theory leaves out some situations in which the extension and the base system
have the same set of terms, such as the extension with coercive subtyping
discussed in Chapter 3 and [LSX13, Xue13b]. However, we have clearly seen
that coercive subtyping gives a way to abbreviate some judgements in the base
system and nothing more so the natural way to think of it is that this extension
is too, a definitional extension in a sense. This was discussed in [LSX13,
Xue13b, Xue13a] and led to the definition I mentioned at the beginning of
this section. This definition needs to take derivation trees into consideration.
This definition is in a sense a generalization of the sense that uses a syntactic
mapping. To see this, it might be helpful to rephrase it so that it focuses on
judgements rather than derivation trees as follows:
T ′ is an extension of T that adds new terms and rules then T ′ is definitional
if and only if:
1. It is conservative.
2. For every derivable judgement J ′ in T ′, for any D a derivation tree of
J ′, there exists J derivable in T such that J ′ =D J .
where J ′ =D J is defined inductively by the fact that, if
D ≡
D1
J ′1
· · · DnJ ′n
J ′
J and J ′ are definitionally equal and there exist J1, ..., Jn such that J ′1 =D1 J1,
..., J ′n =Dn Jn and
J1 · · · Jn
J
is admissible in T .
However this definition is still not general enough to cover new forms of
judgements as we don’t have definitional equality available for judgements of
different forms. Because of this, I think an important step in the direction of
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establishing a comprehensive definition of definitionality or, so to say, what
it means to be a syntactic sugar for type theories would be to generalize
the meaning of definitionality to the point that it does cover new forms of
judgements.
5.2 Parameterized and Dependent Coercions
Parameterized coercions, in the sense of point-wise subtyping described by
Luo and Soloviev [LS99, SL02] are coercions parameterized over free vari-
ables, for example, if A ≤c B then for any n, V ectA(n) ≤c V ectB(n) where
c(a1, ..., an) = (c(a1), ..., c(an)). Here c is parameterized by n. This kind of co-
ercions are used for example in the study of natural language semantic (Asher
and Luo [AL12]).
An interesting future work would be to study how, if possible, one can
represent this in the system with coercive subtyping entries in signatures as
we don’t have free variables available there. Similarly, it would be interesting
to study the potential of this system to represent dependent coercions in the
sense of [LS99], of the form x:A ≤c B(x). A possibility would be to allow the
substitution and not abstraction for the entries in signatures but how to do
this and the consequences have yet to be studied.
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Appendix A
Inference Rules for LF and Π
- type
This appendix puts together the rules for a system Π which is the system with
dependent product type specified in LF .
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Validity of Signature/Contexts, Assumptions
` 〈〉
Γ ` K kind x 6∈ dom(Γ)
` Γ, x:K
` Γ, x:K,Γ′
Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` x:K
Equality Rules
Γ ` K kind
Γ ` K = K
Γ ` K = K′
Γ ` K′ = K
Γ ` K = K′ Γ ` K′ = K′′
Γ ` K = K′′
Γ ` k:K
Γ ` k = k:K
Γ ` k = k′:K
Γ ` k′ = k:K
Γ ` k = k′:K Γ ` k′ = k′′:K
Γ ` k = k′′:K
Γ ` k:K Γ ` K = K′
Γ ` k:K′
Γ ` k = k′:K Γ ` K = K′
Γ ` k = k′:K′
Substitution Rules
` Γ0, x:K,Γ1 Γ0 ` k:K
` Γ0, [k/x]Γ1
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K′ kind Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K′ kind
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` L = L′ Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]L = [k/x]L′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` k′:K′ Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` l = l′:K′ Γ0 ` k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]l = [k/x]l′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K′ kind Γ0 ` k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K′ = [k′/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` l:K′ Γ0 ` k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]l = [k′/x]l:[k/x]K′
Dependent Product Kinds
Γ ` K kind Γ, x:K ` K′ kind
Γ ` (x:K)K′ kind
Γ ` K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1 ` K′1 = K′2
Γ ` (x:K1)K′1 = (x:K2)K′2
Γ, x:K ` y:K′
Γ ` [x:K]y:(x:K)K′
Γ ` K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1 ` k1 = k2:K
Γ ` [x:K1]k1 = [x:K2]k2:(x:K1)K
Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ Γ ` k:K
Γ ` f(k):[k/x]K′
Γ ` f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Γ ` k1 = k2:K
Γ ` f(k1) = f ′(k2):[k1/x]K′
Γ, x:K ` k′:K′ Γ ` k:K
Γ ` ([x:K]k′)(k) = [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ x 6∈ FV (f)
Γ ` [x:K]f(x) = f :(x:K)K′
The kind Type
` Γ
Γ ` Type kind
Γ ` A:Type
Γ ` El(A) kind
Γ ` A = B:Type
Γ ` El(A) = El(B)
Figure A.1: Inference Rules for LF
Γ ` A : Type Γ, x:A ` B(x) : Type
Γ ` Π(A,B) : Type
Γ ` A : Type Γ ` B : (A)Type Γ ` f : (x:A)B(x)
Γ ` λ(A,B, f) : Π(A,B)
Γ ` g : Π(A,B) Γ ` a : A
Γ ` app(A,B, g, a) : B(a)
Γ ` A : Type Γ ` B : (A)Type
Γ ` f : (x:A)B(x) Γ ` a : A
Γ ` app(A,B, λ(A,B, f), a) = f(a) : B(a)
Figure A.2: Inference Rules for Π - type specified in LF
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Appendix B
Rules for Universes
for i ∈ ω
Γ valid
Γ ` Ui : Type
Γ ` A : Ui
Γ ` A : Type
Γ valid
Γ ` Ui : Ui+1
Γ ` A : Ui
Γ ` A : Ui+1
Γ ` A : Ui Γ ` B : (A)Ui
Γ ` Π(A,B) : Ui
Figure B.1: Inference Rules for Russell Style Universes with Π - type
for i ∈ ω ` Γ
Γ ` Ui : Type
Γ ` a : Ui
Γ ` Ti(a) : Type
` Γ
Γ ` ti+1 : (Ui)Ui+1
where ti+1 are the lifting operators,
` Γ
Γ ` ui : Ui+1
` Γ
Γ ` Ti+1(ui) = Ui : Type
where ui is the name of Ui in Ui+1
Γ ` a : Ui Γ, x : Ti(a) ` b(x) : Ui
Γ ` pii(a, b) : Ui
with the following equations:
1. Γ ` Ti+1(pii(a, b)) = Π(Ti+1(a), [x:Ti(a)]Ti+1(b(x))) : Type
2. Γ ` ti+1(pii(a, b)) = pii+1(ti+1(a), [x:Ti(a)]ti+1(b(x))) : Ui+1
Figure B.2: Inference Rules for Tarski Style Universes with Π - type
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Appendix C
Inference Rules for LFS, T
0K
S,≤,
TS,≤, Π0KS,≤ and ΠS,≤
In this appendix I list the rules of the system LFS , T
0K
S,≤ and TS,≤. All these
rules are part of the systems Π0KS,≤ and ΠS,≤ as well. For these two systems
there are additional rules for Π - type which are also presented here.
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Validity of Signature/Contexts, Assumptions
〈〉 valid
`Σ K kind c 6∈ dom(Σ)
Σ, c:K valid
`Σ,c:K,Σ′ Γ
Γ `Σ,c:K,Σ′ c:K
Σ valid
`Σ 〈〉
Γ `Σ K kind x 6∈ dom(Σ) ∪ dom(Γ)
`Σ Γ, x:K
`Σ Γ, x:K,Γ′
Γ, x:K,Γ′ `Σ x:K
Weakening
Γ `Σ, Σ′ J `Σ K kind c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ′)
Γ `Σ, c:K, Σ′ J
Γ,Γ′ `Σ J Γ `Σ K kind x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ′)
Γ, x:K,Γ′ `Σ J
Equality Rules
Γ `Σ K kind
Γ `Σ K = K
Γ `Σ K = K′
Γ `Σ K′ = K
Γ `Σ K = K′ Γ `Σ K′ = K′′
Γ `Σ K = K′′
Γ `Σ k:K
Γ `Σ k = k:K
Γ `Σ k = k′:K
Γ `Σ k′ = k:K
Γ `Σ k = k′:K Γ `Σ k′ = k′′:K
Γ `Σ k = k′′:K
Γ `Σ k:K Γ `Σ K = K′
Γ `Σ k:K′
Γ `Σ k = k′:K Γ `Σ K = K′
Γ `Σ k = k′:K′
Signature Replacement
Γ `Σ0,c:L,Σ1 J `Σ0 L = L′
Γ `Σ0,c:L′,Σ1 J
Context Replacement
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ J Γ0 `Σ K = K′
Γ0, x:K
′,Γ1 `Σ J
Substitution Rules
`Σ Γ0, x:K,Γ1 Γ0 `Σ k:K
`Σ Γ0, [k/x]Γ1
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ K′ kind Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]K′ kind
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ L = L′ Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]L = [k/x]L′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ k′:K′ Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ l = l′:K′ Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]l = [k/x]l′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ K′ kind Γ0 `Σ k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]K′ = [k′/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ l:K′ Γ0 `Σ k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]l = [k′/x]l:[k/x]K′
Dependent Product Kinds
Γ `Σ K kind Γ, x:K `Σ K′ kind
Γ `Σ (x:K)K′ kind
Γ `Σ K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1 `Σ K′1 = K′2
Γ `Σ (x:K1)K′1 = (x:K2)K′2
Γ, x:K `Σ y:K′
Γ `Σ [x:K]y:(x:K)K′
Γ `Σ K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1 `Σ k1 = k2:K
Γ `Σ [x:K1]k1 = [x:K2]k2:(x:K1)K
Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K′ Γ `Σ k:K
Γ `Σ f(k):[k/x]K′
Γ `Σ f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Γ `Σ k1 = k2:K
Γ `Σ f(k1) = f ′(k2):[k1/x]K′
Γ, x:K `Σ k′:K′ Γ `Σ k:K
Γ `Σ ([x:K]k′)(k) = [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K′ x 6∈ FV (f)
Γ `Σ [x:K]f(x) = f :(x:K)K′
The kind Type
`Σ Γ
Γ `Σ Type kind
Γ `Σ A:Type
Γ `Σ El(A) kind
Γ `Σ A = B:Type
Γ `Σ El(A) = El(B)
Figure C.1: Logical Framework Inference Rules for LFS , ΠS , T
0K
S,≤, TS,≤, Π
0K
S,≤
and ΠS,≤
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Γ `Σ A : Type Γ, x:A `Σ B(x) : Type
Γ `Σ Π(A,B) : Type
Γ `Σ A : Type Γ `Σ B : (A)Type Γ `Σ f : (x:A)B(x)
Γ `Σ λ(A,B, f) : Π(A,B)
Γ `Σ g : Π(A,B) Γ `Σ a : A
Γ `Σ app(A,B, g, a) : B(a)
Γ `Σ A : Type Γ `Σ B : (A)Type
Γ `Σ f : (x:A)B(x) Γ `Σ a : A
Γ `Σ app(A,B, λ(A,B, f), a) = f(a) : B(a)
Figure C.2: Inference Rules for Π-type in ΠS , Π
0K
S,≤ and ΠS,≤
Signature Rules for Subtyping
`Σ A : Type `Σ B : Type `Σ c : (A)B
Σ, A ≤c B valid
`Σ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ1 Γ
Γ `Σ0,A≤cB:Type,Σ1 A ≤c B : Type
Congruence
Γ `Σ A ≤c B : Type Γ `Σ A = A′ : Type Γ `Σ B = B′ : Type Γ `Σ c = c′ : (A)B
Γ `Σ A′ ≤c′ B′ : Type
Transitivity
Γ `Σ A ≤c A′ : Type Γ `Σ A′ ≤c′ A′′ : Type
Γ `Σ A ≤c′◦c A′′ : Type
Weakening
Γ `Σ, Σ′ A ≤d B : Type `Σ K kind
Γ `Σ, c:K, Σ′ A ≤d B : Type (c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ
′))
Γ,Γ′ `Σ A ≤d B : Type Γ `Σ K kind
Γ, x:K,Γ′ `Σ A ≤d B : Type (x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ
′))
Signature Replacement
Γ `Σ0,c:L,Σ1 A ≤d B : Type `Σ0 L = L′
Γ `Σ0,c:L′,Σ1 A ≤d B : Type
Context Replacement
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ A ≤d B : Type Γ0 `Σ K = K′
Γ0, x:K
′,Γ1 `Σ A ≤d B : Type
Substitution
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ A ≤c B Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]A ≤[k/x]c [k/x]B
Identity Coercion
Γ `Σ A : Type
Γ `Σ A ≤[x:A]x A : Type
Figure C.3: Inference Rules for Subtyping in T 0KS,≤, TS,≤, Π
0K
S,≤ and ΠS,≤ (1)
121
Subtyping for dependent product Rule
Γ `Σ A′ ≤c1 A : Type Γ `Σ B,B′ : (A)Type Γ, x:A `Σ B(x) ≤c2[x] B′(x) : Type
Γ `Σ Π(A,B) ≤d Π(A′, B′ ◦ c1) : Type
where d ≡ [F : Π(A,B)]λ(A′, B′ ◦ c1, [x:A′]c2[x](app(A,B, F, c1(x))))
Figure C.4: Subtyping for dependent product Rule for Π0KS,≤ and ΠS,≤
Basic Subkinding Rule and Identity Coercion
Γ `Σ A ≤c B:Type
Γ `Σ El(A) ≤c El(B)
Γ `Σ K kind
Γ `Σ K ≤[x:K]x K
Structural Subkinding Rules
Γ `Σ K1 ≤c K2 Γ `Σ K1 = K′1 Γ `Σ K2 = K′2 Γ `Σ c = c′:(K1)K2
Γ `Σ K′1 ≤c′ K′2
Γ `Σ K ≤c K′ Γ `Σ K′ ≤c′ K′′
Γ `Σ K ≤c′◦c K′′
Γ `Σ, Σ′ K ≤d K′ `Σ K0 kind
Γ `Σ, c:K0, Σ′ K ≤d K′
(c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ′))
Γ,Γ′ `Σ K ≤d K′ Γ `Σ K0 kind
Γ, x:K0,Γ
′ `Σ K ≤d K′ (x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ
′))
Γ `Σ0,c:L,Σ1 K ≤d K′ `Σ0 L = L′
Γ `Σ0,c:L′,Σ1 K ≤d K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ L ≤d L′ Γ0 `Σ K = K′
Γ0, x:K
′,Γ1 `Σ L ≤d L′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1 `Σ K1 ≤c K2 Γ0 `Σ k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 `Σ [k/x]K1 ≤[k/x]c [k/x]K2
Subkinding for Dependent Product Kind
Γ `Σ K′1 ≤c1 K1 Γ, x:K1 `Σ K2 kind Γ, x′:K′1 `Σ K′2 kind Γ, x:K1 `Σ [c1(x′)/x]K2 ≤c2 K′2
Γ `Σ (x:K1)K2 ≤[f :(x:K1)K2][x′:K′1]c2(f(c1(x′))) (x:K
′
1)K
′
2
Figure C.5: Inference Rules for Subkinding in T 0KS,≤, TS,≤, Π
0K
S,≤ and ΠS,≤ (2)
Coercive Application
(CA1)
Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K′ Γ `Σ k0:K0 Γ `Σ K0 ≤c K
Γ `Σ f(k0):[c(k0)/x]K′
(CA2)
Γ `Σ f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Γ `Σ k0 = k′0:K0 Γ `Σ K0 ≤c K
Γ `Σ f(k0) = f ′(k′0):[c(k0)/x]K′
Coercive Definition
(CD)
Γ `Σ f :(x:K)K′ Γ `Σ k0:K0 Γ `Σ K0 ≤c K
Γ `Σ f(k0) = f(c(k0)):[c(k0)/x]K′
Figure C.6: The coercive application and definition rules in TS,≤ and ΠS,≤
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Appendix D
Inference Rules for LF ;,
T [C];0K and T [C];
In this appendix I list the rules of the system LF ;, T [C];0K and T [C];.
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Validity of Signature/Contexts, Assumptions
` 〈〉
Σ; 〈〉 ` K kind c 6∈ dom(Σ)
` Σ, c:K
` Σ, c:K,Σ′; Γ
Σ, c:K,Σ′; Γ ` c:K
` Σ
` Σ; 〈〉
Σ; Γ ` K kind x 6∈ dom(Σ) ∪ dom(Γ)
` Σ; Γ, x:K
` Σ; Γ, x:K,Γ′
Σ; Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` x:K
Weakening
Σ,Σ′; Γ ` J Σ; 〈〉 ` K kind c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ′)
Σ, c:K, Σ′; Γ ` J
Σ; Γ,Γ′ ` J Σ; Γ ` K kind x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ′)
Σ; Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` J
Equality Rules
Σ; Γ ` K kind
Σ; Γ ` K = K
Σ; Γ ` K = K′
Σ; Γ ` K′ = K
Σ; Γ ` K = K′ Σ; Γ ` K′ = K′′
Σ; Γ ` K = K′′
Σ; Γ ` k:K
Σ; Γ ` k = k:K
Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K
Σ; Γ ` k′ = k:K
Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K Σ; Γ ` k′ = k′′:K
Σ; Γ ` k = k′′:K
Σ; Γ ` k:K Σ; Γ ` K = K′
Σ; Γ ` k:K′
Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K Σ; Γ ` K = K′
Σ; Γ ` k = k′:K′
Context Replacement
Σ0, c:L,Σ1; Γ ` J Σ0 ` L = L′
Σ0, c:L′,Σ1; Γ ` J
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` J Σ; Γ0 ` K = K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K′,Γ1 ` J
Substitution Rules
` Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
` Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K′ kind Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K′ kind
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` L = L′ Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]L = [k/x]L′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` k′:K′ Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` l = l′:K′ Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]l = [k/x]l′:[k/x]K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K′ kind Σ; Γ0 ` k = k′:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K′ = [k′/x]K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` l:K′ Σ; Γ0 ` k = k′:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]l = [k′/x]l:[k/x]K′
Dependent Product Kinds
Σ; Γ ` K kind Σ; Γ, x:K ` K′ kind
Σ; Γ ` (x:K)K′ kind
Σ; Γ ` K1 = K2 Σ; Γ, x:K1 ` K′1 = K′2
Σ; Γ ` (x:K1)K′1 = (x:K2)K′2
Σ; Γ, x:K ` y:K′
Σ; Γ ` [x:K]y:(x:K)K′
Σ; Γ ` K1 = K2 Σ; Γ, x:K1 ` k1 = k2:K
Σ; Γ ` [x:K1]k1 = [x:K2]k2:(x:K1)K
Σ; Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ Σ; Γ ` k:K
Σ; Γ ` f(k):[k/x]K′
Σ; Γ ` f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Σ; Γ ` k1 = k2:K
Σ; Γ ` f(k1) = f ′(k2):[k1/x]K′
Σ; Γ, x:K ` k′:K′ Σ; Γ ` k:K
Σ; Γ ` ([x:K]k′)(k) = [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Σ; Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ x 6∈ FV (f)
Σ; Γ ` [x:K]f(x) = f :(x:K)K′
The kind Type
` Σ; Γ
Σ; Γ ` Type kind
Σ; Γ ` A:Type
Σ; Γ ` El(A) kind
Σ; Γ ` A = B:Type
Σ; Γ ` El(A) = El(B)
Figure D.1: Logical Framework Inference Rules for LF ;, T [C];0K and T [C];
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Subtyping Rules
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B ∈ C
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B
Congruence
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B : Type Σ; Γ ` A = A′ : Type Σ; Γ ` B = B′ : Type Σ; Γ ` c = c′ : (A)B
Σ; Γ ` A′ ≤c′ B′ : Type
Transitivity
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c A′ : Type Σ; Γ ` A′ ≤c′ A′′ : Type
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c′◦c A′′ : Type
Weakening
Σ,Σ′; Γ ` A ≤d B : Type Σ ` K kind
Σ, c:K, Σ′; Γ ` A ≤d B : Type (c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ
′))
Σ; Γ,Γ′ ` A ≤d B : Type Σ; Γ ` K kind
Σ; Γ, x:K,Γ′ ` A ≤d B : Type (x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ
′))
Context Replacement
Σ0, c:L,Σ1; Γ ` A ≤c B Σ0 ` L = L′
Σ0, c:L′,Σ1; Γ ` A ≤c B
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` A ≤c B Σ; Γ0 ` K = K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K′,Γ1 ` A ≤c B
Substitution
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` A ≤c B Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]A ≤[k/x]c [k/x]B
Identity Coercion
Σ; Γ ` A:Type
Σ; Γ ` A ≤[x:A]x A:Type
Figure D.2: Subtyping Rules for , T [C];0K and T [C]; (1)
125
Basic Subkinding Rule and Identity
Σ; Γ ` A ≤c B:Type
Σ; Γ ` El(A) ≤c El(B)
Σ; Γ ` K kind
Σ; Γ ` K ≤[x:K]x K
Structural Subkinding Rules
Σ; Γ ` K1 ≤c K2 Σ; Γ ` K1 = K′1 Σ; Γ ` K2 = K′2 Σ; Γ ` c = c′:(K1)K2
Σ; Γ ` K′1 ≤c′ K′2
Σ; Γ ` K ≤c K′ Σ; Γ ` K′ ≤c′ K′′
Σ; Γ ` K ≤c′◦c K′′
Σ,Σ′; Γ ` K ≤d K′ Σ; 〈〉 ` K0 kind
Σ, c:K0,Σ
′; Γ ` K ≤d K′ (c 6∈ dom(Σ,Σ
′))
Σ; Γ,Γ′ ` K ≤d K′ Σ; Γ ` K0 kind
Σ; Γ, x:K0,Γ
′ ` K ≤d K′ (x 6∈ dom(Γ,Γ
′))
Σ0, c:L,Σ1; Γ ` K ≤d K′ Σ0; 〈〉 ` L = L′
Σ0, c:L
′,Σ1; Γ ` K ≤d K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` L ≤d L′ Σ; Γ0 ` K = K′
Σ; Γ0, x:K
′,Γ1 ` L ≤d L′
Σ; Γ0, x:K,Γ1 ` K1 ≤c K2 Σ; Γ0 ` k:K
Σ; Γ0, [k/x]Γ1 ` [k/x]K1 ≤[k/x]c [k/x]K2
Subkinding for Dependent Product Kind
Σ; Γ ` K′1 ≤c1 K1 Σ; Γ, x:K1 ` K2 kind Σ; Γ, x′:K′1 ` K′2 kind Σ; Γ, x:K1 ` [c1(x′)/x]K2 ≤c2 K′2
Σ; Γ ` (x:K1)K2 ≤[f :(x:K1)K2][x′:K′1]c2(f(c1(x′))) (x:K
′
1)K
′
2
Figure D.3: Subkinding Rules for T [C];0K and T [C]; (2)
Coercive Application
(CA1)
Σ; Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ Σ; Γ ` k0:K0 Σ; Γ ` K0 ≤c K
Σ; Γ ` f(k0):[c(k0)/x]K′
(CA2)
Σ; Γ ` f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Σ; Γ ` k0 = k′0:K0 Σ; Γ ` K0 ≤c K
Σ; Γ ` f(k0) = f ′(k′0):[c(k0)/x]K′
Coercive Definition
(CD)
Σ; Γ ` f :(x:K)K′ Σ; Γ ` k0:K0 Σ; Γ ` K0 ≤c K
Σ; Γ ` f(k0) = f(c(k0)):[c(k0)/x]K′
Figure D.4: The coercive application and definition rules in T [C];
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Appendix E
Inference rules for LF and Π≤
In this appendix I list the rules for the logical framework LF, Π - type in
this logical framework and subtyping rules. All these rules form the rules for
system Π≤.
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Validity of Signature/Contexts, Assumptions
 〈〉
Γ  K kind x 6∈ dom(Γ)
 Γ, x:K
 Γ, x:K,Γ′
Γ, x:K,Γ′  x:K
Equality Rules
Γ  K kind
Γ  K = K
Γ  K = K′
Γ  K′ = K
Γ  K = K′ Γ  K′ = K′′
Γ  K = K′′
Γ  k:K
Γ  k = k:K
Γ  k = k′:K
Γ  k′ = k:K
Γ  k = k′:K Γ  k′ = k′′:K
Γ  k = k′′:K
Γ  k:K Γ  K = K′
Γ  k:K′
Γ  k = k′:K Γ  K = K′
Γ  k = k′:K′
Substitution Rules
 Γ0, x:K,Γ1 Γ0  k:K
 Γ0, [k/x]Γ1
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  K′ kind Γ0  k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]K′ kind
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  L = L′ Γ0  k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]L = [k/x]L′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  k′:K′ Γ0  k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  l = l′:K′ Γ0  k:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]l = [k/x]l′:[k/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  K′ kind Γ0  k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]K′ = [k′/x]K′
Γ0, x:K,Γ1  l:K′ Γ0  k = k′:K
Γ0, [k/x]Γ1  [k/x]l = [k′/x]l:[k/x]K′
Dependent Product Kinds
Γ  K kind Γ, x:K  K′ kind
Γ  (x:K)K′ kind
Γ  K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1  K′1 = K′2
Γ  (x:K1)K′1 = (x:K2)K′2
Γ, x:K  y:K′
Γ  [x:K]y:(x:K)K′
Γ  K1 = K2 Γ, x:K1  k1 = k2:K
Γ  [x:K1]k1 = [x:K2]k2:(x:K1)K
Γ  f :(x:K)K′ Γ  k:K
Γ  f(k):[k/x]K′
Γ  f = f ′:(x:K)K′ Γ  k1 = k2:K
Γ  f(k1) = f ′(k2):[k1/x]K′
Γ, x:K  k′:K′ Γ  k:K
Γ  ([x:K]k′)(k) = [k/x]k′:[k/x]K′
Γ  f :(x:K)K′ x 6∈ FV (f)
Γ  [x:K]f(x) = f :(x:K)K′
The kind Type
 Γ
Γ  Type kind
Γ  A:Type
Γ  El(A) kind
Γ  A = B:Type
Γ  El(A) = El(B)
Figure E.1: Logical Framework Rules for LF and Π≤
Γ  A : Type Γ, x:A  B(x) : Type
Γ  Π(A,B) : Type
Γ  A : Type Γ  B : (A)Type Γ  f : (x:A)B(x)
Γ  λ(A,B, f) : Π(A,B)
Γ  g : Π(A,B) Γ  a : A
Γ  app(A,B, g, a) : B(a)
Γ  A : Type Γ  B : (A)Type
Γ  f : (x:A)B(x) Γ  a : A
Γ  app(A,B, λ(A,B, f), a) = f(a) : B(a)
Figure E.2: Inference Rules for Π - types specified in LF
128
General Subtyping Rules
Γ  K = K′
Γ  K ≤ K′
Γ  K ≤ K′ Γ  K′ ≤ K′′
Γ  K ≤ K′′
Γ  A = B:Type
Γ  A ≤ B:Type
Γ  A ≤ B:Type Γ  B ≤ C:Type
Γ  A ≤ C:Type
Subtyping in Contexts
Γ  A:Type α 6∈ FV (Γ)
Γ, α ≤ A valid
Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′ valid
Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′  α:Type
Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′ valid
Γ, α ≤ A,Γ′  α ≤ A:Type
Type Lifting and Subtyping
Γ  A ≤ B:Type
Γ  El(A) ≤ El(B)
Γ  k:K Γ  K ≤ K′
Γ  k:K′
Γ  k = k′:K Γ  K ≤ K′
Γ  k = k′:K′
Dependent Product
Γ  Π(A,B):Type Γ  Π(A′, B′):Type
Γ  A′ ≤ A:Type Γ, x:A′  B ≤ B′:Type
Γ  Π(A,B) ≤ Π(A′, B′):Type
Figure E.3: Subtyping Rules for Π≤
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